The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol. 14, 2016-2018, pp. 41-71

Zubiri and Systematic Theology[1]

Thomas B. Fowler
Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America
Washington, DC USA

Abstract

Zubiri's theological writings are extensive, and theological questions were always of importance to him, undoubtedly because of his holistic view of knowledge. Though he wrote on many theological matters, he never formulated his theology in a systematic way. Zubiri recognized the importance of theology for understanding of the human condition, and at the same time how it has in many ways been displaced by "secular" knowledge, even though that knowledge does not fulfill the same function. This paper lays groundwork for construction of a systematic theology based on Zubiri's philosophy and some of his theology works.

Resumen

Los escritos teológicos de Zubiri son extensos, y las cuestiones teológicas siempre fueron importantes para él, indudablemente debido a su visión holística del conocimiento. Aunque escribió sobre muchos asuntos teológicos, nunca formuló su teología de una manera sistemática. Zubiri reconoció la importancia de la teología para la comprensión de la condición humana y, al mismo tiempo, cómo ha sido desplazada en muchos sentidos por el conocimiento "secular", aunque ese conocimiento no cumple la misma función. Este documento prepara las bases para la construcción de una teología sistemática basada en la filosofía de Zubiri y algunas de sus obras de teología.

Introduction

Theology is the intersection of faith and knowledge. We have faith, but we wish to know more about God and His ways, and thus deepen our faith as well as be better equipped to apply faith to life's situations and problems. But theology is a different kind of knowledge than that of experimental science, science, or the humanities; and it requires a different disposition. As Pope Francis has said,

> Since faith is a light, it draws us into itself, inviting us to explore ever more fully the horizon which it illumines, all the better to know the object of our love. Christian theology is born of this desire. Clearly, theology is impossible without faith; it is part of the very process of faith, which seeks an ever deeper understanding of God's self-disclosure culminating in Christ. It follows that theology is more than simply an effort of human reason to analyze and understand, along the lines of the experimental sciences. God cannot be reduced to an object. He is a subject who makes himself known and perceived in an interpersonal relationship. Right faith orients reason to open itself to the light which comes from God, so that reason, guided by love of the truth, can come to a deeper knowledge of God. The great medieval theologians and teachers rightly held that theology, as a science

> of faith, is a participation in God's own knowledge of himself. It is not just our discourse about God, but first and foremost the acceptance and the pursuit of a deeper understanding of the word which God speaks to us, the word which God speaks about himself, for he is an eternal dialogue of communion, and he allows us to enter into this dialogue. Theology thus demands the humility to be "touched" by God, admitting its own limitations before the mystery, while striving to investigate, with the discipline proper to reason, the inexhaustible riches of this mystery.[2]

Theology considered as a whole is thus not an arid academic exercise, but something which must touch the deepest part of each human person. In this way it strengthens and illuminates faith, satisfies our desire to know more about God, and profits us by giving guidance for daily life and the ever-changing problems of the world.

Nonetheless there are components of theology that aim at those who do not yet have faith, or whose faith is very weak. For example, proofs of God's existence are a cornerstone of theology, aimed at non-believers with the goal of converting them. Constructing theology starting from basic human experience is also important to grow each believer's faith. Hence theology, to be relevant and compelling, must start from humanity's current state of knowledge, the situation of belief that is common, the general attitude toward religion prevalent in the epoch, and of course sacred writings, tradition, and accepted doctrines. This means that it must be grounded in experiences, knowledge, and belief that are fundamental, widely accepted, and beyond question. It must also cohere with and indeed illuminate other forms and sources of knowledge, and serve as an inspiration to seekers of knowledge of all kinds. It must accord with Scripture and tradition, and above all it must tell us something intellectually sound and enlightening about God, the world, morality, and life—something that we do not already know. Great Christian theologians of the past have been able to carry out this task; one need only think of Augustine, Basil, Aquinas, Suarez, and others. But times change, as does the intellectual climate; knowledge progresses, and the attitudes of people shift. So theology must be renewed periodically. In our own day, unfortunately, due to several factors including ossified thought, a perceived paranoia about the modern world, and a failure to engage major elements of contemporary knowledge, we find that at the beginning of the 21st century, religion (and theology) are often associated with anti-intellectual attitudes, obscurantism, fantasies, ignorance, rear-guard activities and rigid thought patterns. That is what this book seeks to change.

It was not always so. From its earliest days, Christianity sought to engage the "secular" world, but because Christianity's roots were radically different, its approach to worldly knowledge was likewise different. Pagan and pre-Christian religions tended to diefy forces of nature, whose corresponding gods had to be placated by various ritualistic activities such as sacrifices, based on longstanding custom. This was almost a stimulus-response type of action: sacrifice in case of floods, droughts, famine, or war; otherwise praise the Gods and hope that they will stay away. Any notion of "understanding" the gods was hopeless—a situation that led, in Greece, to the crisis of faith represented by the plays of Euripides. In practice, Greek religion turned into a sort of secular pursuit of *arêté*—excellence, quite divorced from the gods.[3] Even in Hebrew thought, there was little appetite for a rational understanding of God; God was to be worshipped as the one true God, but not subjected to rational inquiry. The work of religious leaders was confined to moral guidance and correct ritualistic practice. Recent remarks by Pope Benedict clarify the situation:

> Theology calls into question the matter of truth; this is its ultimate and essential foundation. Here an expression used by Tertullian may help us to take a step forward: Christ did not say: 'I am custom,' but: 'I am the truth.' The pagan religions were customary by nature. ... They observed the traditional cultural forms, hoping in that way to maintain the right relationship with the mysterious world of the divine. The revolutionary aspect of Christianity in antiquity was precisely its break with 'custom' out of love for truth. The Gospel of St. John contains the other fundamental interpretation of the Christian faith: the definition of Christ as Logos. If Christ is the Logos, the truth, then man must correspond to Him with his own logos; that is, with his reason. [4]

