The intellective movement, as I remarked above, has two phases. First is the movement that impels from a real thing to a field, to the field of reality, in which what the thing is in reality is left at a distance through a disrealizing retraction. It is the movement in whose intellection we intellectively know by simple apprehension what the real thing "might be" in reality (percept, fictum, concept). The intellective movement has a second phase. The real thing which has impelled us from itself to reality itself in a field constrains us tensely there; it is the phase of the movement of return to the real thing, the intentum for intellectively knowing, from the field, what this thing "is" in reality out of the sphere of what it "might be". This intellection is then a discernment, a krinein, a judging. Dual apprehension has lead us to intellectively know what a real thing is in reality in a movement of retraction toward what this thing "might be" in reality, and in a reverse movement which leads us by stepping back (i.e., "distanced") and with discernment to intellectively know what the thing in fact "is" {110} in reality, i.e., to a judgement. It is this which we must now study.

A judgement is an "affirmation". The intentum acquires from the field the character of affirmative intention of what the thing is or is not in reality. This "in reality" is the unity of the "this, how, and what" which generally (though not always or primarily) is expressed in the "is". Therefore our problem is the study of the structure of affirmation as such.

Affirmation, as I said, is an intellection which returns, distanced from (stepping back from) what the real thing is in reality. It is not just a return to the real thing, as if the thing had been left abandoned; rather, it is a non-abandonment of the real, and therefore concerns an intellective return within the real itself. This "within" is not just a material "within", so to speak. We are not talking about the fact that we are within the real; rather the "within" is a "within" which is formally such, i.e., this intellection is expressly and formally intellectively knowing the real in a movement of intellective return to what the real is in reality, that is, in a formal movement of reality. Simple apprehension is a retractive intellection from what a thing "might be" to what it "is" in reality. But always "in reality".

What is this intellection? The question is more complicated than one might think, because intellection can take on a variety of forms. Moreover, in each of them affirmation can have different modes as well. Therefore we must address three groups of questions:

1. What is affirming?

2. What are the forms of affirmation?

3. What are the modes of affirmation?


§ 1



'Affirmation' here means a "firm" intellection as opposed to the "retracted" intellection constituting simple apprehension. Stepping back distends or relaxes, so to speak, the intellection of what the real is. Affirmation is affirming to ourselves intellectually what is the real in that stepping back, in that distension. It is always and only that which is intellectively known that is affirmed "at a distance" or by stepping back in the process of return. What is this affirmation?

Two concepts of affirmation have been put forth, both of which are false, in my opinion, though for different reasons.

In the first place it has been thought, especially since Descartes, that to affirm something is "to believe" that what is affirmed is so. Affirmation would thus be belief. This conception can assume various shades of meaning depending upon one's understanding of belief. It can be understood as a mere sentiment, so that affirming would be the expression of an intellectual sentiment. Or it can be understood not as a sentiment but as a decision of the will; thus affirming would be the expression of a volition. This was above all the idea of Descartes, for whom, as a consequence, the problem of truth is but the problem of the good of the intelligence, and falsehood would be its sin. Finally, one can understand that belief, without becoming a strict act of volition, is at least an act of admission: to affirm would be to admit something. But in any one of these forms, the conception seems to me incorrect, because on a different level, all of them {112} and any related ones minimize the intellective aspect of affirmation. And the fact is that upon saying that A "is" for example B, the questions inevitably arise what is it that is believed, what is it that is decided, what is it that is admitted. Strictly speaking, what is believed or decided or admitted is that "something A is B". In virtue of this, prior to the whole gamut of modes of belief, there is that which is believed, decided, or admitted: "something is B". And in this "something is B" in itself is what the affirmation consists. Affirmation does not consist in believing. This "something is B" is a formally intellective act. There is always a serious ambiguity when one speaks of judgement. On one hand, judging can mean the psychical act, that mental act which, so to speak, we may term assertion. In this sense, judging is asserting. But there is a more radical and deeper meaning of judging, namely judgement as affirmative intention, affirmation. Assertion and affirmation are not the same. Assertion is a mental act of mine, whereas affirmation is the intellective intention independently of whether or not it be asserted by me. Moreover, the affirmative intention forms the possibility for assertion; only because there is an affirmation, only because there is an affirmative intention, can there be an assertion. In fact the same affirmation can be the terminus of different modes of assertion. Now, here we are referring only to affirmation as affirmative intention. I shall employ the word 'affirmation' in this sense, in absolute contradistinction to 'assertion'. In what does this affirmation consist?

Here we meet up with a second conception much more general than the previous one: to affirm is to say "A is B". B is the predicate, but as is well known, I can and I should include B in the "is", and then the predicate is "is B". {113} Judging would then be predicating of A "being B". This is the venerable conception of Aristotle which, with more or less important variants, has run throughout the course of history. It is, as I see it, a conception which is also inadmissable for two reasons. In the first place, it is assumed that affirming is "saying". But what is understood by "saying"? Certainly no one, not even Aristotle himself, thinks that here "saying" can be expressed in some language. But the question remains: what is the intellective nature of the saying as saying? There is no alternative but to appeal to affirmation qua affirmative intention: saying would be having "affirmative intention". And this is conceptualized as something irreducible. But, is it really something irreducible? And above all, in what would its irreducibility consist? That this question has not been rigorously posed constitutes a serious defect of the whole conception, as I see it. Indeed, it has been admitted without further ado that judging is affirming; without questioning formally what the affirming is. Secondly, affirmation is identified with the predication "A is B". And this, as we shall soon see, is formally false regardless of what conception one has of the predicate (whether "B" or "is B"). Not every affirmation is predicative. But that is a subject which concerns not affirmation in itself but what I have called forms of affirmation, which I shall treat subsequently.

With this we are at the point of being able to formulate our problem precisely. In the first place, we are not concerned with what assertion might be, but with what affirmation is. In the second place, we are not concerned with the various kinds of concrete affirmations, but with the function of affirming itself-just as in previous chapters, when treating of intellection, I did not refer to various kinds of intellections but only to what intellective knowing consists in, {114} to the function of intellective knowing itself. Hence we shall now ask not about the various kinds of concrete affirmations but about the function of affirming as such.

Affirming, as we have said, is intellective knowing in a movement of return; i.e., the intellection itself is now formally dynamic. To understand that we must clarify two points: (1) in what the movement of affirmation qua movement consists, and (2) in what the intellection itself in this movement consists. They comprise the two essential questions -affirmation qua intellective movement, and intellective movement qua affirmation. Affirmation only is necessary and possible in a field-based intellection , i.e. in sentient intellection. A non-sentient intelligence would apprehend the truth of our judgement, but would not apprehend it in the form of an affirmation. The logos qua affirmation is constitutively and essentially sentient; it is sentient logos. In what follows I shall speak in general about affirmation as sentient logos, prescinding from the fact that simple apprehension pertains to it; i.e., I shall speak of the logos only as judgement.

1) First of all, then, what is affirmation qua movement? Even at the risk of monotonously repeating the same idea, let me state that affirmation is an intentum. This intentum is not in itself noetic but noergic; it is the dynamic tension of returning to the real, formally already within reality, within this particular real thing. With it the intentum has been converted from a movement at a distance within reality, to a movement "toward" the thing; it is intention. This intention is, then, an internal moment of the intentum. It is no longer a mere "being tense" but a "movement towards" what the real thing is in reality. {115} The intention is a moment of the reversive intentum at a distance, i.e. from reality itself to what, through stepping back (i.e., at a distance), it is "in reality". Intention then is not something purely noetic because it is a moment of the intentum, which is noergic. Intentionality is thus the physical ergon of intellection in stepping back, i.e., at a distance. The moment of returning is a formally constitutive moment of affirmation. Intellection, in stepping back, must fill up that stepping back, and do so in a very precise way, viz. by movement. Every stepping back, in fact, should be gone through. Otherwise the distinction between what a thing is as real and what it is in reality would not be a "distance"; it would be at best mere separation. And that is wrong.

To be gone through is formally constitutive of distance, of stepping back. Therefore intellective going through of distance is formally constitutive of affirmation. To affirm is to "go" from one thing to another "among" the rest. The "among" of differential actualization of the real is a distantial "among". To affirm is to come to intellectively know what a thing is in reality, but based upon others. It is a "coming to" and not a merely "being in" it. But let us avoid a possible mistake which would be very serious. The "coming to" is not a movement which consists in going from one intellection to another, but rather a movement which consists in the very mode of actually intellectively knowing each thing. It is not a "coming to affirm" but an "affirming by coming" or "coming by affirming", a movement which constitutes intellection in the coming itself. In other words, the movement constituting intention is not the intention of directing me to one thing after another, but the intentional intellective movement of the intentum of each thing. It is not intention of intellection, but intellective intention. Judgement therefore {116} is of formally dynamic nature qua intention. The intention itself is formally dynamic.

As I see it, failure to consider consider formally the dynamic character of judgement is one of the most serious errors in the philosophy of human intelligence from Kant to the present. Intellectual dynamism has not been a subject other than in that dynamism called 'dialectic', i.e., reasoning. Dialectic, as usually understood, is that movement constituting the reasoning process. It has been emphasized that the intelligence can go from some intellections to others by combining them suitably; and the first dialectical laws of this process have been rigorously established. But no one has asked why this happens. Is it just a simple fact? I do not think so. I believe that the intellective movement of reasoning is grounded in something constitutive of a mode of intellection, the intellection qua stepping back and returning, i.e., the affirmative intellection. Therefore this movement is not a mere fact, but something anchored in a structural moment of affirmation, namely, in stepping back. This stepping back is not something peculiar to dialectical reasoning, but a structural moment of every affirmation. Dialectical movement of reasoning should have been grounded upon the structure of affirmation as stepping back. Aristotelian philosophy has never asked about this structure; it went astray on the matter of distance and stepping back, i.e., on the basic radical structure of the logos. What is dynamic in dialectical reasoning is grounded in, and is a consequence of, the dynamic character of affirmation. It was necessary to have started from this latter, because not only dialectic but affirmation itself is structurally dynamic. To be sure, Kant saw in dialectic something more than a mere combination of affirmations; {117} but he opted to make a simple logical system out of that combination. With regard to our present question, the position of Kant concerning affirmation as such is, strictly speaking, the same as that of Aristotle.

For other philosophies, e.g. that of Hegel, dialetical movement is more than a fact; it is the formal structure of intellection. Hegelian dialectic is not the movement of some affirmations to others, but the dynamic structure of intellection as such. But this view, as I see it, is just as unacceptable as that of Aristotle, and is so for the same reason but with a different emphasis. Clearly, movement is a structural character of intellection, not a mere fact. But it is a structural character not of intellection as such but only of distanced intellection. Just as in Aristotle, there is absent in Hegel the moment of stepping back. This stepping back, this taking of distance, in fact is not a moment of intellection in the abstract, but something which only applies to a sentient intellection. Now, sentient intellection can apprehend the real in and by itself without any stepping back, and therefore without movement. Only when sentient intellection intellectively knows at a distance do we have movement. The dialectical dynamism is, then, a structural moment of intellection; but only of affirmative intellection, because this, and only this, is distanced intellection, intellection by stepping back. Intellection in itself is not dynamic.

For Aristotle, then, dynamism is just a characteristic of reasoning and not a structural moment of affirmative intellection. For Hegel, dynamism is a structural moment of intellection, but of intellection as such. In both conceptions {118} the idea of distance and stepping back is absent and therefore I believe that they are unacceptable. Stepping back is a structural moment, but only with respect to affirmative intellection.

In what does this affirmative intention consist, not as movement but as affirmation?

2) Intellective movement qua affirmation. This movement is the logos. I repeat: we do not deal with particular affirmations but with affirmation in the sense of function of affirming as such. One usually considers affirming as something "added", so to speak, to the apprehension of things, an addition which consists in a type of internal intellectual "attack" in which the intelligence "decides" to affirm something as real. Now, neither of these two characteristics (being added and being the outcome of an "attack") describes in a rigorous way what affirming is, what intellective movement as affirmation is.

A) In the first place, consider affirming as "added" to the apprehension of things. What apprehension is meant? If one means simple apprehensions, then affirming is certainly something "more"; it is much "more" than simple apprehension. But the fact is that judgement is not based primarily upon simple apprehension, but upon the primordial apprehension of the real. Now, affirming is "more" than simple apprehension, but it is "less", much "less", than the primordial apprehension of reality. Every intellection is an intellective actualization of the real, and as we saw in Chapter I, in primordial intellection we apprehend something not only as if it were real, but as something which is formally and truly real and which is apprehended as real. And in this being "real" of what is intellectively known in a primordial apprehension, in an apprehension prior to any affirmation, in this "real"-I repeat-is where affirmation as such intellectually moves. {119} Affirmation, in fact, does not arise except when what is already apprehended as real is distended by stepping back in the field of the real. Affirmation formally but also constitutively involves the impression of reality. It is sentient logos in virtue of being basically and formally constituted by the impression of reality. Hence, affirmation not only does not add anything to the primordial apprehension of reality, but in fact is an "indebted" mode (because it is "grounded") of being intellectively in what has been already intellectively known as real. It is a distended mode of being already in the real. It is a modalization of the primordial apprehension. Therefore affirmation, which in certain respects is an unfolding, an expansion, of the primordial apprehension of the real, is nonetheless something grounded in a "reduction" of the primordial apprehension of the real, because it is a distensive mode of intellective actualization of the real. It is essential, in my view, to stress this reductive, distensive character of affirming as a mode of being intellectively in the real. Affirming is intellective actualization in which something is intellectively known which is real, but through returning from a stepping back. It is because of this, ultimately, that the conceptions of judgement as a "relation" are wrong. A relation adds, but affirmation adds nothing; on the contrary, it moves distendedly in what already is intellectively. Affirmation not only adds nothing, but in a certain way it subtracts, in that mode of subtraction which is distension. All of those attempts to characterize affirming as something added to apprehension, and as something irreducible to it, are in my view vitiated at their root. Simple apprehension is already a retraction, not of the real, but in the real; and affirming is a being in the real but intellectively known {120} in this stepping back, i.e., in a reduced form, a being distended. Affirmation is not reducible to simple apprehension. And not only is it irreducible to primordial apprehension; rather, one intellectively knows in it distendedly; distendedly, but in it. It is a reduced and distended mode in the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., in something already intellectively known in its reality. Affirmation, to be sure, is formally in reality, but is not the reason why affirming is the primary and radical mode of being intellectively in reality; that, rather, is because affirming is a reduced and distended mode within a prior intellectively being "existing" in reality. By this I do not mean that a determinate judgement is a type of "contraction" of what "the" judging would be; rather, I refer to the function of judging as such. It is not only "a judgement" but "the judging" as such, affirming as such, which is a reduced form of intellection, a reduction and a modalization of that radical and primary form of intellection which is the primordial apprehension of reality.

B) Moreover, this intellection is neither added nor does it consist in a type of "intellective attack" which "decides" what is real; nor is it a "diving in" as it were, in order to pledge oneself to what one takes to be real. Just the opposite. Let us recall, once again, that we are not referring to concrete affirmations but to the function of affirming as such. Now, intelligence is already formally in reality; therefore it does not have to "go forth" to reality. Rather, it is already moving intellectively in reality. Affirmation does not consist in installing ourselves in reality, affirming that something is real, but in being already anchored in reality and intellectively knowing if this reality is "thus" in reality. It is actually being in reality {121} discernedly in sentient intellection. If I must affirm, it is because the real in which I am is intellectively known by returning from a stepping back, and only because of that. This necessity is the intellective moment which I have termed "retention". Distended in the real, I am nonetheless always retained in the real by the real itself. It is for this reason that affirming the real is not some decision or "attack" of mine, but on the contrary a trip within the real already known intellectively as real in the formal sense. This is just the opposite of an "attack": it is the actualization of the real in a retained form. It is not a "going" to intellectively know the real, but "intellectively knowing the real while going" from one point to another in the field. It is not, as I have already pointed out, a going from one intellection to another; nor is it an intention of intellection. Rather, it is a mode of this intellection, an intellective intention. As such, what an affirmation possesses of affirmation; i.e., affirming as such should be understood from the actuality of the real, and not the opposite, viz. the actuality of the real from the affirmation. It is not so much "I affirm" as the opposite "the real is affirmed" in my intellection. Permit me to explain.

