The field is first and foremost a moment of the formality of each real thing. Therefore understanding the field is something proper to the primordial apprehension of reality. The field is not just something privative with respect to the logos; indeed, it is not a primary moment of the logos. It is a moment of the logos, but one which is consequent, i.e., derived from immediate apprehension. It is necessary to insist upon this point: everything we may say about the field is already given in the primordial apprehension of reality of each real thing. Hence, this study should have been included in the first part of the book; but nonetheless I have reserved it for the second part because it is here that the field discharges its most important function.

We shall study the field in three successive phases:

1. General characteristics of the field of real things.

2. Strict concept of the field.

3. Internal structure of the field itself.


§ 1


In general, language has only terms taken from visual apprehension to describe the field. And so, it might seem that the field is only a visual one. But this is a simple limitation of our language. Thus, recall that there are such things as background music, layers of footprints, etc., and that there is a field of displacement as much of things as of my own body. So taking the problem in all of its generality, we may say that the field is the unity of all these things insofar as all of them are actually in it, and therefore the field encompasses them. Even when we employ visual language, what is designated by that language is much broader than just the visual. Thus we are treating the field as the ambit of reality.

The field has a general structure which is very important. Above all there is in the field one or several things which are directly apprehended; they constitute the first level of the field. And when this first level is reduced to a single thing, that thing then acquires the characteristic of the center of the field. With respect to this first level, other things constitute the domain of the rest. And the rest of the things have a precise relation to the first level. In the first place, some of them constitute the background against which the things of the first level are apprehended. This dimension is what constitutes standing out: the things {23} of the first level stand out against the background of the others. But in the second place there are other things which are not part of the background, but simply something which is in the periphery of the field. Thanks to this, the rest of the things of the field acquire a dimension of proximity or distance. The periphery is not strictly speaking a line but a variable zone. As one extends the things of the periphery, they recede further and further until they are lost. For this reason the periphery is the zone of the indefinite, both because it can remain indeterminate in itself, and because even when it is determined it can remain unnoticed by me. First level, background, and periphery are the triple dimension, so to speak, of the field. To be sure, these structures are not fixed. For example, I can vary the first level-which automatically changes the background and the periphery.

The field thus constituted is so, if I may be permitted the expression, in a private way, because the totality of this field in its three zones (first level, background, periphery) is surrounded at the same time by a line which positively determines what the field encompasses; this is precisely its horizon. The horizon is not merely a line circumscribing it, but an intrinsic moment of the field itself. To be sure, it does not pertain directly to the things apprehended; but it does pertain to them insofar as they are encompassed in my apprehension of them. This circumscribing has two aspects. One determines the things which constitute the field as a totality, with its own character; every field has this kind of total character which we call, in visual terminology, a panorama. The intrinsic pertaining of the horizon to the field makes of the latter a panorama. The mode of apprehension of this panorama is syn-opsis. The placement of things within the synoptic panorama {24} is syn-taxis. Synopsis and syntaxis are the aspects of the panoramic unity of apprehension.

But the horizon also has another aspect. An horizon is what marks that which is outside the field. This is not "other" things but the pure "outside". It can be other things outside the field, or something which is outside of everything, viz. the "undefined". It is necessary to stress that "indefinite" is not the same as "undefined". The indefinite is a mode of definition; the "undefined" is not defined even in the sense of indefinite. This difference is essential. The things outside of the field are the undefined.

To be sure, as I have already indicated the structure of the field is not fixed but variable. That dimension of it by which the field is variable is what we call amplitude. The amplitude is variable as much by amplification as by retraction. And by this I do not just refer to the quantity of things which the field encompasses, but to the mode of its unity as a field. This variation depends not only on me, but also on things. Above all, new things modify the horizon; this is the displacement of the horizon. Moreover, every new thing which is introduced into the field, removed from it, or moved inside of it, determines a change in the first level, in the background, and in the periphery; this is a very profound reorganization of the field. Displacement of the horizon and internal reorganization are the two aspects of variability of the field. They are not always independent of each other, but we cannot get into this question or other problems concerning the field because it would take us away from the central question. Let what has been said suffice for now.