Once the commitment to truth is made, rigorous engagement with the "secular" knowledge of the world is imprecindable. Christianity recognized this from the beginning. In the early centuries it was confrontation with the pagan knowledge of the ancient world. In the Middle Ages it was Aristotle and the Islamic tradition of commentators. Now it is science and technology. This does not mean that such secular knowledge is the highest form of knowledge, or that all of it is true; only that it is a form of knowledge, and thus part of the truth about the world and reality. As Benedict notes,

> From this we can understand that, by its very nature, the Christian faith had to generate theology. It had to ask itself about the rationality of the faith. ... Thus, although the fundamental bond between Logos, truth and faith, has always been clear in Christianity, the concrete form of that bond has produced and continues to produce new questions. [5]

Such an orientation toward *truth* rather than *ritual* or *custom* put Christianity on a completely different developmental track than the pagan religions of the time, including the mystery religions, and oriented it more toward philosophy. Indeed, the Gospel of John opens with the phrase "In the beginning was the Word [Logos], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God", very suggestive of Greek philosophical thought—the highest form of "secular" knowledge at the time. Working out the relationship between secular knowledge and Christian theology took more than a thousand years, and it continues today.

Today one aspect of the widespread abandonment of Christianity is that belief in truth is on the decline. When truth ceases to be paramount, power fills the vacuum. So it is not surprising that religions such as Islam (which has always had a problem with truth) have relied upon force and conquest for their spread, rather than preaching. Science itself, which originated in the West, could only flourish because of its close ties to truth. The politicization of science, so evident in debates over "climate change" and evolution, as well as the rise of non-verifiable theories, illustrate what can happen when truth is no longer respected. Zubiri observes that man's fundamental impulse is toward truth, which, correcting Nietsche, he terms the "will to truth".[6] When truth is rejected or suppressed, we get Nietsche's "will to power".

The relationship of secular and theological knowledge immediately poses the question of just what the Logos is, and how it will illuminate or explain faith. "Logos" is a Greek word that refers to all aspects of what we would term "reason", "description", "explanation" "theory", or "inference", among other things. Logos is thus a very broad concept. If Christianity is to integrate Logos, truth, and faith, some idea of what each of those is must be determined; "truth" as well as "faith" are likewise difficult concepts, to which we shall turn later. Christianity, in fact, is radically rooted in truth and the quest to understand faith:

> The first item in the alphabet of faith is the statement, "In the beginning

> was the Word". Faith reveals to us that eternal reason is the ground of all things or, put in other terms, that things are reasonable from the ground up. Faith does not aim to offer man some sort of psychotherapy; *its* psychotherapy is the truth. This is what makes it universal and by nature missionary. It is also the reason why faith is intrinsically "*quarens intellectum,*" as the Fathers say, that is, in search of intellection. Understanding, hence, rational engagement with the priorly given Word, is a constitutive principle of the Christian faith, which necessarily spawns theology.[7]

Theology, in the sense of "talking about God" or "talking about the gods", is not absent from other religions. Homer, in a sense, was theology for the pagan world; the *Mahabharata* discusses religious and philosophical matters in the Hindu context; and of course the Old Testament praises God's ways and narrates God's intervention in history, just to cite three examples. But Christianity made this need to understand in a systematic and rational way more urgent, because Jesus *is* the Logos. Theology, as a quest for rational understanding, is unique, "a specifically Christian phenomenon which follows from the structure of the faith."[8] This linking of religion and logos was radical, because for the first time it enabled the full force of "secular" knowledge to be brought to bear on religious questions, and showed that ultimately there is no division—truth is one.

There is another facet of Christianity, even more important, that shaped it from the very beginning. "For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life."[9] The notion of *love* is so essential the Christianity that without it, the faith would be a mere shell:

> …in the end love sees more than reason. Where the light of love shines, the shadows of reason are dispelled; love sees, love is an eye, and experience gives us more than reflection.[10]

This love is not just a pleasant feeling, but an imperative, a call to action. This is what really set Christianity apart, and still does. And for this reason the Church has always engaged in works of corporal mercy and assistance, including hospitals, schools, aged care, relief activities, and so forth, especially with respect to the poor. This does not seem so remarkable now—we expect that government or some other organization will take care of such societal needs—but it was radical in the days of the Roman Empire. Then society was organized around patrons: except for the poor, each person had a patron that he served, and who dispensed favors to him, and in turn he was patron of those lower on the social ladder. No one worried about anyone except those whom he served, and those who served him. Pagan religion and temples were not geared for social services. If misfortune befell someone, that was just what the gods desired—no community was there to help. Many were attracted to Christianity because it showed love for the downtrodden and unfortunate.

Of course theology does not have the same position in the faith as does Scripture or other forms of Revelation. As the International Theological Commission has so well stated:

> Theology is scientific reflection on the divine revelation which the Church accepts by faith as universal saving truth. The sheer fulness and richness of that revelation is too great to be grasped by any one theology, and in fact gives rise to multiple theologies as it is received in diverse ways by human beings. In its diversity, nevertheless, theology is united in its service of the one truth of God. The unity of theology, therefore does not require uniformity, but rather a single focus on God's Word and an explication of its innumerable riches by theologies able to dialogue and communicate with one another. Likewise, the plu-

> rality of theologies should not imply fragmentation or discord, but rather the exploration in myriad ways of God's one saving truth.[11]

Thus theology is a quest for understanding, one which is vitally important, but never completely finished or exhausted.

At the outset, we may note one extreme position on the notion of logos, that of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza was not a Christian theologian by any means, but his great work *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* (1677) attempts to expound a philosophical/ethical system, including some doctrines we would term "theological", using a strictly deductive method based on the paradigm of Euclidean geometry and incorporating many ideas of Cartesian philosophy. Spinoza assumed certain axioms and then proceeded to deduce conclusions using rigorous logical arguments. This approach, had it been widely adopted, would have turned the Logos into an abstract, non-personal mathematical entity quite far removed from anything in the Bible.