To be sure, affirming is a movement of mine. But movement does not mean spontaneous activity. Every intellection, even the primordial apprehension of reality, is an intellection of mine; and in this sense affirmation is mine also by the mere fact of being intellection. But this does not mean that intellective movement, in virtue of being movement, is a spontaneous movement of mine, because intellection is primarily act and not activity. Assertion, true, is a spontaneous activity. But affirmative intention as such, affirming as such, is not. It is movement, but a movement imposed on the intelligence by the stepping back from the real in differential actualization. I am really {122} led by the real to affirm. To conceive affirmation as an "attack", i.e., as a spontaneous activity, is to thrust upon affirmation what is proper only to assertion. And the two are very different things. As I have said, there are many ways of asserting the same affirmation. Moreover, assertion as such is made possible by affirmation as such. Affirmative intention is, in fact, at a distance by stepping back, and distended; and it is on account of that that it opens the mental ambit of assertion, the ambit of "maneuvering room", so to speak, of assertion. Assertion is a spontaneous attitude of mine; but this spontaneity is possible through the "maneuvering room" of affirmation and only through it. What has led to confusion between asserting and affirming is the dynamic character of affirming. The fact is that affirmative movement, affirmative dynamism, has a precise character, viz. a movement in reality, but a movement in outline or sketchy form, an outline in reality and in what the thing is in reality. Therefore this movement is anything but an "attack", because it is not a spontaneous activity of mine. To be sure, as an outline this movement pertains to me and in this sense it can be said that it is I who affirm. But this outline, even though a dynamism of mine, is a dynamism which is just as receptive as looking, feeling, hearing, etc. can also be. This movement of my intellection is a dynamism of it, but not an action whose intentionality results from any action of mine; rather, it results from a dynamic intention in which my intelligence is found, and precisely in this order-I stress the phrase-my mind. It is in this sense that I say that it is not so much that I affirm as that I find myself in affirmative intention.

C) This outline in reality has a definite character and name: {123} it is discernment. The discerning outline is an intellection which is determined in my intelligence by the actuality of the real as stepped back from. Stepping back determines distention, and distention determines discernment; it is purely and simply the retentivity of the real. Discernment is not the mode of actually knowing intellectively, nor the mode of going to be present intellectively in reality, but on the contrary is a way of moving about in reality, in which one already is intellectively. Discernment, krinein, is something grounded in primordial apprehension, i.e. in the radical intellection of the real as real. To be sure, on many occasions the intelligence affirms without sufficient discernment. But this is a different question; when speaking of the adequacy of discernment I refer to what in a subsequent part I shall call 'evidential demand of the real', a demand or requirement which admits many degrees. Often one affirms without discernment just because primarily discerning is given to us by the real only sketchily; it is a moment of sentient intellection.

Thus, affirmation has four constitutive moments, moments which are formally constitutive of it.

1) In the first place, affirming is actually being intellectively in the real, intellectively knowing it both formally and precisely as real. It is not just conceiving or anything like that. This moment forms part of affirmation owing to the primordial apprehension of reality, to the impression of reality. Affirming is not an autonomous function of the intelligence but a modalization of the intellective function as such. It is a mode of intellection of the real in its physical and formal actuality of real, a formality already known intellectively in primordial apprehension. Affirmation does not innovate; nor is it the moment which immerses us in reality. Rather, it is only a modalization of the intellection of {124} reality, a reality in which we are already immersed in primordial apprehension.

2) This modalization is intellection by returning from stepping back. One intellectively knows by stepping back in intentum what something is in reality. By thus taking distance, by thus stepping back, the intellection is returning to the thing; by so returning, it knows intellectively what the thing is in reality. It is a modalization, then, of the intellective function as such; the intentum remains modalized in intentionality. This is intellection in intentum. The intentum is a "going towards", and its intellective knowing is intentionality. Only this conception of affirmative intention as a moment of a noergic intentum, as I see it, can constitute an adequate concept of the essence of affirmative movement qua affirmative. This is the modalization of primordial apprehension in affirmative intellection.

3) This modalization is not determined by me but rather by the formally sentient nature of my intellection. Only because my intellection is sentient do I apprehend the real in two modes of actualization: unitary and differential. Only the latter gives rise to affirming. That determination does not consist in any type of impulse to affirm, but rather in the actuality of the real in differential actualization. We do not have to hurl ourselves at reality; in our own primordial apprehension of the unitary actualization we are already intellectively knowing the real in its physical and formal actuality of the real. In differential actualization, then, I am already actually in reality and have only changed the mode in which the real thing is made actual to me in sentient intelligence. This mode of actuality is actuality a reverse actuality of stepping back, i.e., a return after stepping back. And such actualization of what the real is in reality is what formally constitutes {125} affirming. Affirming is not an act of mine but a mode of actually being now in reality. What is mine is discerning what is affirmed. It is not a function carried out as process; rather it is something acquired but through the mode of intellective actualization of the real qua real. Ultimately, affirming is a modulation of the impression of reality.

4) This intentionality is constituted in discernment; but discernment is not formally constitutive of affirmation. Affirmation is that in which discernment is given, and must be given; but affirming qua affirming is not discerning.


To summarize, then, affirmation has four constitutive moments:

a) It has a moment of effective reality of what is affirmed as being real. It is a moment which impinges upon the judgement of the impression of reality, something given in the impression of reality.

b) It has the affirmative moment as such. It is the mode of intellectively knowing reality by stepping back in a movement of return "toward" the real, in intentional intellection.

c) It has the moment of being a differential actualization of reality within reality. It has never been formally outside of the real. Therefore affirming is not going to the real from the not real, but is going from "the real" to what is "in reality" but via unreality; it is actually reducing the retroactive reduction itself by a return. This reduction of the reduction formally consists, as we shall see, in what I term 'realization'. It is the essence of affirming.

d) It has the moment of discernment of what is affirmed, the discernment of the many "might be's" of that which "is". {126}

Now, in contrast to the primordial apprehension of reality, every affirmation, in virtue of being "at a distance", i.e., by stepping back, is dual intellection. It therefore involves first something which is judged or affirmed, and second what is formally judged in the judgement. Let us quickly review these two points: About what one judges, and What one judges.



About What One Judges


At first glance one might think that he is judging something to be real which has been apprehended in simple apprehension as unreal; i.e., he would think that what "might be" real is judged as something which "is" real. Therefore that of which he judges would be the content of a simple apprehension, something unreal. Nonetheless, this is incorrect. That of which one judges is something previously apprehended as real. And for just this reason affirmative intellection is constitutively dual. It presupposes and bears in its breast the intellection of something as already real. What is then affirmed if the thing is real? We shall see that forthwith. But although philosophy is not accustomed to inquire about it, one must understand that that of which affirmation is made is not something possible or unreal, but something perfectly real.

This is evident in affirmations which refer to real things. For example, when one says that this water is warm or is freezing, he presupposes that that thing about which he judges, the water, is real. And this is true even when meaning-things are intellectively known. A meaning-thing is not formally a real-thing, but every meaning-thing bears within it a real-thing. A table is not a real thing qua table, but rather a meaning-thing. But the table would not be a table were it not a table by virtue of being a real-thing. Now, I can make affirmations about the table, but only thanks to the fact that "table" is the meaning of a real-thing, for example, of a thing which has {128} a certain size, shape, etc. One might say that there are many judgements which are not of this type because they refer to things which are not real; this is the case with all mathematical statements, and also of the innumerable judgements which play a part in a work of fiction, e.g., in a novel. Every such work contains judgements, even though that about which affirmations are made is fictional. It is thus not evident that that about which one judges is necessarily a reality apprehended in primordial apprehension. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate what I just said. It is certain that neither a geometric space nor Don Juan are real things in the same form as a glass of water. But, do they act, so to speak, as something purely and simply not-real? Not at all. Let us examine the two cases separately.

a) Consider first geometric space. No geometric space, starting with Euclidean space, is qua geometric a physical space. Nonetheless, a geometric space is not just a concept or synthesis of concepts. If it were, such a space would not go beyond what space "might be". Now, mathematics does not deal with spaces which "might be", but only with those that "are"; and it studies them very fastidiously. This means that concepts, simple apprehensions of what spaces "might be", become concepts of what "is". How? Concepts become concepts of something which "is" thanks to a system of postulates.

What are these postulates? I.e., what is it that the postulates postulate? That is the question. As I see it, the postulates do not postulate "truth", i.e., they do not ask that we admit their truth. If they did, mathematics would be purely and simply a combination of truths, {129} ultimately just a phase of logic. Many have thought this, including mathematical thinkers of genius. But that does not prevent it from being false. Mathematics is not a system of necessary truths, merely coherent among themselves with respect to the "principles" of logic; rather, it is a system of necessary truths about an object which, in its way, has reality before the intelligence. What the postulates postulate is not "truth" but "reality"; what is postulated is the reality of that about which one postulates. If one wishes to go on speaking about truths, it will be necessary to say that the postulates enuntiate the "real truth" about what is postulated. That is, the postulates are not mere logical statements but statements of the characteristics which the "content" of the "reality" of what is postulated has. "Postulation" is grounded upon the "might be" and formally consists in its transformation into "is", thanks to the postulation of reality. This transformation, as we shall see in the Appendix following this section, is formally construction.

b) Let us consider the other case, the things which go on in a work of fiction. Such a work, as we have already seen, is how the real "would be" or "might be" in reality. But a novel, for example, does not tell us what "might be reality" but, in its way, what "is reality". Therefore a novel is full of characteristics or notes which are very different from those initially attributed to its characters or situations. The fact is that the story told in the novel, by virtue of being told as a real story, has other properties than those formally enuntiated in a principle. Thus one can justifiably discuss whether this fictional character, say Don Juan, is or is not an effeminate person. In general terms, a novelist feels that his characters force themselves upon him, that they bear him along, that they compel his writing, etc., in virtue of {130} properties which they have through having been realized initially in concrete situations. And this indicates to us that that about which judgements in fictional works are made is clearly not a concrete person, e.g. some citizen of Seville; but is something more than a "how it would be", namely "it is thus". That "is" expresses a reality not like that of a stone, but indeed a reality. All the judgements of the fictional work refer to this reality, which is that given in the impression of reality by the stone. The novelist constructs by creation in this reality "according to definite items of fiction".[1] This is the difference between a novel and mathematics. Both are constructions of reality, but in mathematics one constructs "according to concepts" (as we shall see forthwith), whereas in a novel one constructs "according to items of fiction and percepts". To be sure, the novel has many concepts; but it is not constructed along those lines. The novel as such is not formally constituted in the creation of the reality of the fictions, but in the construction of the content in reality itself according to those fictions. The novel does not refer to fiction but to the reality constructed according to the items of fiction.

c) If we take the judgements of mathematics and those of fictional literature one by one, we shall see that in each of them that of which one judges is "something real". The concepts, the fictions, and the percepts are simple apprehensions; they express what the real "might be", i.e., they are formally and explicitly inscribed within reality itself. But in reality itself not qua terminus of a concrete content but qua it "might terminate" therein; that is, they express not what it "is" but what it "might be". Therefore we say that this simple apprehension expresses something unreal. I need not emphasize it more since it was discussed above. Now, the {131} judgements of mathematics or fictional literature do not concern something formally "unreal", but something unreal though "realized"; they consider that the reality terminates in fact in this or that thing. I use a word from mathematics to refer in a unitary sense to this "concrete" termination, namely 'postulating'. The unreal, without ceasing to be unreal, acquires a postulated reality. When the mode of realization or "making real" is construction, then we have the reality both of mathematics and of fiction. The affirmations of mathematics and fictional literature thus refer to something unreal which is realized (made real) by constructive postulation, whether in the form of construction according to concepts (mathematics) or construction according to percepts and fictions (fictional literature). The intelligence is thus not limited to apprehending what "is already" in it, but also realizes (makes real) its concepts, its fictions, and its percepts in it, or rather, before it. What is intellectively known "is" not then before the intelligence but is something "realized" by the intelligence before itself. To be sure, one can realize without constructing; this is the case with the majority of judgements whose content is realized in the real but without construction. What one cannot do is to construct without realizing. Whence the inevitable consequence that the real, when realized by postulation-despite being so according to concepts or fictions or concrete percepts-may then have, as we are going to see, more notes of its own than those formally included in the concepts, in the fictions, and in the percepts. It is from this reality realized

by constructive postulation that mathematics and fictional literature take their point of departure for their judgements.

Thus every judgement, every affirmation, is about something real presupposed as such. When things are real in and by themselves, that presupposition {132} is formally the primordial apprehension of reality. When the things are real, but realized constructively, then the presupposition is formally postulation. Postulation is possible only by being intrinsically and formally grounded in the primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the primary and radical structure of judgement is to be an affirmation of a thing already apprehended as real (in primordial apprehension) but according to its formal moment of being in a field. In virtue of this, a judgement is not an immediate intellection of something real, but an intellection modalized from that apprehension, that direct and immediate intellection; it is intellection in returning from a stepping back. What is judged in this intellection?

Before tackling this question it is advantageous to clarify just what this reality of mathematics is as postulated. Judgement presupposes the primordial apprehension of reality. But, I must emphasize, it does not deal with any presupposition of process type; i.e., one does not apprehend reality prior to judging. Rather, this reality apprehended prior to judging is maintained as a formally constitutive moment of judgement as such.






We have seen that the mathematical is composed of judgements which refer to something real by postulation. But then the inevitable question arises: What is this postulating of the mathematical real? I said above that the postulating is a postulation of reality; now let us ask ourselves in what this postulation consists. The type of reality which the mathematical possesses depends on that answer.

Stated negatively, the reality of the mathematical is not like that of a stone, for example, because the stone is something real in and by itself. On the other hand, a mathematical space is not real in and by itself, but it does not therefore become not-real. The fact is that, as we have seen at length, reality and content are not the same. In the differential actualization of the real, the moment of formality of reality in a field is formally distinct from the moment of content. Nonetheless, that formality is always physical; the same formality of reality can encompass different contents, not just simultaneously but also successively. Thus, if the color of this stone changes, the content of its apprehension will also change; but its moment of reality has been conserved as numerically the same. Whence it is revealed to us that in these conditions "the" physical reality is a moment which perhaps does not have such concrete content. Reality within a field is in fact, as we saw, the autonomized "de suyo". It is not a kind of ocean in which things are immersed; {134} rather, it is purely and simply the field moment proper to the formality of reality of each real thing. And we have just seen that according to this moment, each real thing is more than it is by virtue of its content. This moment of the "more" is reality itself. Reality itself is therefore a physical moment and not just a conceptive one. And precisely because it is "more" it is possible for it not to have such-and-such a concrete content, i.e., it can have some other. Under these circumstances (1) the "more" is actualized in concepts, in simple apprehensions; and (2) these concepts are then realized as content of the "more". The unity of the these two moments is, as we saw, the unreal object expressed in the "might be". Now, when one postulates that the object "is thus", then one has passed by postulation from the "might be" to the "is". We have reality itself actualized in intellection, and the realization of what is conceived, but realized as a free thing. A free thing is the physical reality with a freely postulated content. Such are the objects of mathematics, for they are real objects constituted in the physical moment of reality itself in a field, the same reality according to which things like this stone are real. The moment of reality is identical in both cases; what is not the same is their content and their mode of reality. The stone has reality in and by itself, whereas the circle has reality only by postulation. Nonetheless the moment of reality is identical. The reality of mathematical objects is the "more", that same "more" of every real thing in and by itself. And precisely by being a "more" it is extended to have a free content by postulation. How mathematical objects are constituted in their postulation I shall explain forthwith.

