It is most important to explain the relationship between the modes of intellection and the primordial apprehension of reality. And when this is done, we must pose two questions. First, the radical question: what are the ulterior modes of actualization of the real? Second, in broad outline what are the ulterior modes of ulterior intellection qua intellection?

Thus we shall examine the following:

1. What ulteriority is.

2. The modes of ulterior actualization.

3. The modes of ulterior intellection.


§ 1


Ulteriority consists very concretely in intellectively knowing what that which has already been apprehended "as real" is "in reality".

It might seem as though it is in these modes that intellection par excellence consists, while the primordial apprehension of reality is something quite poor. But this is not true. Though necessary, of the greatest richness, and of incalculable perspective, the ulterior modes of intellection are but succedaneous. It is only because the apprehension of something as real is insufficient that we have to intellectively know what that real thing is in reality. To be sure, the primordial apprehension of reality essentially and inescapably involves a great determination of content. But despite this there is a certain insufficiency in that primordial apprehension. This insufficiency affects the content of the apprehension, specifically, the notes of the content. In ulterior modes of intellection, the content becomes immensely richer; but it is a content which is intellective only by virtue of being inscribed within the moment of formality of reality of the primordial apprehension. It is not the content which constitutes the formal essence of intellection. To know intellectively is formally to apprehend reality, and to apprehend it just in its actuality of reality with all of its content. And in this respect the primordial apprehension of reality is not only much richer than the intellection of the ulterior modes, but is intellection par excellence, since {267} it is therein that we have actualized the real in its reality in and by itself. It is therein that all of the enrichments of the intellection of what something is in reality have to be inscribed. Hence, despite its enormous volume and richness, the intellection of the ulterior modes is unutterably poor with respect to the way in which the primordial apprehension apprehends reality. The intellection of the most poor reality intellectively known in the primordial apprehension is immensely richer as intellection than the intellection of reality in its ulterior modes. It is only as referred to the primordial apprehension of reality that the ulterior modes are what they are, viz. intellections of the real. It is because of this that these ulterior modes are just succedaneous.

On the other hand, precisely because the ulterior actuality consists in respectivity it follows that its intellection has a fuller content than that of the primordial apprehension. Of course, there is no more reality; but the reality is actualized more richly. If this were not so, the whole system —for example of the sciences—would be constitutively futile. Ulterior apprehension is the expansion of what is already apprehended as real in the primordial apprehension. And thus it is clear that what something is "in reality" is an enrichment of what it is "as reality". The unity of these moments is ulterior intellection.


§ 2


We have already seen that intellection formally consists just in the impressive actuality of the real as real. To reach this idea we have analyzed the intellection of a real thing in and by itself, and only in and by itself. But in general the impressive apprehension of the real apprehends the real in and by itself, to be sure, yet not "only" in and by itself, because several things are given in that apprehension at the same time; and each of them can be a terminus of intellection. There are several reasons for this. The first has to do with the nature of the attentive intellection. One’s attention can be directed more to some aspects than to others; thus what is perceived is so to speak fragmented into distinct things. What was unitarily "a landscape" in and by itself becomes a tree, a brook, a house, etc. Or it can be the case that one has an apprehension of things which are distinct not through fragmentation but because they are independent of each other. In every case, the intellective apprehension is profoundly modified because we are not referring to the fact that these various things, each in and by itself, might be the terminus of a particular apprehension. If that were the case, we would have a multiplicity of apprehensions. We are not now referring to that but to the fact that there is a single apprehension whose terminus is formally multiple: I have different and distinct things within the same apprehension.

Thus things are apprehended distinctly, but not by virtue of being undivided. It thus happens that {269} apprehension itself as act has its own formal unity, different from the unity of each of the various apprehended things. So we can say that things apprehended as multiple in this case nonetheless constitute a particular unity. A thing is real in and by itself; but reality is formally and constitutively respective. Whence it follows that the real is not just real but is diversely respective reality. The actualization of the real is intrinsically and formally modalized qua actualization.

The foundation of this modalization is clear, as we have seen; it is the "towards" as transcendental openness. This openness has different directions, so to speak.