In general Christian theology has taken a less mathematical approach, and traditionally has relied more on Greek philosophical thought. As such it tends to fall into one of two major categories, inspired either by Plato or Aristotle. St. Augustine (354-430) is perhaps the best-known Christian theologian of Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) inspiration. Augustine tells us *credo ut intelligam* ("I believe in order to understand"), thus positioning the logos in a subordinate though still important role. For Augustine, the logos functions as a way to give expression to and some understanding of what is "seen" by the mind; its purpose is not a systematic exposition based on deduction—something not found in Augustine's writings. In a manner reminiscent of the Myth of the Cave from Book VII of Plato's *Republic*, Augustine tells us:

> …I entered into my inward self, you leading me on; and I was able to do it, for you were become my helper. And I entered, and with the eye of my soul (such as it was) saw above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the unchangeable light. Not the common light, which all flesh may look upon, nor, as it were, a greater one of the same kind….but different, very different from all these. Nor was it above my mind as oil is above water, nor as heaven above earth; because above it was, because it made me, and I below it, because I was made by it. He who knows the truth knows that light; and he that knows it knows eternity.[12]

What is thus seen by the mind cannot be given rigorous logical treatment—the vision goes far beyond what can be effectively captured this way—and for this reason theology of Augustinian inspiration has always been skeptical of excessive use of logical deductions when dealing with theological matters.

Christian theology of Aristotelian influence has taken a more systematic and logical tack, with the work of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1277) being the best-known example. Aquinas' starting point was the framework of Aristotelian philosophy (substance and accident, being, actuality and potentiality, substantial change, causality, etc.), and his procedure was to start with the basics (existence of God), and build up theology by carefully carving out small questions and treating them with the methods of disputation common in European universities of the Middle Ages. The paradigm for this type of exposition in Western thought has become Thomas Aquinas' (1225-1274) *Summa Theologica*. St. Thomas starts from the general situation prevalent at the time, which was a belief in the God of Abraham (whether from the Muslim, Jewish, or Christian traditions). He also grounds his work on what was widely considered the foundation of all secular knowledge at that time, namely Aristotle's metaphysics. Unfortunately much has changed in the last 750 years: Aristotle is no longer the un-

questioned source that he once was; a new type of knowledge has emerged that scarcely existed in St. Thomas' time, namely empirical science; and the world does not so universally acknowledge the God of Abraham. Recognizing this situation, Zubiri set out to remake theology and in the process had to remake philosophy as well.

In Aquinas' time, there were few atheists or agnostics; faith was the norm, whether Christian, Muslim, or Jewish. Paganism still existed, but it was only necessary to convince the pagans of the superiority of the notion of one God. Moreover, the only real forms of systematically organized knowledge were philosophy (mostly Greek philosophy), theology, what today we would call "elementary mathematics," and grammar. The Trivium comprised the first three subjects taught in medieval universities: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Logic is part of philosophy, and rhetoric was more of an art form than systematic knowledge. The Quadrivium, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, was thus primarily mathematics. There was nothing comparable to modern science, which now often lays claim to being an explanation of all things insofar as they can be explained, thus obviating the need for theology and most of philosophy. (Whether this claim is in any way legitimate is highly questionable, of course.) But there was the need to integrate the new secular knowledge of those days—primarily Aristotelian philosophy—into the intellectual framework of Christian thought and theology, a task carried out with great skill by medieval philosophers and theologians. Scholastic philosophy and theology, or just *Scholasticism*, as it has become known, continued to our own day, with many famous exponents including Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and more recently Etienne Gilson (1884-1978) and Jacques Maritain (1882-1973).

These divergent views of theology clearly indicate that a critical ingredient has been missing, namely, an analysis of human knowing. How do we come to know? Where do we start? What levels of knowing are there? What is our primary access to reality? With these questions we immediately confront fundamental problems of human knowing and truth. While knowledge of God utilizing reason or "logos" is now and always has been a primary goal, at least in the Western tradition, this does not mean that reason is the first or best approach to theological knowledge (or any form of knowledge); and clearly reason has significant limits when utilized in theology. We may be constitutively in a situation of *fides quarens intellectum*, as St. Anselm noted, but that does not mean that "reason" is a univocal force for such understanding. A fundamental limitation of Greek thought—and it does not matter whether one leans to Platonism or Aristotelianism—was its implicit assumption that reason alone—i.e., thinking—about experience could penetrate the secrets of nature. Because of this assumption, empirical science never really took root in Greece, despite the unquestioned abilities of and early steps taken by Greek thinkers such as Eratosthenes (c 276-195 BC) Archimedes (c 287-212 BC), and Hipparchos (c. 190-120 BC), among others. This attitude led to the substitution of metaphysics for what we now call "science", and to distorted views of reason with respect to theology. In particular, it was interpreted in the West in a particular way, namely that the first duty of theology was to prove the existence of God. This was not the case in Eastern theology, with its greater emphasis on the deification of man through Christ.

Indeed, Zubiri has argued that the traditional paradigm of knowledge in the Western tradition, based on reason in the sense of rational explanation, is incorrect. This will be discussed at length below, in the section "Philosophical Background". Before delving into that topic, let us first discuss what systematic theology is and why it is needed.

I. What is systematic theology?

A systematic theology is a comprehensive explanation of theological doctrines based on a generally accepted intellectual framework. Its purpose is to manifest the internal coherence of all aspects of the Faith,[13] and to show how the Faith relates to other branches of knowledge. In some cases this type of theology exposition also provides a justification or partial justification for certain theological doctrines. The intellectual framework usually comprises a number of philosophical assumptions about the world, which are considered self-evidently true, or at least so incontrovertible as to form a solid foundation for the theological inferences drawn from them. These are then combined with scriptural passages and received tradition to yield a comprehensive understanding of theology. Theology thus provides faith with both understanding and justification. Of course, no intellectual understanding of most theological subjects is ever complete; the element of mystery and incomprehensibility is always present. Moreover it is subject to renewal as new insights come from the growth of secular knowledge and the unfolding of history. In the words of St. Irenaeus of Lyon (c.133-203), perhaps the first to develop a systematic Christian theology:[14]

> …that well-grounded system which tends to man's salvation, namely, our faith; which, having been received from the Church, we do preserve, and which always, by the Spirit of God, renewing its youth, as if it were some precious deposit in an excellent vessel, *causes the vessel itself containing it to renew its youth also*. For this gift of God has been entrusted to the Church, as breath was to the first created man, for this purpose, that all the members receiving it may be vivified…[Italics added][15]

St. Irenaeus also noted against the Gnostics of his time—and this is an ever-present danger—that there is no superior version of Christianity reserved to, entrusted to, or invented by intellectuals. The Faith confessed by the Church is the Faith that belongs to all believers.