For now I should like to recall what I explained in Part One, {135} viz. that reality is not synonymous with existence. Existence and notes pertain only to the content of the real; on the other hand, the formality of reality consists in this existential content and these notes being such de suyo. An existence which did not de suyo concern what is existent would not make of it something real, but rather something which is a phantom. Existence and notes, I repeat, pertain only to the content of the real. Now, the moment of reality in a field is the moment of formality of the "de suyo" autonomized when things are apprehended some among others; i.e., the moment of reality is the ambit of reality, an ambit strictly and rigorously physical. Reality itself in a field is "physical" but not formally existent. Certainly if the content were not existent what was apprehended would not be real; but neither would it be real if it did not have such-and-such determinate notes. That is, there is no reality without content (existential and notes). What happens is that there is "field reality", i.e., reality in a field, a field which is de suyo, but without this particular determinate content, i.e. without such-and-such determinate notes and their determinate existence. The field moment is the de suyo, but in a form such that the "suyo" [itself] of this "de suyo" remains free. Both the notes and their existence remain free, but the de suyo persists as the formal moment of reality. The impossibility that if there is no existence there is no reality does not mean that reality is existence; it only means, as I just said, that while reality is a formality, there cannot be a de suyo without a content of notes and existence. These notes and this existence are what a postulate postulates for reality: they are notes and existence realized only by being postulated in reality itself. In virtue of this, the notes or properties, like their existence, are notes and existence as postulated; but these notes and this existence are real only {136} by free postulation in reality itself, in the de suyo. For greater clarity let me add that when, in mathematics, an existence theorem is formulated (e.g. the existence of a root of every algebraic equation, or of an integral in an ordinary differential equation, or the non-existence of an algebraic equation having e as a root), existence means the naked realization of a note in virtue of the realization of other notes. Since the naked realization of these notes involves a postulated existence, the naked realization of the content is what, with full justification, one calls mathematical existence. It is always a question of realization, but not in the sense of identifying reality and physical existence in and by itself.

In conclusion, actualization of reality itself in intellection leaves its content free. And then what the postulate postulates is that such-and-such determinate content (for example, Euclidean parallelism or non-Archimedean topology), both in its notes and in its existence, is what is realized in reality itself, in the "more", in that same physical reality by which this stone is real. This content thus realized is, as we have said, a "free thing". Geometric space is real with the same reality as has this stone. It is not just a concept, but is reality freely realized; free, but real, real but free. This postulation therefore postulates that reality itself is realized in such-and-such content; it is this realization which is postulated.

The mathematical mode of this postulation is what I here term 'construction'. Geometric space is not a system of objective concepts; rather, the construction realizes, by postulation, these objective concepts. Constructing is not only making something an intentional and unreal terminus (that would be a question of simple content); rather, it consists in projecting this {137} unreal part of the concept onto reality itself "according to concepts". Therefore construction is a mode of realization; it is realizing according to concepts.

One must avoid two possible errors with regard to this idea of construction: construction in the sense of Gödel and construction in the sense of Brouwer.

Gödel calls 'constructing a group' the operation of generating it via the iterated application of certain operations axiomatically defined in the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. One must emphasize this: we are dealing with operations "defined" as such and not with the procedure to bring them about. These groups are what Gödel called constructables. His disciple Cohen (1963) based himself upon non-constructable groups in this sense. The elements of every group in fact have two classes of properties. Some, the specific ones, correspond to the postulates and operational axioms to which I have just referred. Others are generic, in virtue of which they form a group leaving indeterminate the specific properties, which would "force" the generic properties to be specific. The groups thus obtained having only generic characters are by definition non-constructed. Cohen bases himself (for his sensational discovery of the falsity of Cantor's continuum hypothesis) on these non-constructable groups. This seems to contradict what I just said about all of mathematics being constructed. Nonetheless, the contradiction is only apparent, because what I here call construction is something different. In the first place, this is so because what Gödel and Cohen construct is ultimately the objective concept both specific as well as generic. But in contrast the construction to which I refer consists in realizing before my intelligence a concept {138} already objectively constructed (whether constructable or not). And in this sense the realization itself can and ought to be called construction. It is then something very different from construction in the sense of Gödel and Cohen. Both the constructable groups and the non-constructable ones are constructed in the sense of things realized before my intelligence. Secondly, this realization is the construction of a content in physical reality; it is an intellectively free realization in "the" physical reality. It is, precisely, postulating. And this construction thus postulated is construction of the content in physical reality. The groups of Gödel and Cohen are constructed (in my concept of construction) in physical reality. So the construction itself does not formally concern concepts, nor is it a "conceptive" construction; rather, it is a realization in "the" physical reality, but "according to concepts"-two completely different things. And in this sense every mathematical object is constructed by being postulated. It is for this reason that the object thus constructed is a strict reality which can have properties or notes "of its own", or "proper", and not just properties "deduced" from the axioms and postulates. This does not refer to deduced properties but to properties which are already formally in the object. Mathematical objects have their properties de suyo, i.e., they are real. The fact is that the real object made real by being postulated according to concepts has, by being realized, more notes or properties than those defined in its postulation. On account of this and only on account of it are problems posed which may not be solvable with the finite system of axioms and postulates which defined its realization. What is constructed in reality itself is, by being realized, something more than what was postulated when realized. This, as I see it, is the thrust of Gödel's theorem. It does not refer to a limitation intrinsic {139} to affirmations based on axioms and postulates qua affirmations-that is the usual interpretation of the theorem-; rather, it leaves the character of reality of what is constructed according to the axioms and postulates in question to be revealed before the intelligence. It is not, then, the intrinsic inadequacy of a system of postulates, but the radical originality of what is constructed by being real, a reality which is not exhausted in what has been postulated about it. This object is not a real thing in and by itself as is this stone. But neither is it only what "might be real"; rather, it is what "is real" by being postulated and constructed. That, in my judgement, is the interpretation of Gödel's theorem. The judgements of mathematics are then judgements of something real, judgements of the "postulated real". They are not judgements about the "possible real" but judgements about "postulated reality".

This conceptualization of mathematical reality by construction is not, then, a type of formalism, but neither is it in any sense what has been set forth in rigorous opposition to such formalism, viz. intuitionism, especially that of Brouwer. That is the other concept of construction which it is necessary to eliminate in this problem. For intuitionism, mathematical construction is not the same as defining and constructing concepts. Intuitionism rejects the idea that mathematics is grounded upon logic; a demonstration which appeals to the logical principle of the excluded middle is not, for Brouwer, a mathematical demonstration. Mathematics is not a system of defined concepts and operations. An operation, if it is to be mathematical, has to be an operation actually carried out, i.e., one comprised of a finite number of steps. To be sure, mathematics is not interested only in finite groups; for example, it concerns itself with the infinite digit strings making up real numbers. It is true that {140} mathematics cannot actually carry out all the operations necessary to obtain an irrational number, because the number of steps would be infinite. But they can be given, and are given, in a rule or algorithm in which the operations are continued "indefinitely". The object of mathematics, then, would be finite groups as the terminus of operations carried out on them. Intuitionism is a radical finitism. The majority of mathematicians therefore reject Brouwer's ideas despite its applications to topology, because to amputate the infinite series would be for them to nullify an enormous part of the mathematical edifice. Brouwer, they tell us, if forced to be consistent with himself, would be compelled to abandon as invalid an enormous portion of infinitesimal analysis [calculus]. But let us not be concerned with this aspect of the question because in our problem the essential part is that intuitionism claims to be opposed to formalistic axiomism or formalism by putting forth actually carried out operations as opposed to axiomatic definitions. At bottom it is an idea of Kronecker in action: God created the whole numbers and man created the rest. The whole numbers would be a datum of intuition, and therefore constructing would be reduced finally to counting what is given. Defining does not suffice.

But this conception cannot be maintained because the groups-even if finite-are not formally intuitive nor do the operations carried out on them constitute the radical part of what I understand by mathematical construction.

In the first place, Brouwer's finite group is not intuitive. Leaving aside for now the problems posed by intuition, let us say that intuition is the "vision" of something given immediately, directly, and unitarily. {141} In inituition I have the qualitative and quantitative diversity of the given, but never do I have a group. There are no strict intuitive groups, because in order to have a group I must consider, separately so to speak, the moments of the intuitive diversity as "elements". Only then does their unity constitute a group. A mathematical group is always a group of elements, and only that. But then it is clear that no group, not even a finite one, is intuitive, because intuition gives only "diversity of moments", never a "group of elements". In order to have a group it is necessary to have a subsequent act of intellection which makes the moments to be elements. It is then necessary to have a construction. The so-called finite construction, presumably given in intuition, is nothing but the application of the group already intellectively constructed to the diversity of the given. This application is just a postulation: one postulates that the given is resolved in a group. Therefore rigorously speaking one cannot call Brouwer's mathematics intuitionism. Brouwer's group is not intuitive; it is the objective content of a concept of group which is "applied" to the intuitive.

In the second place, the very construction of the group is not, ultimately, a system of operations actually carried out. I say "ultimately", because the carrying out of operations is not the primary component of what I have termed "construction". The finite group is the content of objective concepts. Therefore the operations carried out on this content are operations, however much executed one may like, but always executed on objective contents of concepts. Finite or not, the groups with which Brouwer's mathematics is concerned and the operations carried out on them are conceptive groups and operations. And therefore they are inadequate, {142} as I see it, to ground mathematics: mathematics does not deal with "objective concepts" but with "things which are thus". What I understand by 'construction' is something different. To be sure, it is not a construction of objective concepts by mere definition; but neither is it a series of operations carried out in Brouwer's sense, because his operations are operations on objective concepts. And on this point Brouwer's mathematics does not differ from that of Gödel and Cohen. What I am referring to is that constructing is not carrying out objective operations but projecting before my intelligence that objective content in "the" physical reality. And this reality is not given in intuition but in the primordial apprehension of reality; it is given impressively. As this reality does not have determinate content, I can freely project upon it the content of what is objectively constructed operationally. This projection and not the operation is mathematical construction. The mathematical object, even if it is finite, and even if the operation which objectively produces its content is carried out, nonetheless has a radical proper reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is construction. Brouwer's finite group not only is not intuitive, it is the result of a double postulation: the postulate that groups are applicable to what is intuitively given, and the postulate of conferring upon reality itself the content of the objective concept (operationally constructed) of group. A mathematical object is not intuited but apprehended in a primordial apprehension-two completely different things, as we shall see. Free creation, projected in this double postulation, is intrinsically and formally sentient. Only a sentient intelligence can, for example, {143} not sense the content of a continuous group, i.e. the group of irrational numbers, and nonetheless freely realize this content (conceptualized either by mere definitions, or by operations actually carried out) in a sentient way. A mathematical object, even though finite, and even though the operation which produces it is actually carried out, has, I repeat, its own reality, the physical reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And this is its construction.

Thus in summary, we may say about being constructed: (1) it is not being defined in the sense of Gödel and Cohen, and (2) it is not being carried out in the sense of Brouwer. The opposition between formalism and intuitionism is a problem internal to mathematics, and as such does not concern philosophy. For philosophy, the problem centers on conceptualizing the reality of the mathematical. And from this point of view formalism and intuitionism are not opposed to each other, because both consist only in the determination of the objective content of concepts. Now, constructing is something else; it is creating, freely projecting into "the" physical reality a content according to concepts. Postulating is postulating reality. Without this construction and primary and radical postulation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, Cohen's groups, and Brouwer's intuitionism would all be impossible.

Mathematical construction is thus always an act of sentient intelligence. And therefore the mathematical object has postulated reality. It is not an objective concept of reality but rather is reality in concept. It is, I repeat, the reality itself of any real thing sentiently apprehended, but with a content freely constructed in that reality, according to concepts. What is postulated, I repeat, is not logical truths nor operations actually carried out, but the content of the real (already defined or carried out) {144} in and by postulated construction. The mathematical object is not constituted by the postulates; rather, what the postulates define is the "construction" before the intelligence of that whose realization is postulated, and which acquires reality by this postulation.

The objects of mathematics are "real objects", objects in reality, in this same reality with rocks and stars; the difference is that mathematical objects are constructed by being postulated in their content. A rock is a reality in and by itself; a geometric space or irrational number is a reality freely postulated. It is common to refer to mathematical objects as "ideal objects". But there are no ideal objects; mathematical objects are real. This does not mean -and I must reiterate it-that mathematical objects exist like rocks exist; but the difference between the former and the latter concerns only content, a content given in the one case, freely postulated in reality in the second. Therefore mathematical objects do not have ideal existence but only postulated existence, postulated but in reality itself. What happens is that their content (1) is constructed, and (2) is constructed according to concepts. What is so inappropriately labeled "ideal" is the real constructed according to concepts. Both existence and properties are constructed by postulation in reality itself. Therefore a mathematical object is not real just because of its definition or because it is carried out; but neither is it a real object in and by itself like things apprehended in sensible impression. It is something real by a postulate which realizes a content (notes and existence) freely determined thanks to the postulation.

As the moment of reality is just the "more" of {145} each real sensed thing, it follows that every mathematical object is inscribed in the formality of reality given in impression. That is, it is the terminus of a sentient intellection. This does not mean that a geometric space or irrational number is sensed like color is sensed; the former objects are clearly not sensible. Rather, it means that the mode of intellection of an irrational number or a geometric space is sentient. And this is so (1) because they are intellectively known by being postulated in a field of reality, i.e. in the formality given in the impression of reality, and (2) because their construction itself is not just conceptuation but realization, i.e. something brought about sentiently. Without sensing the mathematical, one could not construct mathematics. Here we put our finger on the difference between sensible intelligence and sentient intelligence about which I spoke at length in Part I of this work. Sensible intelligence is based on the senses; sentient intelligence intellectively knows everything sentiently, both the sensible and the non-sensible. A mathematical object is real with a content which is freely constructed in the physical reality given in impression, and its construction is postulation.

Mathematics itself has produced, among other things, two theorems whose essence, as I see it, is what I said previously, viz. the anteriority of reality over truth. Gödel's theorem, according to which that constructed by postulation has de suyo more properties than those formally postulated, in my view expresses that what is postulated is reality before it is truth. And Cohen's theorem (let us call the non-Cantorian theory of groups that): groups are not just systems of elements determined by postulation; rather, prior to this, there are groups which he terms "generic" and which as I see it {146} are not generic but the simple realization of the group, without the specific properties determined by postulation. The postulated properties themselves are then real prior to being true. The specification here is not a logical difference but a real determination. It is the reality of the group prior to the axiomatic truth postulated. In my view, this is the essential meaning of the theorems of Gödel and Cohen: the priority of the real over the true in mathematics.



What is Judged


In every judgement, as we have seen, one judges about something real, and does so in reality itself. I said that affirmation is a dual intellection because the same real thing is intellectively known twice: once, as that of which one judges, and another, as that which is affirmed about it. This duality of affirmative intellection is based upon a deeper dimension. Since every real thing has a moment of individual reality, and a moment of reality in a field, when a real thing is intellectively known "among" others, these two moments are differentiated and in a certain way "distanced", i.e., stepped back from; this is a dimension of the duality of what is intellectively known itself. What impels us and puts us into the field of reality itself is just the primordial apprehension of reality of that about which one judges. And it is in this field that intellective movement takes place. That about which one affirms in this movement is the real thing already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality. That in which the affirmation moves is reality itself (it is the medium of affirmation). So in contrast to what is usually said - or rather repeated monotonously - judging is not affirming reality itself but rather affirming "in" the reality. Prior to judging and in order to be able to judge, we are already intellectively in reality itself. The function of reality itself is not to be a constutitive part of the judgement itself, because reality itself is also, as we have seen, a moment of simple apprehension. Reality itself is prior to every {148} intellective movement, both simple apprehension as well as affirmation. Reality itself is not, then, a correlate of affirmation, but the formality of every intellective apprehension whether it is judgmental or not. Judgmental intellection is an intellective movement, and this intellective movement in reality itself is a "realization". Upon judging one realizes reality itself in a real thing already apprehended, i.e. one judges about the termination of reality itself in this thing; he judges that which is the real. Now, with this reality itself is reintegrated, in a certain way against every stepping back, to the real thing, to its individual formality of reality. Therefore this reintegration is the formal establishment of the unity of being in a field and being individual. And this formal unity is just what a thing already apprehended as real is "in reality", viz. its "this, how, and what". Therefore that which is judged is what a real thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. Judging is affirming what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality.

Granting that, let us once again direct our attention to this affirmative intention of judgement. What is affirmed, I repeat, is the realization (of something simply apprehended) in this real thing as real; i.e., one turns to a real thing in reality itself. Now, reality itself is that to which, impelled by a real thing already apprehended in primordial apprehension, we have gone in retraction, elaborating a simple apprehension. Therefore reality itself has all of its unreal content from what is simply apprehended. In virtue of this, realization in a real thing is realization in it of what is simply apprehended as unreal. What a real thing is "in reality" is expressed by the realization of simple apprehension in a real thing.