Next we shall try to conceptualize with some rigor what this field is.


§ 2


Let us proceed step-by-step.

1) Above all, we are here posing a very fundamental problem. The panoramic constitution of the field in its two aspects of apprehensive synopsis and positional syntaxis might lead one to think that the field is always something extrinsic to things. But this, as we are going to see, is not the case. The field is nothing beyond real things; I shall repeat that over and over. And even when describing the field I spoke of what is "beyond" the horizon, this "beyond" pertains to the things of the field themselves. Without these things it would not make sense to speak of "beyond them". The field, then, is something in the things themselves. We shall see this immediately.

The field of which we have been speaking can be described first of all through its content, by the things that are in it: rocks, trees, the sea, etc. But the field can and ought to be described according to its own unity. This unity, from the viewpoint of the things it contains, constitutes what can be called the perceptive field. But this denomination is quite inappropriate as we shall see forthwith. Clearly, in this sense the field does not concern the things themselves. That some of them may be near or far, that some may be in the center or the periphery of my apprehension, has nothing to do with the things themselves (at least formally). It is only my perceptive act which encompasses them in a single field. {26} The character of the field is constituted in this case only by my perceptive act. The field is thus extrinsic to the things. To be sure, the things themselves are not completely detached from their position in the field; their size, for example, is not indifferent to their position in the field. But even so, these things which the perceptive act encompasses in unity, are things by reason of their specific content.

Nonetheless, these same things can and ought to be described not only by their content but also by their formality; they are things which are formally real in apprehension. Therefore it is necessary to speak of a field of reality. That which, as I said, we improperly call a 'perceptive field' is nothing but the apprehended content of the field of reality. Strictly speaking, one ought to speak only of a field of real things. The field of reality, in contrast to what up to now we have called the perceptive field, is open in and by itself; in and by itself it is unlimited. On the other hand, described from the point of view of the content of things, the field is closed by the things which constitute and limit it. The merely perceptive field offers a panorama of things; the field of reality offers a panorama of realities. In fact, let us suppose that in this perceptive field there is a light which is turned off, and all of a sudden it is turned on. From the point of view of the content, i.e., with respect to what we have called the perceptive field, there is something new: a new light in the meadow or on the mountain. But from the point of view of the field of reality there is a real thing which comes from beyond the reality that was apprehended before. And it comes not only to the meadow or the mountain but also to the reality of my field; it is something new in reality. With it the horizon of reality has been pushed back, although not so for the {27} horizon of the things seen. With the entrance of the light in the merely perceptive field, this field has been additively enriched; viz., another thing has been added to those that were there before. But from the point of view of reality, there is not properly speaking an addition; rather, what has happened is that the character of the field of reality has encompassed, so to speak, a real thing which previously was not in it.

Therefore, this amplification of the field of reality is not properly speaking "addition" but rather "expansion"; what constitutes the formality of the new thing is numerically the same character of reality which constituted the rest of the things of the field. The real as "thing" is now distinct; but this thing as "real", i.e. its formality of reality, is physically and respectively the same in number. Whence it follows that what has happened is that the field of reality has been expanded in order to encompass a new thing. The amplification or contraction of the field of reality, i.e. the changes of the field of real things perceptively apprehended as real is not additive but expansionary. Thus, in contrast to the perceptive field (in the sense of a thing contained in the field), which is extrinsic to things, the field of reality is intrinsic to them; it is given to me in the impression of reality. This reality is, as we saw, formally and constitutively open. And this openness concerns the impression of reality as such, and therefore all the modes of presentation of the real. Among them there is one, the mode of the "toward". What is now important about this "toward" is that the other realities are in this case, as we have already said, other real things with respect to which each is what it is. Now, this respectivity is formally what constitutes the moment of each real thing in virtue of which each thing is in a field. This field is thus determined by each real thing with {28} respect to itself, from which it follows that each real thing is intrinsically and formally of a field nature.[1] Even were there no more than a single thing, this thing would be de suyo of field nature. That is, every real thing, besides having what we might loosely call 'individual respectivity', formally and constitutively has field-nature respectivity. Every real thing, then, has the two moments of individual "thingness" and field-nature thingness. Only because each real thing is intrinsically and formally of field-nature, only for this reason can the field be constituted by many things.