Among the subjects typically included in any Christian systematic theology are the following:

- Man's knowledge of God
- Existence of God and appropriate proofs
- What the sacred is
- The role of Scripture and tradition
- Basis for and sources of morality
- Behavior norms for man individually and in society
- Authority and the Church
- Sacraments
- Theological knowledge and its relation other knowledge

Christian churches differ in their explanations of these subjects, with more emphasis on scripture and individual interpretation in Protestant traditions, and more on tradition, sacraments, and Church authority in others (Catholic, Orthodox). Some non-Christian religions also discuss these same subjects in their systematic theological expositions. In general, the received intellectual framework is taken as the basis to establish man's knowledge of God, especially God's existence, and then exposition moves to the sacred, morality, sacraments and reasons for accepting Scripture. Once Scripture has been accepted, reasoning based on the intellectual framework (e.g., causality) can be used to establish other doctrines.

Undoubtedly the best-known example of a systematic theology is, as indicated above, the *Summa Theologica* (1265-1274) of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). In this great work, St. Thomas takes as his starting point (intellectual framework) the philosophy of Aristotle, together with other common knowledge of the time. On this basis, in a logical, precise manner, he develops his theological/philosophical system, beginning with the existence and

nature of God, and ranging over the sacraments and moral issues.

Prior to embarking on a discussion of St. Thomas' theology, it is useful to examine the underlying assumptions of that theology, and most others in the Western tradition. These assumptions are so deep-rooted that rarely is any thought given to them; they are considered so self-evidently true that none is really needed. The first assumption is that it is *reason*—rational thought—which puts us into contact with reality. Such rational thought may be philosophy, science, or something else; but in every case, without this accomplishment, we would not be in contact with reality. This view naturally leads to the belief that rational proofs of the existence of God are the first step in knowledge of God and thus in any theology. The second assumption is that reality is made up of discrete things or *entities*, which interact in various ways. They may be souls, material bodies, monads, atoms, quarks, or something else; but in every case, they are entities which are "out there" and which we have to understand. Knowing about reality is thus knowing about these things and how they work. Zubiri refers to the first belief as the *logification of knowing* and the second as the *entification of reality*. He rejects both, and this leads to a radically different systematic theology.

To return now to St. Thomas, we note that St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's philosophical principles as more or less as synonymous with reason itself. Perhaps the most important of these principles—or better, underlying assumptions—is the notion of *sensible intelligence*. This paradigm of knowing is the belief that all knowledge originates through the senses, which require the mind (reason) to assemble sense data into something that provides us with access to reality. According to this paradigm, the senses deliver confused content to the intelligence, which then figures out or reconstructs reality. The Scholastics said, *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus.* This is the version of the logification of intelligence used by St. Thomas, and of course because *ratio* (reason) is our primary access to reality, and (intellectually at least) to God, rational proofs of God's existence should thus be the starting point of any systematic theology. God then becomes a reality-object which is "out there". Much of Medieval theological effort (and theological effort up to our own day) was devoted to such proofs, such as the five proofs of St. Thomas, as well as St. Anselm's famous ontological argument, and Scotus' proof in *De Primo Principio*, based on the notions of possible and actual.

St. Thomas also utilized other Aristotelian notions. Among them is the idea that things in the world are separable and act upon each other; this is the idea of *substance*. With respect to change, or movement, he adopts Aristotle's notion that movement is a *state of the moving thing*, which consists in passing from potency to act. He also adopts Aristotle's basic physics, according to which substantial change (e.g., wood burning to ash in a fire) is the result of something losing its substantial form, going to prime matter, and then back up again with a new substantial form. He accepts Aristotle's (and the Greeks') view that reason, unaided, can penetrate to the truths about how the world works. Perhaps most important for his theology, St. Thomas adopts Aristotle's reasoning about causality, together with some of the ideas from the Arabic philosophers about the productive power of causes. St. Thomas believes that causes are "out there", that we can perceive them, and that, indeed, everything that happens is caused by something. Causality in this strong sense is used by St. Thomas throughout his philosophy and theology; in particular, it plays a key role in the second of his famous five proofs of the existence of God,[16] and in his explication of the Sacraments and sacramental efficacy.

In many ways, causality is the key metaphysical notion for both Aristotle and St. Thomas, because it is the basis of change in the world and at the same time

our knowledge of it. St. Thomas' principal contribution to the theory of causality has to do with creation *ex nihilo*, which is a fact of Revelation and which Aristotle never considered. Aristotle's definition of efficient causality requires that one thing act on another, already existing thing, to bring it from potency to act. St. Thomas basically generalizes the notion of efficient causality to mean contributing being to, or contributing to the being or becoming of something else. Or in other words, efficient causality in the sense of creation does not refer to motion and applies to the entire being of the effect, whereas ordinary efficient causality has to do with motion and applies to only part of the being of the effect.[17] Thus Aristotle's efficient causality is a special case of St. Thomas'. St. Thomas also utilizes other vocabulary and concepts of Aristotle's metaphysics, including the notion of change as reduction from potency to act (first proof), the notion of separable substances (first proof), certain ideas about possibility and necessity (third proof), distinct degrees of being and notion that higher cannot come from lower (fourth proof), and convergence of cosmos toward an end (fifth proof). A detailed discussion of causality may be found in Appendix A, and further discussion of Aquinas' proofs is given in Chapter 3. Table 1 summarizes the differences between Aquinas' theology and that based on Zubiri's philosophy:

Theology area	St. Thomas	Zubiri
Philosophical framework for theology	Vocabulary and concepts of Aristotle's metaphysics	Sentient Intelligence
Nature of change	Passing from potency to act	Not necessarily state of changing thing
Nature of things	Separable substances	Reality is open; no division into substances except human person
Nature of causality	Deterministic, real production of effects, uniform, every effect must have cause	Functionality
Power of real	[mixed with causality]	Dominance of real
God's Existence	Five proofs based on Aristotelian metaphysics	Religation
Sacramental efficacy	Causality	Power of the Real
Nature of Man	Racional animal	Reality-conscious animal
Basis of Church		Reality by postulation
Basis of man's knowledge	Sensible intelligence	Sentient intelligence
Man's contact with reality	Rational	Sentient

Table 1. Comparison of Systematic Theology based on St. Thomas and on Zubiri

The differences between St. Thomas' and Zubiri's outlooks and philosophies suggest that a significantly new approach to theology is required.