The poorly named "subject" of judgement is that real thing {149} about which one judges. It is not properly "subject" but "object" of judgement. What one judges is the realization of a simple apprehension in an object, i.e. in the real. Judging is not then attributing one concept to another but realizing a concept, a work of fiction, or a percept in a real thing already apprehended as real in primordial apprehension. Affirmation is the phase of intellective movement opposed to retraction. In retraction one goes inside the real which is given toward the unreal apprehended in simple apprehension, toward what the real thing "might be" to what it "is". Now one is not dealing with a realization in constructive postulation but with a realization in simple apprehension as such in primordial apprehension. This realization is the judgement. Judging is not, for example, apprehending that this thing which we call a man is real; nor is it apprehending what this man is (which is but apprehending what this thing "might be"). Judging is affirming that what it "might be" to be a man is realized in this real thing which we call a man, i.e., that this real thing which we call "man" is in reality what we understand by man. And this is not a tautology, because the concept of man is not univocal but depends upon that aspect, freely selected, from which one starts in order to conceive it. Starting from the zoological ladder is not the same as starting from the capacity to make tools (for example, from homo australopithecus or from homo habilis). Similarly, starting from social organization is different than starting from the modes and general forms of the real. Thus, what this thing is in reality which we call a man, by being the realization of a concept, is once again known intellectively with respect to the primordial apprehension of reality in each case.

Every affirmation is a dynamic intellection, by returning {150} from stepping back, of something already apprehended in a primordial apprehension, a dynamism which cuts across reality itself, and whose terminus consists in intellectively knowing what that which we have intellectively known as real is in reality.

This clarifies two points for us. First that the real world, i.e. the system of things qua real, does not consist in being the system of what the sum total of true judgements affirms. The system of real things qua real does not consist in being the correlate of what is affirmed. Rather, it is the system intellectively known in my primordial apprehensions of reality, the system given in them. Reality is always prior to affirmation. And the second point is that affirming as such is an intellection that expands the return to the real (from stepping back), with respect to the field of reality.

This structure makes of judgement something essentially dependent upon the way in which primordial apprehension becomes the terminus of affirmation. The way in which primordial apprehension is constituted as terminus of affirmation is what I call the form of affirmation. After having seen what affirming is, let us now ask what the forms of affirmation as such are.


§ 2



When speaking about judgement, I am not referring to the classical division of judgements into quality, quantity, relation or modality, which is the division canonized by Kant. And this is because all these kinds of judgement are but forms of a single kind, viz. judgement as predication. Now, affirmation as such is not predication. There are, as we shall see, forms of judgement strictly pre-predicative. In predicative judgement, that about which one judges has a clear function: to be subject of the judgement. But that is not the only nor even the primary function of the reality about which one judges. Here I use the term 'forms of judgement' to refer to the diversity of judgements according to the function carried out by that which is judged; i.e., the diverse forms according to which a thing already apprehended is the terminus of affirmative intellection. The predicative function is just one of them. There are others, for example judgements in which the thing judged is proposed to the affirmation but not as a subject of it; these are propositional judgements but are pre-predicative. There are also judgements in which the thing judged is not proposed but only placed before the judgement. In these judgements the affirmation is not just pre-predicative but also pre-propositional; they are merely positional judgements. Each of these forms is based upon the previous one: propositional affirmation is based upon positional affirmation, and in turn predicative affirmation {152} upon propositional affirmation. What is the structure of these three forms of affirmation?

1. Above all, judgement is what I call a positional affirmation. Let us begin by posing some examples. I open the window and shout, "Fire!", or perhaps, "rain, sun", etc. Here there is something apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality, viz. what I apprehend upon opening the window. And I apprehend it in all its notes, in primordial apprehension, as something real and in all of its richness and variety of notes. But I do not intellectively know what it is "in reality". Intelletively knowing it as fire, rain, etc. is just the proper affirmation of the judgement, viz. what I have apprehended is in reality. These names, as mere names, are simple apprehensions (percepts, fictional items, or concepts). But in affirmative connotation they express that what is simply apprehended is realized in what I have apprehended primordially, and is what this latter is in reality. If I did not have these simple apprehensions there would be no judgement and I could not say, "Fire!"; I would have only the primordial apprehension of this igneous reality which, without knowing what it is in reality, I apprehend primordially upon opening the window. In this sense I say that that affirmation is positional, because the thing which I judge is not previously apprehended in turn in a simple apprehension which qualifies it, as is the case in other forms of judgement. If I say that the fire is burning, the subject is already qualified as fire in a previous simple apprehension. But when I shout, "Fire!", what I apprehend is not intellectively known previously as fire. Precisely on account of this, what I see upon opening the window is not designated by any previous denomination because every denomination is a denomination of something already simply apprehended. Here what is apprehended upon opening the window is the terminus of a primordial apprehension {153} of reality, but without qualification, without previous denomination. In every judgement the primordial apprehension of that of which one judges is anterior to the judging itself. But this does not mean that a real thing was already previously qualified in some previous simple apprehension. In positional judgement the real is not already qualified by a simple apprehension; rather, there is a single simple apprehension, say that of fire, which forms a part not of the subject but of the predicate, and whose realization is affirmed so to speak globally. It is for this reason a positional judgement. On one side I have the primordial apprehension of reality; on the other, the denomination. Its identification in what is in reality what I have primordially apprehended is just positional judgement. It is because of this that there are not two denominations as in other types of judgement, one of what I see and another of what I affirm as realized in what I see. There is here but a single denomination, and what is denominated is posed as reality. There is but the total, global realization, of this unique single apprehension in the primordial apprehension of reality. It is, to speak a bit loosely, the identity or identification of with simple apprehension; or from the standpoint of simple apprehension, the integral realization of it in the real. I repeat that I am not saying "this is fire" but simply "Fire!". The positional judgement is, in a certain way, not the denomination but the denominative affirmation of the real apprehended in its totality. When I say "Fire!" I clearly have a simple apprehension, that of fire. Otherwise I could not say "Fire!". But that which I see upon opening the window is posed directly as global realization of this simple apprehension, without it having been {154} previously qualified by another simple apprehension. Here the function of the real thing of which one judges is to be "posed" for my denomination or identification as real.

I maintain that this is an affirmation and not a primoridial apprehension of reality. In primordial apprehension of reality we have only the real thing apprehended, and this real thing immediately fills the field of reality itself. But in positional judgement this real thing is intellectively known as realization of something already apprehended in simple apprehension, as a realization of fire. We intellectively know what is apprehended via the route of identifying it with what is, for example, fire simply apprehended. The primordial apprehension of reality is immediate, and therefore is more than a judgement: it is the apprehension of the real thing in and by itself as real, without the necessity of affirming or judging. On the other hand, in positional judgement, the real is intellectively known as a realization of fire or rain, etc. In this intellection what is affirmed is just what in reality is that which we have apprehended as real upon opening the window. In this "position" the real apprehended as a whole is "placed" as realization. It is for this reason that I term it "positional judgement". The affirmative moment of this judgement is not expressed with a new name but with a single substantive name (noun) having an affirmative connotation. And this connotation is expressed in the intonation; for example, by shouting. On the other hand, in primordial apprehension of reality, there is no name whatsoever: it is the mere apprehension of the reality of the real. Positional judgement, then, is pre-predicative; but it is also pre-propositional: the real thing apprehended is not a subject of judgement, nor is it proposed for judgement; it is simply "posed".

2. There is a second form of judgement, viz. propositional judgement. {155} In it the real already apprehended is not apprehended only as real, but is also apprehended as something which for its part is already qualified from a simple apprehension. Let that of which one judges be A. A is not just something which I apprehend as real, but as something which is already A. And therefore, when it becomes the terminus of an affirmation, this A is not simply "posed" for the judgement but "proposed" to it, i.e., posed "as reality" for a subsequent position of what it is "in reality". A proposition is a special form of position; it is the propositional judgement. Permit me to explain.

Consider some common examples in order to establish a frame of reference. "Corruption of the best, worst" (corruptio optimi pessima);[2] "Everything excellent, rare" (omnia praeclara, rara); "All men, equal"; "A woman, always changeable and fickle" (varium et mutabile semper femina)[3]; "What's bred in the bone will out in the flesh" [genio y figura, hasta la sepultura,[4] Spanish proverb]; "This, my vocation"; "Thou, the one Holy One, the one Lord"; "Thou, my God"; "Thou, Lord".

In all these affirmations there is something, A, which is posed as already real; and not simply as real but as something real already qualified in a previous simple apprehension: the corruption of the best, the excellent, the woman, Thou, etc. But the affirmation is constituted in B, or if one prefers in the A not as merely real but as realization of the simple apprehension B; the worst, my God, changeable, all equal, etc.

In this affirmation what is affirmed clearly has two moments. One, the moment pro-posed A. This moment is not only real, but moreover its reality is already qualified and proposed as terminus of a subsequent position. There is, in addition, that of which this real thing is affirmed B. In itself B is not something real, but rather {156} a simple unreal apprehension. But upon becoming the determination of the thing already real, of A, B is realized in and by A. That is, the reality of B has been posed qua that of A, or what is the same thing, the reality of A has been posed not in itself (since it has been proposed as something already real), but qua B. For this reason it is, I repeat, a position which is pro-positional. What is this position of B in A? That is the essential question.

First of all, it is not a "positional" position in the sense explained earlier; if it were, what is affirmed would be two realities, the reality of A "and" the reality of B, but not "one" reality, to wit, the reality of A as B. But neither is it an "attributive" position: I do not affirm that A "is" B. Propositional judgement is pre-predicative. The force of the affirmation does not fall upon something attributed to A. To be sure, A and B are not identical. But:

a) B "is grounded" on A; it is not attributed to A from outside but pertains to A in a way, so to speak, intrinsic to A.

b) This foundation is formal; it is the very "nature" of A, its constitutional nature, so to speak, that which grounds B. I am not simply affirming that a woman is always changeable, but that she is so by virtue of her nature qua woman. Here "nature" has a connotation which is deliberately vague. It does not concern reality in itself, as if it were the essence of reality; rather, it refers to reality qua apprehended in primordial apprehension.

c) This B is not only determined intrinsically by the reality of A; rather, the determination itself, i.e. B, has reality but "in the reality of A". That does not just refer to the fact that a woman by her own nature determines changeability, but to the fact that what is {157} determined-this changeability-is a moment of feminine reality itself: B is a moment of the reality of A.

The reality of A involves, then, by virtue of its own nature, the reality of B in A. This is what I affirm in a propositional judgement. Now, the unity of these three moments: being grounded on A, being grounded on the nature of A, and being a moment of the reality of A, is what I call unity of constitution: "AB".[5] It is not unity of attribution but unity of constitution. And this unity is that which A is "in reality".

Whence arise the two parts of this affirmation. First of all, there is that which is affirmed. What is affirmed here is not a thing, i.e., neither A nor B (A is not affirmed but rather presumed qualificatively); what is affirmed is the constitutive unity "AB". The second part is the affirmation itself. As affirmation, it consists in putting into reality itself the constitutive unity. It is this unity which is affirmed to be real, or rather, it is this unity which is that in which A consists in reality: A is in reality not just "A" but "AB". The intentum has thus been changed in a twofold way. In the first place, it is modified by being an affirmation, an intention; it is an intentum of intellection of a reality stepped back from, i.e., from simple apprehension; it is a judgement. But in the second place, the propositional affirmation is a modification of positional affirmation. When what is posed is formally a constitution and not a thing, then the position is constitutive. Propositional affirmation is, then, constitutive position, an affirmation of what a thing constitutively is in reality.

The expression of a propositional or constitutive judgement is a nominal phrase. It suffices to return to the (Latin) examples given earlier to discover in them two essential aspects. The nominative phrase, {158} above all, lacks a verb; it is an a-verbal affirmation, having only nouns. This does not refer to a verbal ellipsis but to a particular and originary mode of "averbal" phrase. But in contrast to positional affirmation which only has a noun, the nominal phrase always has at least two nouns. These two nouns do not designate a subject and predicate, but a single constitutive reality. The nominal phrase is propositional, but it is pre-predicative. On the other hand, this phrase expresses the affirmative moment of a mode which is proper to it, in the "pause" between the two nouns. The pause is the expression of the constitutive affirmation as such. It is not merely a position, nor is it copulative attribution; this aspect is what the pause expresses. The nominal phrase is generally used in invocations, but not exclusively there. The problem which interests me here is not the when and where-something that varies from language to language-but the nature of the affirmation enunciated in such sentences; this is a propositional affirmation.

This propositional judgement is not the only form of non-positional judgement. There is another form, which I shall provisionally term predicative judgement. In this way we have the three forms of judgement: positional affirmation, propositional affirmation, and predicative affirmation. In what does this last consist?

3. The third form of judgement, I repeat, is predicative judgement. For the moment, borrowing some terminology from classical logic, let us say that it is the judgement whose scheme is A is B. It is because I have referred to classical logic that I have termed the two previous forms of judgement pre-predicative. The linguists call everything said of something a 'predicate'; the predicate here {159} would be is B, and A would be the subject. But this, while it may be true, nonetheless cloaks the proper character of what is affirmed in a judgement. For one of the essential moments for this judgement is that the affirmation be made using a verb, which in the foregoing scheme is the verb "is". And there is another moment which must be pointed out. Ultimately we are dealing more with a copulative affirmation than a predicative affirmation; the verb to be, in fact, discharges the function of a copulative. Whence there is some justification in calling only B the predicate, in respect of which A would be the subject. Given this initial clarification, to which we shall shortly return, and without making the notions more precise at the moment, let us speak somewhat loosely about predicative judgement in the sense of copulative affirmation.

This affirmation is, above all, pro-positional, in the sense explained above. The intentum, in fact, refers to an A previously posited as real. And this reality already posited, A, is posited in turn for a subsequent determination B. Therefore A is a reality pro-posed in order to be affirmed qua B. In this aspect, the copulative affirmation is strictly pro-positional. By being so, the copulative affirmation puts the reality of B qua B as a moment of A. And this B is in itself the terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, item of fiction, or concept), whose reality is affirmed upon being posited in a real A. Hence, in every propositional affirmation, the intellective movement is, on one hand, the position of A qua B, and on the other, the position of B in the reality of A. They are two aspects of the same movement.

Up to now, the predicative affirmation has only been a propositional affirmation. But the role of the predicative affirmation {160} is in the mode of position of A as B, or what comes to the same thing, of B in A. With which position are we dealing?

To be sure, it is not a positional position of either A or B. That would not be "one" affirmation but "two". But neither is it a constitutive position, because B is certainly grounded on A, but not necessarily in the nature of the reality of A. And here is the difference between predicative or copulative affirmation and merely propositional affirmation. For now, one thing is clear: predicative affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation, just like this latter is a modification of positional affirmation. What is this predicative modification?