If we wish to express in a single word the nature of the field such as we have just described it, we can say that the field "exceeds" or "goes beyond" a real thing inasmuch as it is an opening toward others. The field-nature moment is a moment of "excedence" of each real thing. And because this moment is at the same time constitutive of the real thing, it follows that the field is both excedent and constitutive; it is a "constitutive excedent". So more concretely, What is this field-nature moment of the real, i.e., what is this excedence, this going beyond?

2. The field, we said, is "something more" than each real thing and therefore something more than their simple sum. It is a proper unity of real things, a unity which exceeds what each thing is individually, so to speak. Since thing and field have, as we saw in Part I, a cyclic character, i.e., each thing is a "field-thing", that excedence can be seen from two points of view: the field as determined from real things, and real things qua included in the field.

A) Viewed from real things, the field-nature excedence is a mode of what in Part I we called 'trans-cendence'. Transcendentality is a moment of {29} the impression of reality, that moment in virtue of which reality is open both to what each thing really is, to its "its-own-ness", and to what each thing is qua moment of the world. It is, in a synthetic formula, "openness to the its-own-ness of the world". And because this openness is constitutive of the impression of reality as such, it follows that the openness is what makes each real thing, by being real, to be more than what it is by being green, sonorous, heavy, etc. Every real thing is in itself, qua real, something which is itself and only itself; but by being real it is more than what it is by its simple content. This is a transcendental excedence, and it is proper to every real thing in and by itself. But when there are many real things in the same impression of reality, then transcendentality is what makes it possible for these things to comprise a supra-individual unity; this is the field-sense unity. "Field" is not formally transcendentality, but a field is a sentient mode (though not the only one) of transcendentality. The respectivity of the many sensed things becomes field-nature respectivity in virtue of transcendentality. Transcendentality is what sentiently constitutes the field of reality; it is the very sentient constitution of the field of reality. The field as exceeding real things is the field of their transcendental respectivity. In this way, the field is a moment of physical character.

B) But it is also necessary to see things from the standpoint of the field. In this sense, the field is something more than the real things because it "encompasses" them. Upon apprehending the formality of reality, we apprehend it as something which, to be sure, is in a thing and only there, but which exceeds it as well. And thus this formality acquires a function which in a certain way is autonomous. It is not only the formality of each real thing, but {30} that "in which" all things are going to be apprehended as real. It is the formality of reality as ambit of reality. The field is excedent not only as transcendental, but also as the ambit of reality. It is the same structure but seen now not from the standpoint of things but vice versa, so that things are seen from the standpoint of the field.

The ambit is a physical characteristic of the field of reality the same as its transcendentality; it is the ambit of a real thing itself.