II Why is Systematic Theology Needed?

Aristotle begins his metaphysics with a phrase that has echoed down the centuries, "All men by nature desire to know." This natural curiosity—really a thirst—applies to knowledge about God and world as well. It is reflected in creation stories and myths which appear in every culture, and in the medieval expression attributed to St. Anselm, *fides quarens intellectum*, faith seeking understanding. Faith pro-

vides basic knowledge about God, moral behavior, and humanity's origin and place in the world. But most people seek more, and so there is a need to elaborate this basic knowledge about God and the world in order to tell a more complete, and perhaps a more compelling story about our present situation, to take into account secular knowledge, and in addition, to give moral guidance about contemporary problems that sacred writings do not address. And all of this must be done in a coherent manner based on a justifiable, self-evident philosophical basis. Thus there is a need for a systematization of knowledge about matters relating to God, the world, and human conduct, one which can be updated regularly. In Western Civilization, this inevitably takes the form of rational exposition, because of the priviledged place that rational knowledge has in our culture. Thus there are the following subject areas, of which our innate desire to know calls for an explanation:

- Explain and elaborate the creation story
- Give rational and/or other justification for the existence of God
- Explain more about God (infinite, infinitely powerful, all-knowing, etc.)
- Expand moral guidance from sacred writings to cover all aspects of modern life, including political organization
- Explain and elaborate with rational discussion key beliefs such as sacraments
- Explain relationship of secular knowledge (such as science) with knowledge stemming from sacred writings, tradition, fathers of the church, and other sources
- Discuss the nature of mystical theology, its scope and limits
- Discuss other confessions and other religions, with respect to their beliefs (correct or incorrect), their relationship to Christianity, and eucumenical concerns.

This is a rather long list, and one which requires the best efforts of extremely able thinkers over long periods of time. Furthermore, as noted above, the work is always incomplete, since the march of history and the progress of science continue, along with further reflection on sacred texts and earlier theological writings.

But the key point is that theology *must be relevant to current circumstances*. This does not mean that theology just becomes a byword for contemporary beliefs, and changes accordingly over time. Indeed, one of its main functions is precisely to challenge these beliefs. Rather, it means that theology must engage the contemporary world and show how its subject matter is not only relevant to that world, but actually essential to its understanding of reality and its proper functioning. In today's world (early 21st century), theology seems remote from most people's thoughts, and few believe that it has much relevance to daily life. This problem goes beyond systematic theology, of course; but it clearly reveals that theology has failed in its two objectives. Yet the openings are clearly visible: the financial crisis that began in 2008 had deep roots in a moral failure, the indebtedness of peoples and nation states has moral as well as economic roots, and the policies of those nation states to deal with contemporary problems also cries out for moral guidance—all of which must be grounded in a solid theology.

Traditionally theology has been called "The Queen of the Sciences", indicative of a normative function. Unfortunately today "science" refers almost exclusively to empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Few in these sciences would consider that theology (or philosophy) exerts any real normative function, or recognize any such pretension. The Galileo affair still looms large in this context, and is invoked whenever theologians stray too far into what is regarded as the exclu-

sive territory of science. This is a significant issue, in light of the influence of science in today's environment, and the prestige that science enjoys: what role does theology have with respect to knowledge such as science? What is the nature of the boundaries between science, theology, and philosophy? Should theology seek to imitate or emulate empirical science? Continuing Pope Benedict's remarks:

> [For St. Bonaventure there was a] despotism of reason, when it becomes supreme judge of all things. This use of reason is certainly impossible in the context of the faith because it seeks to submit God to a process of experimental trial. In our own time empirical reason appears as the only declaredly scientific form of rationality. ... It has led to great achievements, and no-one would seriously wish to deny that it is just and necessary as a way to understand nature and the laws of nature. Nonetheless there is a limit to such a use of reason. God is not an object of human experimentation.

In other words, there are limits to what reasoning based on experimental methods can achieve. Curiously, even science itself is encountering these limits. Current theories in high-energy physics, such as Supersymmetry and String Theory have either failed to make experimentally testable predictions, or have claimed that such predictions are probably not possible.

III. Relationship Among Faith, Theology, and Understanding

Clearly any type of systematic theology involves faith (for which we seek understanding), theology (in the etymological sense of "knowledge of God"), and human understanding (what can we know and how do we know it). The basic premiss is that faith gives the essential (but perhaps minimal) knowledge of what is necessary for salvation, while theology is an expansion of that knowledge and a bridge between faith and what might be termed "secular knowledge". Human understanding (primarily philosophy) underpins theology by assuring us that our theological knowledge is sound, while at the same time showing its limits—limits which are transcended by faith and by mystical experience, for example.

"Faith" is a frequently used word, and has several related definitions. A common dictionary definition is "something that is believed, especially with strong conviction".[18] Thus one can have faith in democracy, capitalism, communism, or some other politico-economic system. A related definition is "allegiance to duty or a person, loyalty"; thus one can have faith in one's leaders, and specifically, belief that they can do what they are expected to do (or what you would like them to do). In this sense, "faith" really means "confidence". In religious contexts, the dictionary defines faith as "belief and trust in and loyalty to God", which is very common in the Old Testament, for example, "You are the LORD God, who chose Abram and brought him out of Ur of the Chaldeans and named him Abraham. You found his heart faithful to you, and you made a covenant with him to give to his descendants the land of the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Perizzites, Jebusites and Girgashites. You have kept your promise because you are righteous."[19] In the Abrahamic traditions, faith thus involves a belief in a personal deity, one who spoke to Moses. Another definition is "firm belief in something for which there is no proof", though the connotative meaning of this definition depends heavily on what one intends by the phrase "no proof".