Modification of predication consists in B being grounded on A, but in such a way that this foundation of the reality of B in A is not necessarily-as in the case of propositional affirmation-the very "nature" of the reality of A. Rather, it consists in that B, though being in A, is so only in the sense of "merely being". Here "being" is used in the sense of "realizing" something, independently of the character of of this realization. In propositional judgement what is affirmed is that this realization is what is in the "nature" of something. But here we are dealing with a realization in which we disregard its mode, whether necessary or not necessary. A and B each have their own entity, and their unity consists in B being realized in A. In this fashion the reality of B in A, or the reality of A as B, involves two moments. On one hand, B is in fact in A. But on the other, B is something which, although it takes its reality from being put in A, nonetheless its reality is maintained in a certain way as its own reality inside the reality of A; and therefore {161} even though it is in A, it is, in a certain way, different from A. Therefore between A and B there is a unity to be sure, but a unity which, within A, maintains a certain distinction between the reality of A and the reality of B. Hence it is not a simple constitution. The constitution not only puts B in A but puts this B in the very "nature" of the reality of A, whereas now B is put in A though as something formally distinct from A. A is certainly B, but does not consist in being B, nor does B consist in being A. This is no longer constitution; it is what I shall term connection. There is a great difference between constitution and connection. Connection is union as well as distinction; union and separation are the two aspects of the unity of connection. This connection can have various characteristics; it can be either necessary or de facto. But one is always dealing with a connection "derived" from the reality of A. On the other hand, in the unity of constitution, rather than a "necessity of A", one deals with the very "nature" of A. The constitution is thus more than necessary; it is in a certain way constituting. When one says, "femina, variabile", one affirms that a woman is changeable by virtue of being a woman. Similarly, when one says "this paper, white", that about which one is thinking, to wit, "this paper", is white precisely because it is "this", i.e. one thinks in a certain way about the nature of "this". But when one says "this woman is changeable" or "this paper is white", one does not affirm that "this" woman consists in being changeable nor that "this" paper consists in its whiteness. In propositional judgement one thinks more about the nature of A than in the reality of the "other thing", B. In predicative judgement there is the reality of A and the realization of B in A, but in an A which as such has its nature independent of B; it is for that reason that there is connection. It is no longer AB but rather A-B. This is the connective or copulative affirmation. {162}

We see immediately that this affirmation is a modification of propositional affirmation. Propositional affirmation puts the reality of B as a moment of the nature of the reality of A. Now, however, B is in a way less pegged to the reality of A. In place of constitution, we have connection; and in place of propositional affirmation, we have predicative affirmation.

This connection is not properly speaking a "relation", because every relation presupposes the two things related. In a connection one does not presuppose the reality of B, but rather puts B in the reality of A; hence it is B which receives the reality of A. In this fashion the presumed relation is consequent upon the connection. And this brings us to the question of the parts which make up this predicative affirmation.

On the surface, this affirmation comprises three "parts": A, B, and is. Whence it follows that function of the copula "is" is to express the relation between B and A. But this really doesn't say much of importance. A correct analysis of copulative affirmation strictly requires that the affirmation have only two parts: what is affirmed and the affirmation itself.

In the first place, what is affirmed? The connective unity of B and A. That is, in what is affirmed A and B enter, and what is affirmed of them is their connection. We have, above all, A and B. Some think that A and B are two variables of the same type and that their difference is merely functional: A carries out the function of subject, and B that of predicate. For just this reason it is possible to switch their functional positions, making B the subject and A the predicate. This is the so called "conversion" of propositions in formal logic: "All men are mortal", {163} and by conversion, "Some mortals are men". Apart from the quantifiers, A and B do not differ in the two cases other than by their functional position. But this is actually not correct. Strictly speaking, A is not a part of what is affirmed; rather it is simply "what" is proposed to what is affirmed. Hence, rather than being a part of the judgement, it is assumed by it. This assumption is usually called the "subject"; but strictly speaking it is not the subject but rather the "object" (sit venia verbo) about which one judges. The function of that which is already apprehended is now being pro-posed as "subject". This interpretation of what is proposed to the judgement as its subject is certainly a very debatable one. It depends upon the concept one has of the structure of the unity of things and their notes. Conceptualizing a thing as the subject of its inherent accidents is nothing but a theory. In my view, this theory is unacceptable. But that is not what interests us at the moment. Rather we are concerned not with the ulterior concept of connection, but the connective character of B with A, whether or not it has the character of a subject. And only in order to clarify the expression will I call A the subject; it is in fact the reality already apprehended as something which is not the "subject of" B, but the "subject to" a connection.

On the other hand, B is not something which is on a par with A, so to speak, because in itself B is a term proposed not as real, but as something unreal, as terminus of a simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, or concept). Hence its connection with A has all the character of "realization" of B in A. To identify A and B with two interchangeable magnitudes, as if they were homogeneous terms, is to speak nonsense. The subject is reality and the predicate realization. They do not function on the same level. Even when I carry out the so-called "conversion" of a judgement, the essential difference is not in the quantification of A and B, {164} but in the fact that in the second judgement A is by itself now a simple apprehension realized in B, which is the reverse of what happened before. Thus A and B are not, formally, on the same footing. The difference between them is not a difference in location in the judgement, but an essential difference. A and B can be interchanged so that A is sometimes the subject and other times the predicate. But their formal difference is always essential not interchangeable. The subject is always a proposed reality and the predicate is always something unreal which is realized. It is the same thing which happens in the case of all propositional judgements: it doesn't make sense to convert the nominal propostion, "all women, changeable" into "something changeable, woman".

What is affirmed of A and B is their "connection". We have already seen that this conection is not a relation; rather, the "relation" is something consequent upon the "connection" and grounded upon it. The connection establishes A in B. The relation between B and A exists, but only after B is established in A, i.e., after the connection. The relation-if one desires to speak of relations-is what results from the realization of B in A, i.e., it is the result of the connection. The formal conceptualization of A and B refers to this relation, which presupposes its essential connective difference. Therefore the so-called formal logic is based upon the relation resulting from the connective affirmation. Now we see that this logic is not what is primary, because the formal relation between A and B is grounded on the affirmative connection of realization of B in A. That is, every formal logic is grounded upon a more radical logic, the logic of affirmation. "Formal logic" is the play of two homogeneous variables, whereas the "logic of affirmation" is the intellection of the realization of something unreal (B) in something already real (A). And this is the essential point: the logic of the affirmative intellection of the real. As our subject is not logic, {165} it suffices to have pointed out this idea which I deem essential; we are not seeking to invalidate modern formal logic, only to ground it in the logic of affirmation.

That which affirmed is, then, the realization of B in A in connective form. Thus, A is reality proposed, and B is something unreal realized in A; and this realization is of connective character. What is the affirmation?

The affirmation itself does not consist in connecting B with A but in putting the connective unity A-B into reality itself. If one desires to continue talking about relations, he must say that affirmation does not consist in affirming the relation of B with A, nor that of A with B; rather, it consists in putting this relation into reality itself. The unity of B in A moves along a line of relation. On the other hand, affirmation moves along a line which in a way is orthogonal to this latter. That is, in affirmation one does not go from B to A nor from A to B but from A-B to the reality of what is primordially apprehended. In propositional judgement affirmation is orthogonal to constitution. In predicative judgement affirmation is orthogonal to connection.

With this we see that predicative judgement is a modification of the intentum, but a modification which is threefold. The intentum modified has become an intentum of judgement, i.e. an affirmative intention. Secondly, the predicative judgement involves a propositional intention, which is a second modification of the absolute intention. And thirdly, the propositional judgement has been taken in predicative intention.

The grammatical expression of this predicative affirmation requires some special consideration. It is the expression by the "is". This "is" discharges, as I see it, not two but three functions: {166}

a) It expresses an affirmation; as such it means the "reality" of the connection A-B. This connection is given in reality itself.

b) It expresses the connection of B with A, i.e., it expresses the "connective unity" A-B, and what A is "in reality".

c) It expresses the relation which is established between A and B in this connection and by it. In this aspect, the function of the "is" is to be a copula. It is the "copulative relation".

These are the three functions of the verb is: "reality", "connective unity", and "copulative relation". Now, these three functions have a precise order of foundation, to wit, the copulative relation is grounded in the connective unity, and that in turn is grounded in the affirmation of reality. This order is essential; it cannot be inverted, and so one cannot think that the primary function of the "is" is to be a copula and that the connection is merely a relation, and that this relation constitutes judgement. Such a conception is absolutely untenable. To see why, it suffices to refer to linguistic considerations. They show us quite clearly the fact that the verb to be (est, esti, asti, etc. does not in any respect constitute a special verb. In the first place, every verb-and not just to be-has the two primary functions. If I say "the bird sings, the horse runs, the man talks", etc., the verbs 'sings', 'runs', 'talks' have the two functions of expressing an affirmation, i.e., the position of something in reality itself, and also of expressing a connection between the horse, the bird, and the man with some states or actions or qualities (the exact expression does not matter here). Whence the serious error of thinking that predicative affirmation is necessarily in the form "A is B". The judgement "the bird sings" is just as predicative as the judgement "A is B", not because "sings" {167} is equivalent to "is a singer"-which is absurd, just as absurd as saying that in the nominal phrase there is an ellipsis of the verb to be. The judgement affirms the connective unity of the bird and its singing. It is on account of this that I said at the beginning that I was only provisionally expressing predicative judgement in the form "A is B". Now, in this very case the verb to be is present. Originally it was a substantive verb like all the rest; and like them, it expresses the affirmation of the connective unity of A and B. However, not all verbs-but many old verbs, e.g. in Greek or Latin-have, in addition to their verbal meaning stemming from their etymological root, a copulative character which they have gradually acquired. Consider the verbs meno, auxanomai, hyparkho, pelo, gignesthai, phyo, etc., etc., etc... Among them is one which merits special attention. From the Indo-European root *sta derives the Greek verb histemi, which as an intransitive verb means to be firmly on one's feet. Its compound kathistemi has, in the primitive aorist tense katesten, the sense of being established, constituted, installed, etc. And this aorist acquired-as one can readily understand-a copulative meaning as well. From "being established" the verb took on the meaning "is". From the same root derives the Latin stare. Already in the classical period it sometimes had the meaning of a copula as a strong synonym of esse. It passed into the Romance languages, and in particular into Spanish as estar,[6] which unites to its "substantive" sense a copulative sense grounded upon it. Later I will examine in detail what in my opinion constitutes the difference between the two Spanish verbs for "to be": ser and estar. In all of these verbs the "connection" fades into "relation". Now, the verb to be also passed from being a substantive verb to being a copula. The copulative meaning of these verbs was, then, acquired, and its acquisition was grounded in the previous substantive meaning, so to speak. {168} Moreover, the copulative meaning not only was acquired, but was always secondary. So we can say that the three functions are grounded in the above-mentioned form, and none is exclusive to the verb to be, especially if one remembers that there are very many languages which do not even have this verb.

If, for greater simplicity, we return to the predicative judgement such as it is generally used in formal logic, we shall have to distinguish in every such judgement-as I wrote some sixty years ago-its grammatical structure and its intellective structure. Grammatically, the subject is the object expressed in only one of its aspects (A, this table, etc.). The predicate is another aspect of the same object, the aspect designated as B. The copula is the verb to be which designates the unity, both connective and relational, of these two aspects. But from the point of view of its intellective structure, the subject is the real object proposed, with all of its real properties (the property of being A and all the remaining properties). The predicate is a simple unreal intentional apprehension of one or several notes of the object, realized in it in connective form. The copula is the affirmation that this connective unity pertains to reality, or rather, to what A is "in reality".

This structure is essential for two reasons. First, because it shows us the structure of predicative affirmation; and second, because it places before our eyes something decisive, viz. that the "is", the "to be", does not rest upon itself but upon reality. That is, reality is not a mode of being; rather, being is grounded in reality. We saw this already in Part I, and we shall return to it in more detail in a subsequent section.

To summarize, affirmation is a moment of intellective movement which intellectively knows what a thing, already apprehended {169} as real, is "in reality". Moving in the field of reality itself, the intelligence steps back from a real thing in a retraction in which it intellectively knows what the thing "would be" in reality. This is simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, concept). Now, following in the field of reality itself, the intelligence turns therein to a real thing in order to intellectively know, in this stepping back, what the thing is in reality. And that intellection is, as we have seen, affirmation. Affirmation is the "distanced" intentum of a thing, i.e., in a stepping back. That about which one judges is something already apprehended as reality, and that which one judges of the thing is what it is "in reality". For it, the thing of which one judges can have three functions: mere position, pro-position, and subject of predication. And each of these functions constitutes a form of affirmation.

This difference among the three functions of the real in affirmation has a formally sentient character. Only because there is an impression of reality is there a field of reality, a field of the de suyo. The three functions are grounded in and established by the impression of reality. It is sentiently as if I see myself having stepped back from what something, already apprehended as real, is in reality; and it is sentiently I find myself retained by the real as apprehended and returned to it: this is sentient logos. In this reversion, the logos intellectively knows the realization of the simple unreal apprehension, and intellectively knows it by a determination of what has already, previously, been apprehended. This determination is, to be sure, anchored in the fact that it is my intellection which, by being sentient, is distanced or stepped back from, and which by being so returns to the real in three different forms: positional, propositional, and predicative. But it is because the real, when impelling me impressively to step back, opens to me {170} the three possibilities of determination: positional, constitutive, and connective. They are thus three ways of traversing the distance from the unreal to what the real is in reality (through stepping back and returning). They are three forms of intentum. A non-sentient intellection cannot step back, and therefore it cannot have the three functions: positional, constitutive, and connective; nor can it intellectively know in the corresponding triple intentionality: positional, constitutive, and connective. The logos is born from the impression of reality and returns to it in these three forms, grounded upon the three forms determined by the real as apprehended primoridially. Now, in what, formally, lies the difference between these three functions? To intellectively know what something is in reality is to intellective know the unity of the field moment and the individual moment of the real. These two moments are moments of the formality of reality impressively given in it. Whence it follows that the three functions are three forms of the unity of what is of the field and the individual, i.e., three forms of unity of the formality of reality. In this unity something which we may call "the force of reality" is made patent; not in the sense of force of imposition of the real, but in the sense of force of unity of the moment in a field and the individual moment, i.e., force of realization. The strongest unity is positional form; it is the supreme form of intellectively knowing with the logos what something is in reality. Less strong is the propositional or constitutive form; it affirms unity as constitution. Weakest, finally, is predicative affirmation, which affirms the unity of the real as connection. Altogether, then, there are three degrees of force of realization, three degrees of intellectively knowing what something is in reality.

But in each of these three forms of affirmation there can be distinct modes. The problem of the forms of affirmation {171} thus leads to the third problem. After having examined what affirming is, and after examining what the forms of affirmation are, we now have to confront the problem of the modes of affirmation.


§ 3



I said earlier that the forms of affirmation are distinguished according to the function carried out in an affirmation by the thing about which one judges. On the other hand, what I call the modes of affirmation concern the affirmative intention itself qua affirmative. This is our present problem.

Let us begin again to clarify the ideas. Affirmative intention or judgement is an intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back, of what a thing, already apprehended as real, is in reality. This intellection has its own characteristics.

Above all it is, as I said, an intellection in movement, a movement which consists in intellectively traversing the distance in which we are with respect to what a thing is in reality, i.e., in stepping back from it. This intellective movement is, then, dual. By being so, the intellective movement which is intellectively knowing that a thing is real, is not intellectively knowing yet what this real thing is in reality. In this sense, the intellective movement is above all an absence of intellection of what the thing is in reality. But it is not just a movement characterized by this absence, because it is the movement of a dual intellection, in which the movement is directed towards a fixed point, toward what the already real thing is in reality. The duality thus stamps the movement with its own character, in the sense that what is not intellectively known is going to be so, or at least is intended to be so. Whence it follows that this movement is not just an absence but something essentially different, a privation. {173} Privation is the character which duality stamps on intellective movement qua movement. This intrinsic unity of movement and duality is what constitutes expectation. The movement of privation as such is what constitutes expectation. Conversely, expectation formally consists in privational intellective movement. Expectation is the intellection of the other in its first presentation as "other". This concept already greeted us some pages back when we spoke of the concept of intellective movement.

Now it is important to repeat that expectation is what, in its etymological sense, corresponds to "looking at from afar". But this does not refer to some psychological state of anticipation; rather, it refers to an intrinsic character of the intellective movement as such. What is this character? One might think that it consists in that intellective movement which is "questioning". But we have already seen that this is not the case: questions are grounded upon expectation, and in most cases we are in intellective expectation without asking ourselves anything.

What is it that we expect in this expectation? We have already answered many times: not pure and simple reality (because that is given to us already in primordial apprehension, prior to any judgements, and only on account of it is judgement possible); rather, what we expect is not "reality" but what the real is "in reality".