The ambit is not some sort of material covering or wrapping, like some atmosphere which envelopes the real things. In particular, I stress that the ambit is not space. In the first place, space is not a radical part of things, but something determined by something radical in them, viz. spaceness. Things are spacious, and only because of this is there space. Spaceness is neither relative nor absolute space. But neither is the ambit spaceness. What spaceness and space are is something which has to be understood with respect to the ambit, and not the other way around-as if the ambit were either space or spaceness. The ambit is rather something like the ambience which things generate. Therefore it is nothing which goes beyond them. The ambience is ambient "in" things themselves just as transcendentality is transcendentality "in" them. Nonetheless, things and their ambience of reality are not formally identical. The ambit is the ambience "in" things; it is a physical characteristic of them, consisting above all in being the ambient of real things. The ambience is not the atmosphere which surrounds things but the ambience which they themselves determine. This is respectivity as ambit. And for the same reason this ambience is not a void of reality-that would be for us to leave real things altogether and is impossible. The ambit is the ambit of the proper formality of reality, which is {31} perfectly physical. Encompassing is just a physical moment of the formality of reality; it is respectivity qua constitutive of the field.

In summary, the field of reality has two important characteristics which express its excendence with respect to real things. The field is "more" than each real thing, but is more "in" them. The field is, in fact, the respectivity of the real qua given in the impression of reality. And this respectivity is at one and the same time transcendentality and ambit. They are the two characteristics which give to respectivity its full meaning. Like transcendentality, the respectivity of the real leads in a certain respect from each real thing to other realities. As ambit it is the ambient which encompasses each real thing. Ambit and transcendentality are but two aspects of a single characteristic: the field-nature of the sensed real. This characteristic is what we shall always call transcendental ambit. The formality of the real thus has two aspects. On one hand, it is the formality of each thing in and by itself, what loosely speaking might be termed "individual formality". But on the other hand it is an excedent formality in the thing, i.e., it is a field-nature formality. And this field-natureness is transcendental ambit.

Anticipating some ideas I may say that according to the moment which I have termed 'individual', the intellection of a real thing consists in intellectively knowing it as real: "this thing is real". According to the moment which I have termed 'field-nature', the intellection of the real thing intellectively knows reality as being this thing in this way in reality: "reality is this thing". They are not two different apprehensions but two moments of a single apprehension; but as moments they are distinct.

In the transcendental ambit we have the general character, {32} or the global character, so to speak, of what we call the 'field of reality'. But it is necessary to take one more step; it is necessary to ask ourselves, in fact, What is the intrinsic structure of the field of reality, of the transcendental ambit of reality? This is the subject of the next section.


§ 3


In virtue of being a transcendental ambit, the field of reality can contain many real things. But it does not contain them in just any form, i.e., as some mere multitude; on the contrary, this multitude has very precise structural characteristics. They are the very structure of the field of reality. It is a structure which, as I will state, is given in the primordial apprehension of reality.


Some Things "Among" Others

In order to discover the structures of the field of reality, let us start from the fact that reality, such as it is given to us in impression, has different forms, one of which is the "toward" by which reality inexorably leads us to other realities. This does not refer to an inference or anything of that nature, nor is it a going toward reality; rather, it is an apprehending of reality itself in the mode of "toward", in a directional mode as a moment of reality. This "toward" is not just a mode of reality's presenting itself, but is, like the other modes, a mode of presentation which is transcendentally open. This means that every thing by virtue of being real is in itself of field nature; every real thing constitutes a form of reality "toward" another. To be sure, the "toward" is formally {34}a form of reality; but the "toward" in transcendental openness (proper to the impression of reality) is formally of field nature. And since this impression is numerically identical in all real things apprehended in an impression, it follows that in the field determined by the reality of each thing all the others are there as well. This is a structural and formal moment of the field; the field determines the reality of each thing as a reality "among" others. The "among" is grounded in the field nature and not the other way around; it is not the case that there is a field because there are some things situated among others, but rather some things are situated among others only because each and every one of them is in the field. And there is a field precisely and formally because the reality of each thing is formally of field nature. The "among" is not just a conglomeration; nor is it the mere relation of some things with others. Rather, it is a very precise structure, that of the actualization of one thing among others.