Above all there is the openness of the thing apprehended as real to other real things which are also apprehended. This is the openness of the "its-ownness" of each real thing, apprehended as real, to the "its-ownness" of other things, also apprehended as real. It is the openness of each thing apprehended with respect to apprehended "its-ownness" of other things. When a real thing is actualized respectively to other real things in the direction of openness, we say that the thing is found in a field of reality. To intellectively know what a real thing is in reality is now to intellectively know it as a moment of the field of reality, as being respective to other things of the field.

But the formality of reality is respectively open in another direction as well. By being pure and simple reality, it is transcendentally open to being a moment of reality itself. It is, then, open to what we have called the world. Thus to intellectively know what a real thing is in reality is to intellectively know it as a moment of the world.

These are two different modes of intellection because we intellectively know different modes of ulterior actualization of the real. {270} To intellectively know what a color, which we see, is in reality is to intellectively know what it is in the field-sense with respect to other notes, e.g. sound. But to intellectively know what that color is in reality as a moment of the world is something different; it is to intellectively know it, for example, as a light wave or a photon.

Respectivity in a field and worldly respectivity are not, to be sure, two respectivities; but they are two different dimensions of the respectivity of the real as such. We shall dwell a bit on these points.

The field of reality is not an order of things which is extrinsic to their reality. On the contrary, it is an intrinsic moment of each thing, a field-sense moment of it. Even if there were but a single real thing, this thing would still be in a field, i.e., of field-nature. As we know, each real thing has a moment of content and one of formality. It is only by the second moment that things constitute a field of real things. Since things themselves in our impression of reality give us their moment of reality, it follows that the field of reality is determined by real things themselves and not just by the unity of my act of perception. This reality is in fact formally and constitutively open, as we saw. And only because each thing is intrinsically and formally open to a field, only because of this can many things be in a field. In virtue of it, there is a rigorously cyclic respectivity between a real thing and the field of reality. Each real thing grounds the field, but the field reworks, so to speak, the real things which have determined it. This is also what happens in physical nature. The charges on bodies generate the electromagnetic field, just as masses generate the {271} gravitational field; but these fields affect the charges and masses of the bodies, so that the field itself acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the bodies. For a trivial analogy, we might say that a real thing is a source of light which spreads light everywhere, i.e. generates the field of clarity. And in this clarity, i.e., in this light, we not only see the other things but also the source of light itself. Whence the field of clarity acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the sources of light. The field moment does not withdraw us from real things, but draws us more deeply into them because it is a constitutive moment of the formality of reality qua transcendentally open.

As a concept, the field forms an essential part of scientific knowledge. Given a certain quantity, if at each point in space this quantity has a fixed value only by virtue of its position, physicists say that this space constitutes a field. Thus Einstein was able to say that a field is nothing but the physical state of space. Space as a kind of empty recipient of every structure is a chimera; that which we might call ‘empty space’ is purely and simply nothing—a splendid definition. In other sciences as well, for example biology, one speaks at times of phyletic fields.

The field of reality does not coincide with this physical field nor with the phyletic field, because both space and the phyletic directions are but moments of reality, moments of the field of reality. Thus, for example, every distance is a moment of the field of reality and not the other way around. Whatever space may turn out to be, it must always be understood from the standpoint of the field of reality, rather than the field being understood from the standpoint of space. Every real thing {272} qua real is constitutively open, and this openness toward other things is above all transcendentally that of a field.

But the real is not open only to the "its-ownness" of each real thing; that which is really its own is, by the mere fact of being so, reality. In virtue of this, the real is a moment of pure and simple reality and, therefore, everything real in its immense multiplicity has a certain proper unity as worldly reality. This unity does not consist in the unification of real things qua real, but is unity itself as an intrinsic and constitutive moment of each real thing qua real. This unity of moments is what constitutes the world. Even if there were only a single real thing, it would be formally worldly.

In summary, each thing is real in and by itself, and is reality which is in a field and in the world. These two latter moments are, then, two dimensions of transcendentality. But they are not independent. Each thing is purely and simply real, i.e. worldly, because "its-ownness" is what constitutes it as real. And because this respective reality is above all in a field, it follows that worldly transcendence affects the field itself. Conversely, a field is nothing but the world qua sensed moment of "its-ownness". And since this "its-ownness" is sensed in the manner of a field, it follows that the field is the world qua sensed; it is the field which is constitutively open to the world. The world is the sensed transcendentality of the field.