This "expectant" movement takes place in stepping back. And in this being moved back a step, the intellection has, as we saw, its own character: intellective intention. It must be stressed that every intention-in order to be such-is in itself formally and constitutively expectant. I deem this concept essential. It does not refer to the fact that one must expect an {174} affirmation, but to the fact that the intention itself is the proper and formally intellective moment of expectation. If it is necessary to intellectively know that A is B, not only do I have the intentionality of B in A, but precisely because I start from A this point of departure constitutes an expectation of what the intentionality of A is going to be. Every intention is, then, formally and constitutively expectant. Conversely, every expectation, as the character of intellective movement, is formally and constitutively intentional. Intellective movement is a movement "from-toward". In this movement I can consider only that "toward" which one is going. That is the only thing which up to now has generally been considered; in the classical concept of intention, one considers only the fact that the intention "intends" its end, an end which therefore is usually termed "intentional". But I believe that this is inadequate. The fact is that one can and should consider the intention itself not only as "going toward" but also as "departing from". And then the intention is expectation. Expectation and intentionality, then, are but two intrinsically unified aspects of a single intellective movement, which is therefore "expectant intention" or "intentional expectation". Whence it follows that the intellective movement in which we intellectively know what a thing already apprehended as real is in reality is, I repeat, intentional expectation or expectant intention.

Granting this, we must ask ourselves how this intentional expectation is resolved. Resolution is the affirmation in which expectation is molded; it is intellection itself as affirmation. But let us not get confused. There is on one hand the intellective intention itself qua intention; and this intention is intrinsically expectant. But on the other hand, there is the affirmation in which this intention is molded. {175} Since it is molded intention, I have called it and will continue to call it affirmative intention. Let us not confuse, then, the intellective intention with the affirmative intention. This latter is the resolution of the first, the resolution of the expectant intention. So how is intentional expectation resolved into affirmative intention?

Affirmative intellection, as the intellection that it is, is an intellective actuality of the real. Now, this actuality of the real has different modes; and these different modes of actuality of the real determine different modes of affirmation. Each mode of affirmation thus depends essentially and constitutively upon the mode by which the actualization of the real determines or resolves the intentional expectation. Permit me to explain.

a) Above all, it is an intellective actualization of the real, but of the real as already apprehended as real; it is therefore reactualization. And this reactualization is such with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectively know what the real is in reality. We are dealing, then, with the realization of a simple apprehension in what has already been actualized as real. Now, this realization depends first of all upon the characteristics, the traits, which are already given in the primordial actualization of the thing as real. I speak of the traits as "given". This phrase is chosen for now to be deliberately neutral, because the real qua reactualization poses two questions. The first is, What is the mode by which such-and-such real thing determines the realization in it of simple apprehension? The second is that of ascertaining in what the determining itself consists, in what the real qua determining principle of this reactualization in all its modes consists. We shall concern ourselves with the latter question in Part Three. For now let us fix our attention on the first, {176} in the diverse modes through which the real determines its reactualization, i.e. the diverse modes through which the given traits of the real determine the realization or non-realization of what is simply apprehended. And it is because of this that I speak about the fact that the traits are given in reactualization. To simplify the terms, in place of reactualization I shall speak simply about the actualization of traits given in the realization of simple apprehensions. Do not confuse the actualization and the realization of traits of what is simply apprehended in reality itself with this actualization of a real thing in simple apprehensions and with the realization of these simple apprehensions in the given thing. Now, the simple apprehensions are realized in different ways depending upon the nature of the actualization of the real.

b) Now, this actualization is an intrinsic determinant of the modes of resolution of intentional expectation. Thus, if the traits of the real with respect to what it is in reality are intellectively known in a confused or ambiguous way, the resolution of the intentional expectation takes on different characteristics. And in virtue of this, these modes of resolution are those expressed in the modes of intellection itself qua affirmative intention. Thus the ambiguity, as we shall see, is a proper mode of actualization of the traits of the real with respect to simple apprehensions; and according to this mode of actualization, affirmative intention, affirmation, has that mode which constitutes doubt. To preclude any confusion I shall systematically develop the two ideas just outlined.

First, all these modes of affirming depend essentially and constitutively upon the modes of reactualization of the real in the order of simple apprehensions. {177} Ambiguity, for example, is a mode of this actualization. It is the real itself insofar as it actualizes its traits in an ambiguous way with respect to simple apprehensions, with respect therefore to what the real is in reality. It is a characteristic prior to any affirmation; it is, let us repeat, the mode of actualizing the traits of the real with respect to what this particular thing is in reality, with respect to the simple apprehensions at my disposal.

In the second place, these different modes of actualization define different modes of affirmation and of affirmative intention; for example, ambiguous actualization of the real determines dubitative affirmation or dubitative affirmative intention-doubt properly so-called. In these modes, for example the doubt-mode, we are not primarily dealing with a state of insecurity in which we are assaulted by ambiguity, in contrast to other states, such as that of security. We are not talking about states, but formal modes of affirmative intention. We do not mean that when one affirms that something is ambiguous he finds himself in a state of doubt; rather, we mean that doubt is the ambiguous affirmation of the ambiguous qua ambiguous. It is the affirmative intention itself which is intrinsically and formally doubting. The ambiguous is not just that to which affirmative intention refers, nor it is only a characteristic of what is intellectively known; rather it is at one and the same time a characteristic of intellection and the affirmation itself. Doubt is not just an "affirmative intention about the ambiguous" but an "affirmative ambiguous intention in itself, determined by the ambiguity of the actualization of some real thing. Doubt is then a mode of affirmation, not a state consequent upon affirmation; and the proof is that both moments can be quite disparate. I can be in a state of insecurity with respect to a doubting affirmation. In such a case, I am sure that the affirmation {178} is of doubt; I am sure that the thing is in reality doubtful. The same applies mutatis mutandis for certitude and all other modes of affirmation, as we shall see forthwith.

Therefore what we call 'modes of affirmation' formally consist in the modes such as the diverse actualizations of the traits of the real which determine the resolution of intentional expectation.

In what does this modality as such consist? We have already seen that affirmation is a sentient intellection at a distance, the result of "stepping back". And its sentient nature reveals that the return to the real has the character of a force, the force of realization. This force has three different degrees depending upon whether one is dealing with positional, propositional, or predicative affirmation. And this force not only has degrees, but also a quality which we might term firmness. It is just what the term and concept 'a-ffirmation' refer to. "Grade of realization" and "firmness" are not the same thing. Each of the three degrees of force of realization can be exercised with different firmness. For example, the difference between doubt and certainty has nothing to do with the force of realization, but rather with the firmness with which this force operates. I can doubt or be certain that "every woman, fickle", or that "A is B". The first phrase is nominal (a constitution), the second predicative (a connection); they are two degrees of the force of realization. But doubt and certainty are in the firmness with which the constitution or connection is realized. Every logos is sentient, and is so in two moments. First, because I sentiently intellectively know what something is in reality as a force of realization; and second because I sentiently intellectively know with a certain firmness. That is, there is force and there is firmness. The firmness is the very mode of affirmation. Now, the differences of firmness are the different modes of affirmation. {179}

Granting this, the modalization of affirmation has a clearly defined structure. Above all, we have the real actualized with its traits in primordial apprehension. These traits are notes of the real of quite diverse character, both with respect to quality and intensity as well as position. But the real we now make the terminus of a second intellection, the intellection of what it is in reality. Then intellection qua act acquires its own character; it becomes intentional expectation of what that which we have already apprehended as real is in reality. The resolution of this expectation has three moments:

a) Above all it is the moment of contribution of our simple apprehensions , or to use common parlance (but to speak much less precisely), it is the contribution of our ideas. Only as a function of our simple apprehensions can we intellectively know what the real is in reality.

b) With respect to these simple apprehensions, the traits of the real are actualized in different ways; this is the moment of reactualization. These traits, as moments of the real and simply real, are what they are in and by themselves, and nothing more. But with respect to simple apprehensions, they can take on a different mode of actualization. A far-off figure is apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality as a far-off figure, and nothing more; in itself it is something actualized as real and nothing more. But if I am to intellectively know what this figure is in reality, I draw upon my simple apprehensions, for example that of shrub, man, dog, etc. Is this figure a shrub, a man, a dog, or what? With respect to these simple apprehensions, and only with respect to them, do the traits of the far-off figure acquire a reactualization, because the fact is that I seek to intellectively know if this figure realizes the characteristics of the simple apprehension of a man, {180} a shrub, a dog, etc. It is then a second actualization but-I must again insist-only with respect to the realization of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is intellection brought to fullness in the light of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is a second intellection; and this second intellection is distinguished from the first by being intellection in the light of simple apprehensions. Herein consists the "secondarity" of second intellection: in being an intellection qualified by simple apprehensions. Simple apprehensions are not merely the terminus of an intellection, but are also and formally an intrinsic qualification of intellection. Simple apprehension is the "quali-ficating" moment of second intellection itself. Second intellection is intellection at a distance, from stepping back, and in virtue of that one knows intellectively only in the qualified light of simple apprehensions. A perfectly determined trait in primordial apprehension can be, as we shall see, only slightly determined with respect to the realization of a simple apprehension, because reactualization is actualization of the real as realization of a simple apprehension. And this reactualization is what has different modes: the unknown shape can reactualize the characteristics of a shrub, of a man, of a dog, etc. and actualize them in a more or less vague way, and so forth.

c) I intellectively know these diverse modes of reactualization, and I affirm them with respect to realization itself; this is the moment of affirmative intention, the moment of affirmation. Depending on what the modes of reactualization have been in the second moment, affirmation takes on different modalities because every affirmation is in itself modal. To be sure, this modality has nothing to do with what in classical logic is referred to as modality, viz. the difference in connection {181} of subject with predicate according to whether it is contingent, necessary, etc. Here we are not talking about the connection between subject and predicate, but about the mode in which the actualization of the notes of the real are affirmed.

Such is the structure of the modes of intellection at a distance.

The study of this structure can be made from different points of view. These modes, in fact, are mutually dependent. And this dependence is of the greatest importance in our analysis. But it is essential to delineate carefully the ideas involved, because this dependence can be of different types. "Dependence" can mean the mode in which an affirmation depends upon others with respect to its production in the mind. The dependence is then a psycho-genetic fact. But it is not this connection which is of concern to us here. The only decisive thing is the internal structure of each mode of affirmation. And it is this structure which is found to be dependent, qua structure, upon other affirmations. Thus it is possible that an affirmation might be doubtful as compared with a certain affirmation, for example. But this can mean two things. It can mean that the affirmation began as something doubtful and that doubt has given way to a certain affirmation. This is the psycho-genetic connection. But it can also mean that as a mode of affirmation the structure of the doubtful affirmation occupies a well-defined place with respect to a certain affirmation. This is a structural nexus or dependence. The two types of dependence are quite different. Our certain affirmation almost never comes preceded by a doubt, but is generated in other ways. Nonetheless, in every case the structure of certainty, the structure of what certainty is, is dependent constitutionally upon the structure of what doubt is. What we are here trying to conceptualize is not a psychogenesis {182} of our affirmations, but the intellective spectrum, so to speak, of its diverse structures. And it is only to this dependence of structural nature that I refer when I speak of the fact that some modes of affirmation are dependent upon others.

What are these modes? That is the problem we must now address.

1. In the lower part of the spectrum of affirmative structures we find a peculiar mode of affirmation. We have apprehended something as real and we seek to know intellectively what it is in reality. It can happen that we do not succeed in this effort. In that case we say that the affirmation is an affirmation of our ignorance; we do not know what the thing is in reality.

But this description is radically wrong and completely inadequate. In the first place, the verb "to know" [saber] is used.[6] True, up to now we have not spoken at all about what "knowing" is; that subject will occupy us elsewhere. Up to now I have spoken only of intellective knowing [inteligir] and of intellection. But disregarding that for the time being-however essential it is, as we shall see-let us employ the verb to know as synonymous with intellection. But even so, the previous description is radically wrong. In fact, what is this business of not knowing what something is in reality? The Pithecanthropic man from Java, for example, did not know what a rock is in reality. Do we then say that he was ignorant of what a rock is in reality? As I see it, No, because being ignorant of what something is in reality is a mode of intellection of something already apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality. All ignorance is therefore always ignorance of something already apprehended as real. We intellectively know the reality of the "rock-thing", but we are ignorant of what it is in reality. Now, the Pithecanthropic man did not have {183} primordial apprehension of the "rock-reality". Therefore his not knowing what the rock is in reality is not ignorance; it is nescience. The Pithecanthropic man did not have any intellective actuality of the thing we call a rock. His "not knowing" here is "non-intellection"; it is an "absence" of intellection. On the other hand, in the case of ignorance one has intellection of the real, but not yet intellection of what that real thing is in reality. Therefore it is not an "absence" of intellection, but a "privation" of it. Ignorance is privation of intellection of what something which has already been apprehended as real is in reality; it is not merely an absence of intellection. Strictly speaking, when one is ignorant of something one knows what the ignorance is of. The formal terminus of ignorance is the "in reality" of something already apprehended as real. To be sure, there are types of ignorance which refer to the mere reality of something. But no reality is intellectively known as merely real; rather, it is grounded (in whatever way; that does not concern us here) upon something already intellectively known as real, where intellection of what it "in reality" demands the mere reality of something else. And it can happen that we are ignorant of this reality. But then it is clear that in its ultimate root, ignorance concerns the "in reality" of something already apprehended as "real". Otherwise we would be in the situation described before: our non-intellection of mere reality would not be ignorance but nescience. It would be a case of not having the vaguest idea of that reality. But this is not ignorance; it is more than ignorance, it is nescience. Ignorance then is not nescience but a positive characteristic of affirmative intellection. Which characteristic?

Let us return once again to our modest point of departure. We have an intellection of a certain real thing and we seek to know intellectively what it is in reality. Intellection is {184} then a movement of intentional expectation, which has to be resolved. And the resolution of this expectation has three moments.

a) Above all we make use of our simple apprehensions, and with them try to intellectively know their possible actualization in what is already intellectively known as real. Does the figure actualize the simple apprehension of a man, of a shrub, or of something else? At this point the two other essential moments of intellection arise in the intellection.

b) Intellection of the realization of simple apprehensions (which we have at our disposal) in the real already apprehended as such, is the second essential moment. This realization can have different modes which are, so to speak, different degrees of sufficiency.

There is a lowest degree. With respect to the simple apprehensions which we have at our disposal, it can be the case that the real realizes none of them. The thing is real but it has not been actualized with respect to any simple apprehension; it is what I term indeterminate actualization. And this type of modal actualization constitutes a mode of realization of the order of the simple apprehensions in the real thing. And this realization is also indeterminate. What is this indetermination? Of course, it is not a "lack" of actualization, but a positive "privation" of the "understood" actualization. In what does this privation consist?

Let us recall what it is to intellectively know what something is "in reality". Every real thing apprehended in its formality of reality has two moments, that of individual reality and that of reality in a field. And it is precisely their intrinsic unity which formally constitutes what the real thing is "in reality". Now, as I have already said, when one intellectively knows something real "among" others, these two moments are {185} in a certain way functionally differentiated, since the field encompasses not one but many things. Whence the unity of being in a field and being an individual is not apparent. It is rather mediated by simple apprehensions in the field of reality itself. It is the realization of these simple apprehensions which fills the field moment and its unity with individual reality; mediation is the actualization of a real individual thing in simple apprehensions. Now it can happen that individual reality is not actualized in any of the simple apprehensions we have had. In that case there is a unique actualization, viz. the actualization of the real thing as in a field, but an empty field. The real thing thus is inscribed in the "hollowness" of the field. Whence it follows that the unity of the individual thing and the field remains in suspense. That is, what this thing is in reality remains in suspense. This suspension is not just an absence, nor some lack of determination; rather, it is a positive mode of actualization, viz. privational determination. It is the positive actualization of the "in reality", but in a privative mode. It is then the privative actuality of a hollowness; and this privational actuality is precisely the "indetermination". Indeterminate, then, does not here mean indefinite, because being indefinite is a mode of determination. Indetermination means rather "un-defined". "Un-defined" is not the same as "indefinite". In virtue of that, the ambit of the indeterminate is constitutively open without limits; it is open to everything else. "Everything else" does not refer to other things, but to what the "un-defined" thing might be in reality. It is the "everything else" of the "in reality". What is un-defined is the mode of unity of the individual and of the being in a field, i.e., what the thing is in reality. As it is the {186} un-definition of something already definite as real in primordial apprehension, it follows that this un-definition is privation. Privation is the actuality of the "hollowness" of the individual in the field; it is the "in reality" in suspense. Simple apprehensions are what determine the actuality of the indeterminate.