To be sure, the "among" is a moment of the actuity of the real: a real thing as such is among others. But the "among" also has a characteristic of actuality: the thing is actualized "among" others. Clearly these two aspects of "among" do not coincide, because there can be many things situated among others which are not intellectively present in actuality. What is important to us here is the "among" of actuality. It is a positive characteristic proper to each real thing qua of field nature. The "toward" of field-natureness is above all a "toward" in "among", or in other words, an "among" which positively has the characteristic of a "toward" of reality. If this were not the case, the "among" would be pure emptiness. But it is a field because it is reality open in a "toward" from each thing to all the others. And it is so because that openness is in turn determined by the reality of each thing. By being determined by the reality of each thing, the "toward" is a {35} real "toward"; it is reality in "toward". And it is in this that the field as "among" consists. Because of this things are not only some among others, so to speak materially, i.e. in actuity; but moreover they have a position with respect to others, they are among others by reason of their actuality. The field as the first plane, as the periphery, as the horizon, is just the structure of positionality; i.e., the structure of the "among" as a "toward". The field is not only something which encompasses things, but prior to doing so is something in which they are included, each and every one. Prior to encompassing things, and in order to be able to encompass them, the field includes the things in itself. And this inclusion is grounded in the field-nature characteristic of each real thing qua real. Hence: 1) the real thing determines the field; 2) the field determines the inclusion of the real in it; and 3) the field encompasses what is included in it. Such is the first structural moment of the field, viz., the position in the "among". Etymologically 'among' means the interior determined by two things. But each one represents the possibility of this determination because each thing is real in the "toward". In this way the "among" is a moment of the transcendental ambit.

But this is not the only structural moment of the field, because things are not only various but variable.


Some Things as a "Function" of Others [2]

All things are variable in the field of reality. Above all, they can enter and leave it, or change their position with respect to other things. But in addition, each note, for example {36} color, size, etc., taken in and by itself, is something which can change and does change. Now, when we apprehend various things in a field, none of them is apprehended monolithically, so to speak, as if the unity of the field were merely additive. On the contrary, each thing is actualized together with others, or after them, or outside of them, or on the periphery of the field, etc. Each real thing in a field is actualized not just "among" other things but also as a function of them. Position, so to speak, is proper to a thing "among" others, but this is an "among" in which each thing has the position it does as a function of the others, and changes as a function of them. A real thing can disappear from the field; but this is never a type of volatilization of the thing, but a ceasing to be "among" the other things. Hence, it always (and only) disappears as a function of them. The unity of the field-nature moment and the individual moment is a functional "among"; it is what I term the functionality of the real. Here 'functionality' is taken in its broadest sense, and hence without any allusion to the diverse types of functionality which can be present. The fact that a thing is of field nature implies a character of functionality that is radical. Conversely, real things are not primarily encompassed by the field, but rather each is included in it, as we say; encompassing is grounded upon inclusion. Now, the mode of field-nature inclusion of each real thing has the intrinsic and formal characteristic of functionality.

What is this functionality? I have already described it: it is dependence in the broadest sense of the word. This functional dependence can assume diverse forms. We may cite some which are of special importance. Thus, a real thing can change as a function of another real thing which has preceded it; this is pure {37} succession. Succession is a type of functionality. The same must be said of something which is not successive but rather coexistent, namely when one real thing coexists with another. Coexistence is now functionality. From this point of view, every real thing in the field occupies a position by virtue of a field-nature function, in the field; it is next to other things, it is in the first plane or on the periphery, etc. But there are still other forms of functionality. Real material things are constituted by points. Each point is "outside" of the others; it is an ex. But it is not something which is simply outside; rather, the ex is a unity constructed with respect to the other ex's as points of the thing. We express this by saying that every ex is an "ex-of". In virtue of this every point has a necessary position with respect to other points by reason of its "ex-of" or "out-of". This quality of position in the "ex-of" is what I call spaciocity. It is a property of each material reality. Now, the functionality of real spacious things qua spacious is space; this is spaciality. Space is grounded in spaciocity. And this functionality depends upon the other notes of the things. That is to say, it is things which determine the structure of the functionality, i.e. the structure of space. As I see it, this determination is movement; the structure of space is thus the geometric cast of movement. (Naturally, I do not refer to geometric space but to physical space.) It can be quite varied: topological, affine, and metric structures, for example, and under this latter there are different metrics, viz. Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Succession, coexistence, position, spaciocity and spatiality, etc., and types of functionality. I do not claim to have made anything like a complete enumeration; I have only mentioned these cases to exemplify functional dependence. {38}