The New Testament moves more in the direction of the last definition, though keeping emphasis on belief and trust in and loyalty to God. Jesus frequently comments on faith or its absence: "Jesus turned and saw her. 'Take heart, daughter,' he said, 'your faith has healed you.' And the woman was healed at that moment."[20] "...Because you have so little faith. Truly I tell you, if you have faith as

small as a mustard seed, you can say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move. Nothing will be impossible for you."[21] St. Paul often speaks of faith in remarks such as, "And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins."[22], "They must keep hold of the deep truths of the faith with a clear conscience."[23] And especially his famous remark in Hebrews chapter 11: "And what is faith? Faith gives substance to our hopes, and *makes us certain of realities we do not see*."[24] In all cases there is implied the notion that faith will cause one to act in certain ways; it is not a neutral belief: "You foolish person, do you want evidence that faith without deeds is useless."[25] This connection with action arises because the realities (such as God) about which we are made certain by faith *eo ipso* impose obligations upon us. That is, if God exists, we must act in certain ways or risk punishment. In turn, we have expectations of them, unrealistic perhaps at times, but expectations nonetheless—this was one of the great themes of the Old Testament. Obviously, this was a characteristic of pagan belief everywhere—witness the rituals and sacrifices that all such religions had, on all continents, and as such it is a general characteristic of religious faith. In fact it touches a key notion, that of the *power of the real*, which is a fundamental part of our experience.

Today it is common to hear expressions such as, "He puts his faith in science" or "He puts his faith in modern medicine". The meaning of these expressions is fairly clear: the person believes that science or medicine is *the* (or *a*) source of knowledge, i.e., of truth, and such knowledge can be used to achieve desired results in the world.

St. Thomas emphasizes that faith is not of what is seen, nor of what is known through science. Quoting St. Gregory, who says, "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception," he points out that "there can be no faith about things which are an object of science". It is nonetheless possible for something to be believed by one person, i.e., an object of faith for him, but actually seen (or been seen) by someone else. St. Thomas uses the examples of the Trinity and angels; but even in our world we have faith (in this sense) in many things we have not seen, but that others have (such as the Great Pyramid of Egypt or the surface of the moon. In religious contexts, however, "faith" refers to belief that something exists, something which we as living humans have not seen or experienced, but expect to see or experience at some point, such as God, heaven, etc.

With respect to religious faith, it is not simply a belief in just anything that has not been seen or experienced, such as quarks; rather, it is a belief—confidence—in something that has *transcendence and power over us and the world*, something to which we owe *respect and obedience*. Jesus explicitly brings in the notion of power when answering the High Priest at his trial, "You shall see the Son of Man at the right hand of the power" (Mt. 26:64). Similarly, when confronting Pilate, Jesus says, "You would have no power over me if it were not given to you from above." (Jn 19:11). The notion of power—which recurs throughout the Bible—is key to understanding faith. Power in the Bible is only related in an analogical way to the notion of power in physics, namely energy per unit time (e.g., 1 watt = 1 joule per second), or amount of work that can be done in a given time (1 horsepower = 746 watts). Power in the Bible does concern the ability to do things, but not in the same sense as in physics. Rather, it does so in a sense that transcends such ability, and reaches to something more fundamental, namely reality in a fontanal sense. Jesus "seated at the right hand of the Power" captures the triple notions of transcendence, reality, and fontanality.

By implication there is an element of fear involved. But we do not merely *assent* to the existence of such a transcendent thing; we effectively *surrender* ourselves to it, at least in the Abrahamic religions: "Faith is not *assent to a judgment*,

but *surrender to a personal reality*."[26] Moreover, this faith involves a belief in truth; while it is possible to believe things (theories, assertions) that are not true, this is not considered desirable and no one would even want to have faith in what is untrue. But what is truth in this context? Not the truth of a judgement, or a testimony, or what a person says or does. Truth is what the "person himself [is] *qua* reality. Hence, faith is, intrinsically and at one and the same time, loving and believing…faith is the surrender to a personal reality *qua* true." [27]

Faith also involves *seeing*, as in the expression, "seeing with the eyes of faith". "Seeing" is a metaphor that recurs throughout the Old and New Testaments. *Seeing* means that we are able to understand at a deeper level, that we gain knowledge of matters that goes beyond immediate phenomenological experience. As Pope Benedict has written:

> When we put our confidence in what Jesus sees and believe in his word, we are not in fact moving around in total darkness. The good news of Jesus corresponds to an interior expectation in our heart; it corresponds to an internal light in our being that reaches out to the truth of God. Certainly, we are before all else believers "at second hand". But St. Thomas is right to describe faith as a process, as an interior path, when he writes: "The light of faith leads us to see".[28]

He refers to the episode of the Samaritan woman (John 4:4-42), in which the woman believes because of what Jesus tells her, and then goes to her village and spreads the news. The villagers welcome Jesus and after their experience with him, tell the woman that they believe not because of the woman's words, but because of their direct encounter with Jesus. In such a living encounter, "faith is transformed into 'knowledge'."[29] The parable of the man born blind (John 9:1-41) also deals with seeing and blindness on multiple levels—the Pharisees can see, in the phenomenological sense, but they are blind in the spiritual sense, in the sense of faith. The man born blind not only gains sight in the phenomenological sense, but also begins to see with the light of faith.

Seeing is also important in mystical experiences, and in apparitions of the Virgin. At Lourdes, Bernadette could see the Virgin, but the crowd around her could not. Similarly at Fatima, the children could see the Virgin but the crowd only saw unusual fluttering of leaves on the holm oak tree above which she appeared. As these examples indicate, human beings are capable of seeing in ways that go far beyond day-to-day experience, and that reality itself is not just a zone of things.