And this is not just some conceptual subtlety. The thrust of this distinction can be seen most clearly in human reality. For purposes of clarity, {273} when one speaks of realities, one always thinks of a real thing as something distinct from oneself. But this is essentially false; real things are not just the rest of the real things, but also include me as a reality. Now, my reality (i.e. every human reality) has actualization in a field. This is what ultimately constitutes what we term the ‘personality’ of each individual. Personality is a mode of actuality of my own reality in the field of all other realities and of my own reality. And for this reason, personality is inexorably subject to the inevitable vicissitudes of the field of reality. So on account of my personality I am never the same. My own personal life is of a character defined by a field. But what I am as reality is not exhausted in what I am in contradistinction to all other things and my reality among them; rather, my reality in a field, my personality, also includes other things as moments of my personal life. Thus, meaning-things, which are not pure and simple reality, are nonetheless constructed moments of each thing with my personal life. Every meaning-thing is a constructed moment of the field-sense actuality in which my personality consists. But my reality also has a worldly actuality. I am a person, i.e. I have personhood, and as pure and simple reality, my reality is not personality; it is something more elemental and radical, viz. personhood. As a worldly moment, I am a person, i.e. personhood, and as a field-sense moment, I am personality. And thus we can see what is of a field-nature, i.e. the personality, is the personhood actualized in a field. Personality is the field-sense qualification of personhood. For this reason I am always the same (personhood) although never the same thing (personality). {274}

Actuality in a field and worldly actuality are, then, different modalities of the respective actualization of the real. And each of these actualizations determines a proper mode of intellection.


§ 3


Intellection is always just the actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence. This intellection is precisely the primordial apprehension of the real in and by itself. But the real as sensed is ulteriorly actualized as in a field and as in the world. Thus it is that what is intellectively known as real can be ulteriorly known intellectively according as it is "in reality". This "in reality" has the two dimensions of being in a field and being in the world.

To intellectively know what something real is in reality is above all to intellectively know the already apprehended real as real, according as it is what it is in a field with respect to other things. This intellection is no longer primordial. I intellectively know what a real thing is in reality as "its-ownness"; I intellectively know what the real thing is in function of other realities. And this intellection is what constitutes the logos. Logos is the intellection of what the real is in its reality in a field. So I intellectively know a real thing from the standpoint of other real things; I intellectively know it therefore in the field-sense. Hence the logos is an enrichment of the content of the primordial apprehension; the enrichment which "proceeds from", and is "grounded in" the other things of the field "toward" which what the logos intellectively knows is open in the field sense. The openness of a field is the foundation of the logos and of the enrichment of the content of primordial apprehension. Here ‘logos’ means not only a proposition or a judgment, primarily because simple apprehension as judicatory apprehension pertains so essentially to it, {276} and the logos itself consists in its constitutive unity. Simple apprehension is not just something to which a judgment is added; rather, it is nothing by itself and is what it is only in its intrinsic unity with judgment. Conversely, no judgment can be a judgment if what is affirmed is not firmly part of what is simply apprehended. This is the logos. What is the intrinsic nature of this unity? We shall see it subsequently: it is a dynamic unity. Why? Because every intellection is sentient. The ulterior intellection which the logos is, is a modalization of sentient intellection. And this modalization is grounded upon the dynamism of the logos. The logos is formally sentient logos, and for this reason, and only for this reason, it is a dynamic logos.

But there is another reason not to confuse logos with judgment. Logos does not always rest upon itself qua judgment, but can rest upon other logoi. Thus it pertains to the logos not just to be a judgmental intellection, logismos, but also to be an intellection grounded on other logoi, i.e. syllogismos, what is usually termed ‘reasoning’. Logos is not only judgment; it can also be co-legere or inference in a field. This inferring has been called ‘reasoning’. But the word is incorrect; it might seem to indicate that reason consists formally in reasoning, in mounting one logos upon one or more others. But this is doubly false, because in the first place reasoning does not by itself constitute an intellection of the real; indeed it does not go beyond being a mode of the logos itself as mere intellection. And in the second place, reason, as I am about to discuss, does not aim at the logos but at the real itself; and this is not a constituent of reasoning. {277}

And here once again the greatest amplitude, the greatest enrichment proper to ulterior intellection reappears. The real in and by itself is reality apprehended in a primordial apprehension; and conversely, reality as real is not actualized as real except in primordial apprehension. But not everything excluded from this primordial apprehension is also excluded from its intellection in the logos. Thus, what we call a table is not something actualized in the primordial apprehension of reality, because the real as such is not the table as table, but as a "thing" with properties; and it is only a table in a constructed function with the reality of my life. I do not apprehend tables, but I have a logos of tables, and in general of every meaning-thing. This is the enrichment of the reality of my life as constructed with the real. Logos does not amplify reality, but constitutes an undeniable enrichment of its content.