This functionality is, I said, an intrinsic and formal characteristic of the field; i.e., it is not the case, for example, only that B depends upon A; rather, there is an inverse function as well. In the case of temporal sucession, B may certainly succeed A, i.e., be dependent upon A. But in turn, A preceeds B; it is the antecendent. Functionality, then, is not a relation of some things with others, but is a structural characteristic of the field itself qua field; some things depend upon others because all are included in a field which is intrinsically and formally a functional field. This means that every real thing, by virtue of its moment of field nature-ness, is functional reality. Moreover, the functionality is an intrinsic field-nature characteristic because it pertains to each real thing by the mere fact of being of field-nature: each thing determines the field-nature-ness, and therefore its own functionality. Field-nature reality itself is, qua reality, of a functional character. That each real thing depends upon another is owing to the proper reality of both of them, to the intrinsic functional character of the field itself. The field is in itself a field of functionality. Only on account of this can each thing depend upon others. But it can also be independent of some of them. Independence is a mode of functionality.

I repeat, functionality is a moment of the reality of each field-nature thing. And each thing is a "toward" which is transcendentally open to other real things. Each thing is formally real by being de suyo. Now, each real thing is de suyo transcendentally open, and this openness has a dimension which is formally functional. This field-nature functional actualization is proper to the unity of all the modes of sensed reality, one of which is the "toward". What is of field-nature is functional in the "toward".

Whence arises an essential characteristic of functionality. It is not {39} a functionality which primarily concerns the content of the notes of the real, but rather concerns their actualization as real. It is not that a body, for example, is of functional character qua body; i.e., it is not that a body depends upon some other body or some other content. That will always be problematic. What is not problematic is that by being real, the body is in functional dependence with respect to other reality qua reality. Hence we are dealing with the functionality of the real as real. This is the essential point, as we shall see forthwith.

Now, this functionality is what is expressed by the preposition "by". Everything real "by" being field-nature real is functionally real, "by" some reality. This "by" is something sensed and not something conceived. Human sensing is an intellective sensing that is radically an impression of reality; it is something given "physically". Hence any subsequent intellection physically moves in this already physically given reality. Intellection does not need to get to reality because it is formally already there. Now, because this reality is actualized in a field-nature way, the field-nature-ness is a moment of the impression of reality; and therefore the functionality itself is a moment which is given in the impression of reality. It is given as one of reality's formal moments. Thus we are not dealing with inference or anything of that nature, but rather with a datum which is immediately and formally given in the impression of reality.

Conversely, the datum is a datum of simple functionality. It is essential to insist upon this point in order to preclude serious errors.

Above all, 'functionality' is not synonymous with 'causality'. Causality is but one type of functionality among others. In classical philosophy a cause is that from which something {40} proceeds by means of a real influence upon the being of the effect. Now, causality is not something given. We never perceive the productive influence of a real thing upon another. Thus, as I see it, the experimental studies (otherwise of the first rank) dealing with the presumed immediate perception of causality are radically incorrect. Our perception never perceives causality, but always does perceive the functionality; in the field of reality we sense reality in its functional moment as a field-nature moment of the impression of reality. We perceive that a thing is real as a function of others, and functionality which can be and is quite varied. Causality is only a type of functionality, and moreover very problematic. For example, with respect to efficient causality no refutation of metaphysical occasionalism is possible in the intramundane order. But for now I leave aside human actions; they will be taken up again in Part III. The "by" is functional, but this does not mean that it is causal. The "by" is something which we always perceive.