Therefore religious faith in the Abrahamic traditions involves the following elements:

1. Transcendence
2. Power
3. Respect
4. Fear
5. Obedience
6. Truth
7. Surrender
8. Love
9. Reality
10. Personal reality
11. Seeing beyond the ordinary

Note that in other religious traditions, such as Buddhism, several of these elements are absent or greatly attenuated. For Buddhism, they are: fear, surrender, love, and personal reality. For Deism, absent are respect, fear, obedience, surrender, love, and personal reality.

We can synthesize these various meanings of faith in the context of Christianity by first enumerating the salient points:

1. Belief in realities not yet seen or directly perceivable by the senses, which simultaneously are transcendent and impose obligations upon us.
2. Trust in and loyalty to God

3. Belief in God and God's ability and desire to use His power to help us
4. Surrender
5. Truth

We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the philosophical background needed for a grasp of theology.

V. Philosophical Background for Theology

Any discussion of theology, and any theology, must start from a framework of knowledge. This knowledge includes data about the world, truths known, and proper methods of reasoning, because theology is not a literary creation, but elaborated knowledge based on these sources. "Proper methods of reasoning" comprises logical arguments such as induction, deduction, and inference to the best explanation. It goes considerably beyond traditional syllogistic logic, which is unable to show the validity of even simple arguments such as "All horses are animals, therefore all heads of horses are heads of animals". "Truths known" refers to both revelation and truths that can be known through philosophy, and for this reason all theology ultimately involves a philosophical underpinning, which gives us knowledge about the world, about knowledge itself, and about transcendental matters, including God, insofar as these can be known without the aid of revelation. The solidity of the theology ultimately is a function of the solidity of the philosophical framework. St. Thomas built his theology on the philosophy of Aristotle, which, as we have seen, has a number of serious problems that have come to light as a result of the progress of knowledge in the last seven centuries.

Therefore we must start with a radically different philosophical framework, and thus our theology is radically different than what is commonly encountered. First it starts with two key aspects of human experience that are usually ignored or considered as secondary: (1) our direct experience of the power of the real, and (2) our direct contact with reality through our most basic way of knowing, what Zubiri calls *sentient intelligence*. From there a complete development of knowing at all levels can be inferred—and knowing at the level of *reason* is but one of three levels. A more complete understanding of critical concepts such as causality and essence follow, as does much clarified notions of reality and truth. In addition, it is possible to develop the notion of personhood and all of its attendant concepts from our direct experience of reality. Thus, Zubiri's philosophy, even at the outset, is linked intimately to experience, truth, and reality—three key aspects of Christianity. Let us explore Zubiri's philosophy in greater depth, and examine its connection to theology.

V.1 Poles of Zubiri's Thought

Roughly speaking, there are two poles of Zubiri's thought: (1) that which is most radical in Aristotle, his conception of essence as the tØ tˆ Çn einai, what makes a thing be what it is; and (2) the phenomenological concept of reality. His own radical innovation was to weave these two into a unified whole via the new concept of sentient intellection. But Zubiri radically rethinks both Aristotle's and the phenomenologists' legacies; so his concept of essence, his concept of reality, and his concept of intelligence differ in many respects from the originals.

(1) Zubiri points out that Aristotle begins by conceiving of essence as that which makes a thing what it is, in the most radical sense. Later, however, Aristotle links his metaphysics with his epistemology by claiming that essence is the physical correlate of the definition (of a thing). Knowledge is then of essences via definition in terms of genus and species; the most famous example is of course "man is a rational animal". Zubiri comments:

> When the essence is taken as the real correlate of the definition, the least

> that must be said is that it is a question of a very indirect way of arriving at things. For…instead of going directly to reality and asking what in it may be its essence, one takes the roundabout way of passing through the definition. [30]

For Zubiri, this is not merely a roundabout way, but something worse:

> …it is a roundabout way which rests on an enormously problematic presupposition, namely, that the essential element of every thing is necessarily definable; and this is more than problematical.[31]

In fact, Zubiri believes, the essence in general cannot be defined in genus-species form, and may not be expressible in ordinary language at all. He believes that essences—in the radical sense of determining what a thing is, and thus how it will behave, what its characteristics are, and so forth—can be determined only with great difficulty; and much of science is dedicated to this task. Specifically, Zubiri believes that it is necessary to go back to Aristotle's original idea of essence as the *fundamental determinant of a thing's nature*, what makes it to be what it is, and expand on this concept in the light of modern science.

But this critique indicates that there is a deep realist strain to Zubiri's thought, a belief that we can, in some ultimate sense, grasp reality. The problem arises in connection with our belief that what we perceive is also real—a belief upon which we act in living out our lives. This compels Zubiri to make an extremely important distinction with respect to reality: between reality in apprehension (which he terms 'reity'), and reality of what things are beyond sensing (true reality, *realidad verdadera*). Zubiri believes that the failure of past philosophers to distinguish these, and consequently, their failure to recognize that they refer to different stages of intellection, is at the root of many grave errors and paradoxes. This leads directly to the second pole of Zubiri's thought: Phenomenology.

(2) Zubiri takes three critical ideas from phenomenology (Husserl, Ortega y Gasset, and Heidegger). First is a certain way or "idea" of philosophy. In particular, he accepts that phenomenology has opened a new path and deepened our understanding of things by recognizing that it is necessary to position philosophy at a new and more radical level than that of classical realism or of modern idealism (primarily Hegel).[32] This also becomes the basis for Zubiri's understanding of the relationship of science and philosophy.