And here one sees the difference between the traits of a thing in and of itself, and its traits with respect to a second actualization. The traits of a real thing in and of themselves can be perfectly determinate in their individual reality, and yet their intrinsic unity with respect to the field can be indeterminate. The real thing is determinate, but what it is in reality is indeterminate.

c) This actuality of the indeterminate, this actuality of the "hollowness" of the field of individual reality, in turn defines its own mode of intellective affirmation because it defines its own mode of realizing something in simple apprehension. Every intellective movement is, as we have seen, intentional expectation. And therefore, qua mere intellection, that movement is a privational intention; it is in just this respect that its expectant character consists. This intentional privational expectation is resolved in an affirmation whose mode is determined by the mode of the actualization. When the actualization is a privational "hollowness", the affirmation takes on a special mode. Every expectant intention is in itself privational; when the actuality of the expected is indetermination (in the sense explained), it follows that intentional privation becomes the character of the affirmation; it is the privational aspect of intention molded into a mode of affirmation. It is not privation of intention; that would be just an intellective deficiency. Nor is it intention {187} itself as deprived of a positive terminus, because that would be just some manifestation. It is an intention which consists in the very mode of affirming; it is the affirmation itself as privational. Privationality of the act of affirmation is vacuous affirmation. Now, this mode of affirming is precisely what constitutes ignorance. Ignorance is affirming "privationally" the "in reality". It is an affirmation suspended in itself as affirmation. It is a positive mode of affirmation. A mode of affirmation such that the affirmative intention is as if folded back upon itself is a proper intentional hollowness; the empty affirmative intention as a mode of affirming is what ignorance consists in. It is like a shot in the dark. It is, then, in the first place a hollowness, but in the second a hollowness of what the real is in reality. Hollowness is then a positive affirmative ambit; a positive affirmation in hollowness, an indeterminate affirmation. The expectant privational intention is folded back upon itself, molded into a suspended affirmation. It is being suspended as a mode of affirmation itself, not merely a suspension of what is affirmed. Such is the essence of ignorance: a suspended vacuous affirmation, of the indeterminate as such.

Precisely because ignorance is a mode of affirmative intellection, man not only has to go on learning what things are in reality, he also has to learn to be ignorant. Only thus can he create new simple apprehensions which in time can lead from ignorance to other modes of affirmative intellection. The access to ignorance, on the periphery and above nescience, is a firm intellective movement.

The realization of simple apprehensions is therefore {188} not a simple task. Insofar as this realization progresses, real things actualize their traits in a more definite way; this is the structural emergence of other modes of affirmative intellection.

2. What a thing is in reality can begin to actualize and realize more of its traits with respect to simple apprehensions.

a) Actualization of a real thing in these simple apprehensions is not purely and simply indeterminate. The actualization, in fact, is sometimes a more or less vague, even fleeting, moment; sometimes it is extremely concrete. It is the moment in which the announcement of a determination begins to emerge, however vaguely. It is a purely dawning or inchoative moment. But it is an indication which is no more than an indication, since scarcely has the actualization been indicated when the emerging traits once again dissolve and become invalid. It is what I shall term a "revoked indication". Now, this revoked indication formally constitutes that mode of actualization which is the hint. It is not mere indetermination, but neither is it determination; it is the dawning of revoked determination, the mere suggesting of a possible determination, its first indication. The hint is a mode of actualizing a real thing with respect to what it is in reality, i.e., with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we seek to intellectively know it. The traits of the real thing are never hints; they are what they are and nothing more. On the other hand the hint is always and only a hint or evidence of something, and this something is what is apprehended in simple apprehension. It is then only a hint of what the real thing is in reality.

b) This mode of actualization and realization moulds the affirmation in accordance with a particular mode of intention, viz. the affirmative intention of the hint as guess. {189} A guess is a mode of affirmation. This does not refer to guessing an affirmation, but to affirm by guessing, so to speak. The emptiness of intention, i.e., of ignorance, now gives way to that of guessing the intention. This is the intellection of the first pointer to the determination of what a real thing is in reality. One guesses only what the thing is in reality, because it is actualized for us as a hint.

This intellection naturally admits of various degrees. Merely pointing to a determination can be a pointing which tends to make itself clear. But it is a pointing quickly revoked. This mode of hint is what I call clarescence, the breaking of the dawn of clarity. Guessing the affirmative intention of the clarescent is glimpsing, the glimpsing of the clarescent. The hint can be more than just clarescence. In the revoked pointing of the hint, not only may the light which is dawning be actualized, but some traits of the thing as well. But these things, now revoked, actualize the thing as something which is in reality poorly drawn or sketched. This actualization of the hint can be called blurred. Something blurred consists in traits being actualized sketchily with respect to what the thing is in reality. It does not refer to a type of mix of traits, but to a rigorous sketching. Sketching is not the privation of figure, but neither is it a precise figure. "Sketching" here refers to the revoking, which actualizes the traits as not being determinately of the thing such as it is simply apprehended. And this "not" actualizes the thing not as indeterminate but as sketched. The revoking sketches the traits of the thing actualized in simple apprehension. Nothing is blurry in itself but only is so with respect to {190} simple apprehensions. And the blurred formally consists in this sketching. Now, affirmative intention, the realization of the blurred qua blurred is confusion. This does not refer to some confusion of "ideas" or anything of that sort; rather, it is a mode of affirming, affirming confusedly that something is in reality blurred. We dimly perceive what that thing is in reality. Finally, in the repeated appearance and disappearance of actualized traits, there are some which do not point to something else, which remain as definitively revoked; whereas others continue to point insistently. The blurred thus continues to manifest vaguely its traits. So the hint is more than what is sketched of the blurry; it is realization as indication. It is a "pointing manifestation", but one which is revoked as soon as it points. Therefore we say that its traits are only indicated. There is only an indication of what the thing is in reality. Now, affirmative intention of something indicated, realized as such, is what we call suspicion. It is a mode of affirmative intention: one suspects something which is only indicated. It is a suspicion of what the thing is in reality.

To summarize, hint can present three qualities: clarescence, blurredness, and indication. The intellective intention of the hint as such, the guess, thus possesses three qualities determined by the hint: the glimpse of the clarescent, the confusion of the blurry, and the suspicion of the indicated.

But this last quality, suspicion, is already the inchoate transition to a different mode of affirmation.

3. In fact the peak of the indication conduces to fixing a set of traits with respect to simple apprehensions. {191} In them a real thing is actualized in a way different from and superior to the hint, and this actualization determines an affirmative intention superior to the guess.

a) What is this actualization? Recall first that in the actualization of indetermination and hint, the multiplicity of traits is always an open multiplicity: the hollowness and revocation leave open the multiplicity of actualizable traits. But now, the traits do not remain revoked or even just manifested; they are on the contrary sustained. Before, even though manifested, they did not go beyond being indices, since they were going to be revoked immediately. But now, what is manifested is not revoked. Thus the manifested traits become sustained. What are these sustained traits? They form a multiplicity of a very definite character. Above all it is a multiplicity of traits which is quite fixed: something real has this or that set of traits; for example, the traits of a shrub or a dog, but not those of a man. The thing in question is in reality only a dog or a shrub. It is in this that sustaining formally consists. When they are not revoked, the traits comprise a multiplicity which is not open but closed, a bounded multiplicity. To be sure, the traits are not determined, but neither are they random; the scope of their non-determination is one which is bounded. Moreover, this multiplicity not only is bounded, it is a defined multiplicity; the traits are of a dog, a shrub, etc. The indetermination is not just bounded but also defined. The bounding of the area of indetermination, and the definition of the traits constitutes a decisive step beyond mere indetermination.

Here we have the traits of a real thing actualized now with respect to simple apprehensions. But it remains to go {192} one step further. These traits are sustained, but by whom? By the real thing itself. It isn't enough to say that traits comprise a bounded and definite multiplicity; rather it is necessary to say in what the sustaining itself consists. The sustaining is thus the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to the simple apprehensions of dog and shrub. Hence what must be said is in what the sustaining consists as actualization. When something actualizes its traits in a sustained manner, we do not say that the thing could be one thing or another indifferently, but that it could be one thing as well as another. Sustaining is not mere insistence, but that mode of actualization of the "either one". Now, these traits pertain to the real thing. It is the real thing which sustains the traits of the dog or of the shrub. And then this thing is no longer either indeterminate nor a hint. It is no longer one or the other, but as much one as the other: it is ambiguous. The mode of actualization of what a real thing is in reality now has the mode of ambiguity. In the sustaining of multiple traits of a bounded and defined multiplicity, a thing is in reality ambiguous. What is bounded and defined of the multiplicity concerns the traits; the ambiguity concerns its sustaining, its actualization; it is an intrinsic mode of actualization. Together with the mode of actualization of indetermination and hint, we now have a third mode of actualization: ambiguity. It is a real thing itself which in reality is actualized ambiguously with respect to simple apprehensions.

b) Now, actualization of a real thing as ambiguous is molded into its own form of realization of affirmative intention; this is doubt. Doubt is formally the affirmation of the ambiguous real qua ambiguous. Doubt is etymologically a mode of duplicity. But here we are not dealing {193} with the duality of intellection by stepping back, at a distance, but the dual character of the actualization of the real. It is this special mode of duality which constitutes ambiguity. Let us remark in passing that when speaking of doubt and ambiguity, it is not necessary that there be only two terms (dog, shrub); there could be a greater number. But for the sake of clarity I limit myself to those cases where there are two. And this is the essential point. Doubt is not grounded in disjunction; it is not grounded in the fact that a real thing is in reality either a dog or a shrub. Doubt is grounded, on the contrary, upon a conjunction, namely that something can be as much dog as shrub, i.e., upon an ambiguity. And as a mode of affirmation, doubt is not a type of oscillation or vacillation between two affirmations. It is on the contrary a mode of affirming what a real thing is ambiguously in reality. We vacillate because there is a doubtful affirmation; but there is no doubtful affirmation because we vacillate. Doubt is a mode of affirmation, not a conflict between two affirmations. We affirm yet with doubt the ambiguity of what something real is in reality. It is not a not-knowing where to turn, but knowing that the thing is in reality ambiguous. It is of course understood that the thing is really ambiguous with respect to my simple apprehensions; nothing is ambiguous in itself.

Here we have the third mode of affirmation: doubt. It constitutes a structure erected upon the structure of ignorance and of conjecture. The emptiness of indetermination is molded into the conjecture of the hint. And this conjecture or guessing grows: the glimpse of the clarescent becomes the confusion of the blurred; and this confusion is pinned down in the suspicion of the indicated. Now, the suspicion of the indicated is pinned down in the doubt of the ambiguous. In the reduction of {194} indetermination to hint and hint to ambiguity, one is so to speak stretching the circle of what the real thing is in reality. One more step, and this circle takes on a qualitatively different mode, which in turn determines a different mode of affirmative intellection.

4. In fact, it can happen that something which is present, while still ambiguous, is found to be closer to one of the two poles of the ambiguity than the other. This approximation is not just gradual but the expression of a new mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality, a mode which in turn determines a new mode of affirmation, of realization.

a) As actualization with respect to simple apprehensions, a real thing is closer to one than the other. What is this proximity? In ambiguity one deals with a multiplicity which is bounded and limited. But now a new characteristic appears, that of "weight", pondus. Actualization has a certain weight; it is not just a metaphor introduced ad hoc. It is something extremely precise which is expressed in a term, pre-ponderance. The intrinsic character of actuality is more than simple ambiguity; it is preponderance. What is preponderant is the actualization of the traits with respect to a simple apprehension. Approximation pertains intrinsically to the actualization of a thing; and this intrinsic approximation is what constitutes preponderance. In virtue of that, the actuality of a thing includes, just as in the case of ambiguity, two terms 'bounded' and 'defined'; but it sustains one more than the other. Therefore the thing is no longer "one as much as the other" but "rather more one than the other". The "rather one than" is the preponderance. In ambiguity this character of preponderance is cloaked, so to speak. From such a point of view, {195} ambiguity would be an equi-ponderance. But the converse is not true: ambiguity is a mode of actuality which is intrinsically distinct from and independent of all ponderance. The continuity of the transition is a mode of actuality to the other; its intrinsic irreducibility cannot be reduced.

b) Now, actualization of the preponderant as such determines its own mode of realization, of affirmative intention, viz. opinion. Opinion is formally a mode of affirmation; it is affirming not vacuously, nor by guessing, nor in a doubting fashion, but as opinion. This does not refer to an opinion one may have about a possible affirmation; rather, it is a mode of affirmation. What the thing is in reality, preponderantly, is for example a dog; and the mode of affirmation of the preponderant as such is formally opinion. Nothing is preponderant nor therefore subject to opinion in itself; rather being preponderant, to be subject to opinion is to be so only as an actuality with respect to simple apprehensions. In and by itself, the distant dim figure has all the features of a distant dim figure, and nothing more. But with respect to my simple apprehensions, this distant dim figure has the traits of a dog rather than a shrub. Affirmation as an intentional mode of the "rather than" is an affirmation which is intrinsically subjectable to opinion. Only as the terminus of this affirmation can preponderant be called subject to opinion.

As a mode of affirmation, opinion can have different characteristics depending upon the weight of the traits actualized. Preponderance, preponderant actuality, can at time be only a light tilting or attraction. It is a kind of inchoate gravitation. The affirmative intention {196} of the actual as tilting or attraction is that intention we call inclination. This is an expression which is most definitely ambiguous. It can suggest, indeed, the idea of a tendency or something like it, as happens when one speaks of good or bad inclinations. But here it means only inclination as an intrinsic mode of affirming. The same thing happens with this expression as with the word 'intention'. From meaning the intention of an act of will it came to mean the intentionality proper to intellection. I believe that it is necessary to bring about the same thing with respect to this expression as happened centuries ago with the word 'intention'. Inclination is a modalization of this intention; it is the mode of affirming, of realizing actuality as tilting or attracting.

Just one more step and the form in which the preponderant traits are actualized will no longer be merely tilting or attracting; rather, those traits will "carry" more on one side than the other. We may term this mode of actuality gravity, a gravitation not merely inchoate but in a certain way macroscopic. The affirmative intention of the preponderant with gravity is probability. Here I refer to probability as a mode of affirmation, not of probability as a characteristic of physical reality. What physics understands by probability is as I see it what we might call the measure of possibility. All physical states of the electron described by its wave function are possible. But all are not equally possible. The quantitative structure of this of this possibility is what as I see it constitutes real probability. But here we are not dealing with that. We are not dealing with the measure of the real but with modes of affirmation; I affirm probably that a thing is such or such in reality. The modalization of the preponderance {197} according to gravity constitutes a probable intention as a mode of intention.

Finally, it can happen that certain traits have so much "weight" that their load is clearly to one side. This is the actuality of the preponderant as conquest. The mode of affirmation, of realization, of conquest is conviction. We say that traits drag us along toward an affirmation. Being in a dragged-along intention is that mode of affirmative intention constituting conviction. The "conquering" [vincere] within a thing is "at the same time" the "con-vincing" of the intention.

In summary, weight, preponderance, has three qualities of actuality: tilting (or attraction), gravity, and conquest. And these qualities determine three qualities of affirmation: inclination, probability, and conviction. They are the three modes of opinion.

But however much the traits drag along and determine the conviction of intellective knowing, they are but pointed out or indicated. One more constriction in this structure might lead us to a different mode of affirmative intention.

5. It can happen, in fact, that a thing is actualized in traits which are perfectly and univocally determinate, but which nonetheless are not necessarily what the thing is in reality. Rather, they constitute only, so the speak, the outward appearance of what it is in reality. This determines its own mode of affirmative intention.

a) What is this mode of actuality? A dim figure in the distance has all the traits proper to a dog. Here, then, we are not involved with any ambiguity at all, nor with any preponderance. The traits are neither ambiguous nor preponderant; they are on the contrary univocally determined. We say, then, and with reason, that we see a dog. {198} But is this the same thing which occurs when I see a dog in my house? I also see the dog in my house; but there is an essential difference between these two apprehensions. In my house, I see something which in fact "is" a dog, whereas that which I see in the distance, although it has all the canine characteristics perfectly defined and delineated, nonetheless only "has" them. This "having" indicates precisely the difference in actualization of the real with respect to the traits of simple apprehension of the dog. What is this having, in what does it consist, and what is the mode of actualization of a real thing with respect to it? These are the important questions.