In the second place, this functionality is formally sensed, i.e., not only is it something accessible, it is something for which access is already physically given in sentient intellection, in the transcendental "toward". Whence the error of Hume's critique. For Hume, causality is not given, but only temporal succession. Now, I have just said myself that causality is not given. But Hume did not notice that there are two different aspects of the question. First of all, he did not see that temporal succession is just a form of functionality. In the second place, the succession is not the succession of two impressions, but the same impression of reality, one which is of successive nature-which means that what is essential about functionality does not concern the content of the impressions {41} but their formality of reality. In Hume's example, the ringing of the bell just follows upon the pulling of the cord. Now, it is not the case that the bell's ringing is qua ringing a function of the pulling of a cord qua cord; rather, the fact is that it is the reality of the ringing qua real which is a function of the reality of the pulling of the cord qua reality. And this is something perfectly given, even supposing that the ringing were not a function of the pulling of the cord. Functionality is functionality of the real inasmuch as it is real. In this sense it is a concept which encompasses many possible types. This formality, this "by" as such is given in the impression of reality. Hume's whole critique is based upon the content of sensing, but he erred on the matter of formality. Content is always problematic. There isn't sensing "and" intellective knowing, but only sentient intellection, impressive intellection of the real qua real.

In the third place, let us observe that the exordium of Kant's Critique is Hume. Since causality is not given, for Kant it is an a priori synthesis, a synthetic a priori judgement as the possibility of objective knowledge. Now, this is unacceptable. Above all, functionality is neither an analytic judgement (Leibniz) nor a synthetic judgement (Kant). Functionality is given in impression, not in its content but in its formality of reality, because it is a moment of the "toward". And the "toward" is not a judgement. As such it is not something a priori to the logical apprehension of objects, but a datum of the impression of reality. Whence the formal object of knowledge is not causality but functionality. The science of which Kant speaks (Newtonian physics) is not a science of causes but a science of functions of the real qua real.

* * *


In summary, the field of reality has a structure which is determined by two moments: the moment of the "among", and the moment of the "by". Each thing is real in the field among other real things and as a function of them. These two moments are not independent. Functionality, the "by", is rigorously speaking the form of the "among" itself. The form of being "among" is functional.

With this we have set forth in broad outline the structure of the field of reality. In order to preclude false interpretations it is not out of place to stress again the concept of the field. Above all, the field of reality is a moment which concerns things, but in their formality of otherness; i.e., it concerns things when they are intellectively known. The field is not a moment of these real things qua real beyond impression. The field is a dimension of the real such as it is given in apprehension itself. But on the other hand the field is not something which depends upon sentient intellection as an act of mine; it is not therefore something so to speak "subjective". The field is a dimensional moment of the real given in the sentient intellection, but only as actualized therein. It is a moment of actuality, not of actuity. To be sure, this actuality is only given in apprehension, in sentient intellection; but it is a physical moment of the real which is apprehended qua reality. This actuality is merely actual-ity, and as such constitutes an intellection. As actuality, it is always and only actuality of reality itself. Therefore the field as a dimension of the actuality of the real is not a moment of the real beyond apprehension; but neither is it a subjective moment. It is a moment of actuality of the real as real in sentient intellection. {43}

In this field thus determined in and by each real thing we apprehend in subsequent intellection what the things already apprehended as real are in reality. This is a modal intellection of its primordial apprehension. Which? That is the subject of the next chapter.


[1] 'Field nature' translates Zubiri's campal. It means being within a field, and furthermore that this is an essential characteristic of the thing.-trans.]^

[2] [Zubiri is here adopting language from mathematics, e.g. variable x is a function of y and z. The sense is that each thing is connected in an essential way to others, and changes in terms of (or as a "function" of) their actions.-trans.]^