Logos, then, is a dynamic intellection in a field of what something is in reality. But there is another mode of intellection, the intellection of the real as a moment of the world. Now, the world is the transcendental part of the field, because the field is nothing but the world as sensed. Hence, intellection of the real as in the world is formally based on intellection of the real as in a field, i.e. on the logos. It is for this reason that the former intellection is not a simple mode of the logos, viz. it is an intellection of the world. And this intellection is what formally and rigorously constitutes what we call reason. It is not an argument nor the result of arguments or other chains of reasoning, but a progression from reality in a field to worldly reality. This progression cannot be reduced to the logos. To be sure, it is dynamic; but not every dynamism is a progression. The logos does not progress toward anything, but is already in a field and moves in the real already {278} apprehended in the field. On the other hand, the dynamism of reason consists in being here-and-now in progress. It is not a dynamism within a field but a dynamism which leads from the field to the world. Reason is not argument but transcendental progress toward the world, toward pure and simple reality. Since the "toward" is a sensed moment of the real, it follows that not only is the logos sentient, but reason itself is too; it is sentient reason. In virtue of this the expression "toward" reality can lead to a mistake, that of confounding "towards" other things with "towards" the world. Both reason and logos are grounded upon the "towards" of the transcendental openness of the real as such. The "towards" is therefore a "towards" within the real. Thus we are not referring to a dynamism or progression "toward" reality; on the contrary, we have a dynamism and a progress which is already within reality itself. Reason does not have to "achieve" reality because it is born and progresses in it.

In other words, the field-nature moment and the worldly moment are modes of actualization which are determined intrinsically and formally by the real itself. And as every intellection is actualization of the real, it follows that the real known intellectively and respectively to another real thing has two moments of actuality. The first is the moment of reality in and by itself; it is the primary and radical actuality, what rather vaguely and imprecisely I have called ‘the individual moment of reality’. But the real in respectivity does not have a new actuality; rather, what it acquires is the actuality of its own reality respectively to other things. So we are not dealing with another actualization but a re-actualization of what the real is in and by itself. The intellection of the real in this aspect is, then, constitutively "re-actuality". This "re" is what {279} formally expresses the fact that we are dealing with an ulterior intellection. Ulterior intellection is a re-actualization in which the actuality of a thing is intellec-

tively known as actualized with respect to another reality.

Since primordial apprehension is sentient and takes place in impression, ulterior intellection is impressive ulteriority; hence logos is sentient and reason is sentient. Ulteriority is grounded in the very structure of the impression of reality. The intellection of a real thing as respectively open, as re-actualized, is what I call ‘intellectively knowing what the real is "in reality".’ What is primordially apprehended is always real; but if we ask what it is in reality, this "in reality" consists in an actual determination of the real thing with respect to other real things. If this were not so, the apprehension of the real would not give rise to the question of what this real thing is in reality. All that is possible only because intellection is sentient. Hence, neither logos nor reason has to get to reality; on the contrary, reality is actualized in sentient intellection. It is because of this, and only because of it, that logos and reason arise, and that both of these intellections take place already within reality. It is, I repeat, why logos is sentient and reason likewise is sentient.

How this ulterior modalization occurs, and what the structure of its link to primordial apprehension of reality is, will be the respective themes of the other two parts of the book. They are the themes of the dynamic sentient logos, and the progress of the sentient reason.

But before embarking on that task, it will not be out of place to return to the point of departure of this first part in order to see better the unity of our analysis. {280}


[1] [Readers should bear in mind that Zubiri employs the word 'ulterior' as a technical term, with its primary meaning that listed as first in the Oxford English Dictionary, "lying beyond that which is immediate or present, coming at a subsequent point or stage"-trans.]^

[2] [Zubiri's meaning here is obscure; even empty space is teeming with virtual particles which pass in and out of existence in accordance with the Uncertainty Principle, DpDt > h/2p -trans.]^