In the first place, the "having" designates a certain difference between what a real thing is in reality and its traits. Otherwise the verb "to have" would lack meaning. This does not refer to ambiguity or preponderance, because ambiguity and preponderance concern the traits of a thing and here these traits are univocally determined. The difference marking off "having" has to do with a different dimension, the effective volume of a thing. Permit me to explain. Actualized traits are univocally determined, but only constitute what is superficial-the super-facies-or the surface of the thing's real volume. Now, the volume qua circumscribed by these "facies" or faces has that mode of actuality termed aspect. Here, 'aspect' does not mean something which is only more or less precise, variable, or ephemeral and circumstantial. On the contrary, aspect is here something perfectly precise; and in its precision it pertains intrinsically, really, and determinately to the thing. But it does so in a special way. Aspect is only a mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality. It does not refer, I repeat, either to ambiguity or preponderance of traits; rather, it refers to the fact that, in its own precision, this group of traits {199} comprises the aspect of what the thing is in reality. What the dim distant figure has is precisely the aspect of a dog.

In the second place, What is this 'having' itself? The aspect is not formally what the real thing is in reality, but an aspect "of" the thing. This "of" is a genitive of intrinsic pertaining. In virtue of it the aspect is something like an envelopment or external projection of what a thing is in reality. This envelopment is not a type of encapsuling, because then the aspect would not be intrinsic to the real thing but would contend with it. Now, having [tener] is not containing [contener]. The dimly perceived figure in the distance has the traits of a dog; nonetheless, it is but the dog's aspect. The pertaining of the aspect to a real thing is a type of pressure, by which the aspect is more or less "attached" to what the thing is in reality. What the thing is in reality is projected, so to so speak, in its traits, which are thus its "ex-pression". The unity of the aspect with what a thing is in reality is the unity of "ex-pression". And this expression is a manifestation, therefore, of the thing. Having is, as such, manifesting. Aspect is the ambit of manifestation of what a thing is in reality. Here we see clearly the difference between ambiguous manifestation and preponderance. The ambiguous and the preponderant are constituted in what "is now" manifested. On the other hand, with regard to aspect, one does not deal with what is now manifest, but with manifesting itself.

In the third place, "What is the mode of actualization in aspect and manifestation of what a thing is in reality? When I apprehend a dog in my house, I apprehend the dog and in it the manifestation of its traits, its aspect; I therefore say that it is in fact a dog. But when I see at a distance a figure which has the aspect of a dog, I do {200} the inverse operation: I apprehend the aspect and intellectively know in it the actualization of what the thing is in reality; I go from the aspect to the dog. The first thing which strikes me about this actualization is the dog's aspect. And this "striking me" is what, etymologically, comprises obviousness. In the obvious a real thing is actualized, but merely as aspect. And upon going from aspect to thing, it is obvious that the latter has been manifested in aspect: a thing is obviously what is manifested in its aspect. Precisely on account of this it never occurred to anyone to say without further ado that what is apprehended is a dog. But it is a dog only obviously. The obvious is on one hand the aspect as being "of" a thing; on the other hand this "of" admits of degrees of pressure. And in virtue of this the aspect is, in a certain way, "attached" to the a thing but with laxity. Laxitude is the formal character of merely "having". Laxitude of determination is univocal, but the "of" itself is lax; strictly speaking a thing could be in reality different than its aspect. Actualization has, then, a precise mode: it is the aspect which manifests as obvious what a real thing is in reality. Obviousness is the new mode of actualization. Like all the rest, this mode is so only with respect to simple apprehension. Nothing is obvious in itself, but only with respect to a simple apprehension. The realization of the simple apprehension as aspect is only now obvious.

b) Now, the actualization of a thing as something obvious determines a proper mode of affirmative intention of realization; it is plausibility. Plausibility is formally affirmation of the obvious. It is a mode of affirming, viz. affirming plausibly that a thing is in reality such as its aspect manifests it. Plausibility is a mode of affirming, and that which is affirmed in this mode is the obvious. But since {201} the obvious is what strikes us, it follows that plausibility is the form in which intentional expectation of intellection at a distance is molded. Simple apprehension is plausibly affirmed as realized in a thing. The plausible, just by virtue of being so, is what a thing is in reality, as long as the contrary is not evident. This "as long as" expresses at once the character of the obvious reality from the aspect and the plausible character of its affirmation.

This idea of the obvious and the plausible is, as I see it, what constitutes Parmenides' doxa. The mind is borne to what strikes it when it apprehends things in accordance with their form and their names. Onoma and morphé are the mode in which things strike us; náma-rupa say some of the Upanishads. Forms and names are the obvious aspect of a thing. And affirming that things are thus in reality is just the plausible, the doxa. It is not a question of mere phenomenological appearances, nor of sensible perceptions, much less of concrete entities as opposed to being as such. As I see it, the question is one of obviousness and plausibility. All affirming of the concrete multiplicity of things is simply affirming the obvious, affirming that things are in accordance with the aspect which strikes us. Therefore that affirmation is only plausible. For Parmenides, the philosopher goes beyond the obvious and the plausible, to the true being of things. For Parmenides and the most important philosophers of the Vedanta, our science and our philosophy could only be science and philosophy of the aspectual. This mutual implication between aspect, obviousness, and plausibility is, as I see it, the interpretation both of Eleatic philosophy as well as some Vedantic thought. {202}

What a real thing is in reality is thus univocally determined, but in a lax sense. A thing "has" this or that aspect in reality, and therefore is obviously the way it is. Affirmation of the obvious as such is plausibility. The plausible is the mode of affirming the "real-manifest-thing", but nothing more.

But we are not yet finished.

6. Let us suppose, in fact, that the thing in question I do not apprehend off in the distance but nearby, for example in my house. I apprehend that the thing is a dog. Then I do not say that the thing has the aspect of dog, but that it is a dog. What is this mode of actualization of the thing and what is the mode of its affirmation?

a) Above all, the difference between a dog and a canine aspect is not primary. Rather, it is always posterior to the intellective apprehension of the dog itself, and therefore is grounded in the intellection of dog. The nature of aspect is thus grounded upon the actualization of what a thing is in reality, and not the other way around, as previously occurred. In this actualization what we previously called "aspect" is not, properly speaking, an aspect but a moment incorporated into the thing. Aspect is now what gives body to the thing. A thing is not just volume but body. Incorporation is the primary character of the new mode of actualization. What we previously called "aspect" is only the form of actuality of what the real thing is in reality. And as such it should be called corporeity. I am not referring only to the body as an organism or anything of that nature; rather to the body as merely the moment of actuality of a real thing itself. It is the moment of actuality of a simple apprehension in the real thing itself.

In the second place, precisely on account of this, the actualization {203} means that it is the thing itself and not only its manifestation which realizes my simple apprehension. This simple apprehension is not actualized only in the aspect; it is not an aspectual actualization but an actualization of what a thing is in reality. That is, what is realized from a simple apprehension constitutes a moment of the real thing itself in its reality. That is the constitutional character of this new actualization. Here, constitution is not a character of the reality of a thing, but only of the intellective actualization of what that thing is in reality. 'Constitutive' here means what pertains to what the thing is in reality; it is not a character inside of the real thing by which one distinguishes other characteristics of it, for example those which are adventitious. A trait which belongs to what a thing is in reality is a trait which constitutes this "in reality" of the thing. Here the genitive "of" does not mean "having" but "constituting". The simple apprehension of the dog is not "had" by this thing; rather, it constitutes what the thing is in reality: a dog. Laxity has given way to constitution.

Then what is the mode of actualizing of a thing's traits univocally determined as constitutive moments of its actualization? The answer is simple: the traits which form a body with what the thing is in reality, and which therefore pertain to the constitution of its actuality, are traits of what the thing in fact or effectively is in reality.[7] Indeed, effectivity is the new mode of actualization. This does not refer to these traits manifesting what a thing is in reality, but rather that they are traits which in effect are of it. Of interest is not the aspect which a thing has, but something constitutive of what it is in reality.

Corporeity, constitution, and effectivity are three concepts which, {204} upon reflection, if not perfectly identical in this problem, at least are three concepts for which the words expressing them are ultimately synonymous. For better understanding, I shall call this mode of being actualized 'effectivity'.

Here we must pause briefly. These ideas of constitution and corporeity may seem to be the same as those characterizing the primordial apprehension of reality. A real thing apprehended in and by itself is compact; it seems, then, that what we call the actualization of a real thing in intellective movement is only a new designation for compaction. But this is not at all the case, because affirmative intellection is an intellection at a distance (by stepping back) of mediate character; it is not intellection of a thing in and by itself. In intellective movement we have distanced ourselves from a thing and we return to it in order to intellectively know it in a reactualization. This reactualization, however much it may be actualization, is only "re-". What does this "re-" mean? To be sure, it is not compaction in any primary sense. What we have called 'constitution' is not compaction but something similar to this; it is rather a re-constitution. When we step back from a real thing, not only my intellection of reality, but also my intellection of what the real thing is in reality, is distanced. The compaction is broken into incompaction. Now, in effectivity, in the constitution of actuality, what a thing is in reality is actualized not in a compact mode, but in a reconstituted mode. Seeing this white paper is a primordial apprehension of reality. Actualizing it as a piece of paper which "is white" is a reconstitution. In virtue of being so, the constitution is subsequent to the compaction. It is, if one wishes, the mode in which the non-compact becomes in a certain way compact. This becoming is reactualization. {205}

Effectivity is constitutive of the actuality of what a thing is in reality. It is a new mode of actuality: not indetermination, not hint, not ambiguity, not preponderance, not obviousness; rather, it is effectivity univocally determined.

b) This mode of actualization determines a mode of affirmative intention, viz. certainty. The in fact-ness of constitution determines the certain firmness of affirmation. Certainty, radically considered, is not a mental state of mine. We are not talking about being sure but rather that the thing apprehended is thus with total firmness. The word 'certainty' [certeza], then, is taken in its etymological sense. That is certain which is already fixed; it is the fixedness of a thing. 'Certain' [cierto] is an adjective derived from the verb cernir which means to choose with firmness, to screen. In Spanish we have the derivative acertar which does not mean "to be sure" but "to hit upon precisely that which one aimed at"; "to be now sure of" something is not a type of security but a goal reached. Whence the verb acquired the meaning of encountering. Certainty is thus the supreme degree of firmness of intention. By the same token, we can say that it is unqualified firmness, as opposed to other modes of affirmation such as doubt or probability. Certainty is not the maximum probability, as is often said; rather, it is another mode of affirming with a different firmness. In certainty we have firmness par excellence. Here I again emphasize the difference between a judgement which is certainly firm and the primordial apprehension of reality. In the primordial apprehension of reality there is, if one wishes, a primary firmness of an intellection of the real in and by itself; this is the mode of intellection of the compact. But strictly speaking primordial apprehension does not have firmness; that rather is the exclusive province of certain judgements. In certainty, one deals, so to speak, with {206} a "con-firmation" of what was the firmness of the primordial apprehension.

The two characteristics of re-constitution and con-firmation, taken together, i.e. taking together the "re-" and the "con-", are the two moments of certain affirmative intellection in contrast to the compact apprehension of reality; they are the two moments of certain firmness, of certainty. For this reason we can say that certain judgement recovers a real thing, but at a different level. And this different level is the "in reality".

With this we have structurally analyzed the most important zones of the spectrum of affirmation modes. For this purpose I have had recourse to examples which make the point clearly, e.g. the dim figure at a distance. But in order to preclude incorrect interpretations it is important to point out that these modes are applied not only to what it is to be a dog, a shrub, etc., but also to the most modest and elemental trait of the real. Thus, if we seek to intellectively know the color which a thing possesses in reality, it can happen that a thing has, in the intellective movement of my apprehension, an indeterminate color. For example, I have a hint that the color is blue, green, or a lilac hue; it can be that it is more

blue than green, that it has a blue aspect, or that it is in fact blue.

All of these modes constitute the spectral gamut of affirmation modes. The actualization can be indeterminate, a hint (clarescent, blurry, indicating), ambiguous, preponderant (tilting or attracting, gravity, conquering), obvious, effectively. Correlatively, the modes of affirmation, of realization, are determined: ignorance, conjecture (guess, confusion, suspicion), doubt, opinion (inclination, probability, conviction), plausibility, certainty.

All these modes are so many modes of resolution of the intentional expectation in affirmation. They are {207} modes of firmness. And these modes depend upon the diverse modes in which the real is actualized differentially in intellective movement.

But this poses a decisive question for us, because all these modes of affirmation-as we have just seen at great length-are modes in which the real determines affirmation in its dimension of firmness. But now we have to ask ourselves not what they are nor in what the modes of determination consist, but rather what is the determining itself. The study of what affirmation is, of what its forms are (force of realization), and what its modes are (modalities of firmness), has been the study of the structure of affirmation. Now we have to delve into this other important question: the real determinant of affirmation, the medial structure of the sentient logos. {208}







We saw in Section I of this Second Part what the intellection of a real thing is with respect to other things, i.e., what the intellection of a real thing in the field of reality is. This intellection is what we call 'logos'. This logos as intellection has three basic, fundamental characteristics. In the first place, the logos intellectively knows what a real thing is in reality; but does so based upon another thing simply apprehended through stepping back, i.e., at a distance. To be in reality is to be a this, a how, and a what. This intellective knowing based upon another thing is the moment of duality. In the second place, in this duality one intellectively knows what the real is in reality going from a real thing to the other things of the field. This is the dynamic moment of intellection. This movement has, as we saw, two phases. In the first we are impelled from the thing which we seek to know intellectively toward that based on which we are going to intellectively know the former. This phase is a movement of retraction. In it one intellectively knows in simple apprehension what a thing "might be" in reality. But as we are restrained by the real thing, the movement of being impelled or retraction is going to be followed by a second phase, one which in a certain fashion is contrary to the first. This is the movement of return or intentum from reality itself in a field toward the thing. In this return one intellectively knows not what a thing "might be" but what it "is" in reality; it is af-

firmation. {210} The study of intellective movement in its two phases has been carried out in Section 2.

Now, the step from the "might be" to the "is" is determined in the field of reality itself. The field, we said, is not something which is seen but something that makes us see; it is the medium of intellection. Here the duality does not constitute a structural moment of the dynamism, but a moment of the "mediality". The medium is what makes us discern, from among the many "might be's" of the thing, that particular "might be" which is more than "might be": it is the "is". And this poses a new problem for us. In Section 2 we studied the formal dynamic structure of the logos, but now we must study the determination by which the medium of intellection, reality, makes us "discern" what a real thing is among the various "might be's". That is, what is it that determines the realization of a determinate simple apprehension of the real thing. This is the theme of Section 3, the formal medial structure of the logos. We shall center this study on two questions:

1. What is that determination in itself.

2. What is the character of the logos qua determinate; truth and logos

The study will be carried out in the following two chapters.



[1] [The phrase "items of fiction" is used here to translate Zubiri's fictos; etymologically, both derive from the Latin fictum, from facere, to make. The English plural 'fictions' should be understood here in this sense.-trans.]^

[2] [English does not normally use the construction to which Zubiri here makes reference in Spanish and Latin, in which the verb to be is omitted, so the translated sentences may sound rather peculiar-trans.]^

[3] [Vergil, Aeneid, Book 4, verses 569-570. -trans.]^

[4] [This is an idomatic expression-trans.]^

[5] [Zubiri's word is complexión, which means constitution in the physiological sense.-trans.]^

[6] [As noted earlier, estar has the meaning of "is" in the strong sense of "is actually" or "is here-and-now".-trans.]^

[7] [Zubiri employs several Spanish verbs which have the English translation, 'to know': saber, from the Latin sapere; conocer, from the Latin cognoscere; and inteligir, from the Latin intelligere. The first refers to knowing in the sense of intellectual or practical knowledge; the second generally means 'to know' in the sense of 'to be familiar with' or 'to know someone'; the third is what is translated throughout this book as, 'to intellectively know'.-trans.]^

[8] [The Spanish word Zubiri uses is 'effectivamente', which is stronger than the English 'effectively', although the idea is similar. It is closer to the English 'in fact', though to avoid very awkward expressions, 'effective', 'effectively', and 'effectiveness' will be used.-trans.]^