Secondly, he accepts that philosophy must start with its own territory, that of "mere immediate description of the act of thinking". But for him, the radical philosophical problem is not that proclaimed by the phenomenologists: not Husserl's "phenomenological consciousness", not Heidegger's "comprehension of being", not Ortega's "life", but rather the "apprehension of reality". He believes that philosophy must start from the fundamental fact of experience, that we are installed in reality, however modestly, and that our most basic experiences, what we perceive of the world (colors, sounds, people, etc.) are *real*. Without this basis—and despite the fact that knowledge built upon it can at times be in error—there would be no other knowledge either, including science. However, at the most fundamental level, that of direct apprehension of reality, there is no possibility of error; only knowledge built upon this foundation, involving as it does *logos* and reason, can be in error. Zubiri points out that it makes sense to speak of error only because we can—and do—achieve truth.[33]

But because the world discovered to us by science is quite different from our ordinary experience (electromagnetic waves and photons instead of colors, quarks and other strange particles instead of solid matter, and so forth), a critical problem arises which thrusts Zubiri towards a radical rethinking of the notion of

reality. This is one of the main themes of *Sentient Intelligence*.

The third idea—perhaps 'inspiration' is a better term—which Zubiri draws from phenomenology has to do with his radically changed concept of reality. For Zubiri, reality is a formality, not a zone of things as in classical philosophy:

> In the first place, the idea of reality does not formally designate a zone or class of things, but only a formality, reity or "thingness". It is that formality by which what is sentiently apprehended is presented to me not as the effect of something beyond what is apprehended, but as being in itself something "in its own right", something *de suyo*; for example, not only "warming" but "being" warm. This formality is the physical and real character of the otherness of what is sentiently apprehended in my sentient intellection.[34]

This conception of reality is, so to speak, a radical "paradigm shift", because it means that there are multiple types of reality and that many of the old problems associated with reality are in fact pseudo-problems. Zubiri notes that

> The reality of a material thing is not identical with the reality of a person, the reality of society, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the reality of my own inner life identical to that of other realities. But on the other hand, however different these modes of reality may be, they are always reity, i.e., formality *de suyo*.

Much of Zubiri's great work *Sentient Intelligence* is devoted to analyzing the process of intelligence, and explaining how its three stages (primordial apprehension, *logos*, and reason) unfold and yield knowledge, including scientific knowledge.

V.2 Sentient Intellection: Direct Contact with Reality

Zubiri seeks to reestablish in a radical fashion the basis for human knowledge, as the principal step in his restructuring of philosophy. This task goes far beyond any type of Kantian critique—something that Zubiri believes can only come after we have analyzed what human knowledge is, and how we apprehend. For Zubiri, perception of reality begins with the sensing process, but he rejects the paradigm of classical philosophy, which starts from opposition between sensing and intelligence. According to this paradigm, the senses deliver confused content to the intelligence, which then figures out or reconstructs reality. As we discussed earlier, the Scholastics' motto was *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus*. This is *sensible intelligence,* and according to Zubiri, the entire paradigm is radically false.

Zubiri's point of departure for his rethinking of this problem is his observation that in our experience of the world we have *direct contact* with reality—we do not have to "get to" reality through some complicated chain of reasoning based on sense data—the epistemological problem that Western philosophy never solved. The things we perceive: colors, sounds, sights, are *real* in some extremely fundamental sense that cannot be overridden by subsequent reasoning or analysis. That is, there is associated with perception an overwhelming impression of its veracity, a type of "guarantee" which accompanies it, that says to us, "What you apprehend is reality, not a cinema, not a dream." This of course is exactly what Kant thought impossible, but which has always been the experience of mystics such as St. Teresa of Ávila—Zubiri's "great friend", according to his wife.

Implied here are two separate aspects of perception: first, what the apprehension is of, e.g. a tree or a piece of green paper, and second, its self-guaranteeing characteristic of reality. This link to reality must be the cornerstone of any theory of the intelligence:

> By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is apprehension of reality in and

> by itself. This intellection…is in a radical sense an apprehension of the real which has its own characteristics….Intellection is formally *direct* apprehension of the real—not via representations nor images. It is an *immediate* apprehension of the real, not founded in inferences, reasoning processes, or anything of that nature. It is a *unitary* apprehension. The unity of these three moments is what makes what is apprehended to be apprehended in and by itself.[35]

Thus what we have is a fully integrated process with no distinction between sensing and apprehension. Zubiri terms this *sensible apprehension of reality*. The fundamental nature of human intellection can be stated quite simply: "actualization of the real in sentient intellection".[36] This actualization of the real Zubiri calls "primordial apprehension"; it is the basis for all other knowledge, including science, theology, and other higher forms. Primordial apprehension is not these types of knowledge, but is essential to them because otherwise they would not be reality-based. The fact that we have direct contact with reality will be important for certain theological questions.

There are three moments of the actualization of the real:

- *affection* of the sentient being by what is sensed (the *noetic*).
- *otherness* which is presentation of something *other*, a "note", *nota* (from Latin *nosco*, related to Greek *gignosco*, "to know", and *noein*, "to think"; hence the *noematic*)
- *force of imposition* of the note upon the sentient being (the *noergic*).

Otherness consists of two moments, only the first of which has received any attention heretofore: *content* (what the apprehension is of) and *formality* (how it is delivered to us). Formality may be either formality of stimulation, in the case of animals, or formality of reality, in the case of man.

The union of content and formality of reality gives rise to the process of knowing which unfolds logically if not chronologically in three modes or phases:

- Primordial apprehension of reality (or basic, direct installation in reality, giving us pure and simple reality)
- Logos (explanation of what something is *vis à vis* other things, or what the real of primordial apprehension is in reality)
- Reason (or *ratio*, methodological explanation of what things are and why they are, as in done in science, for example)

This process, shown schematically in Figure 1, is mediated by what Zubiri calls the 'field' of reality. The reality field concept is loosely based on the field concept from physics, such as the gravitational field, where a body exists "by itself", so to speak; but also by virtue of its existence, creates a field around itself through which it interacts with other bodies. The two are inseparable and should be considered as different aspects of the same reality. So in the case of the field of reality, a thing has an *individual* moment and a *field* moment. The individual moment Zubiri refers to as the thing existing "by itself" or "of itself"; *de suyo* is the technical term he employs. The "field moment" implies that things cannot be fully understood in isolation. This is in stark contrast to the notion of essence in classical philosophy.

Roughly speaking, primordial apprehension installs us in reality and delivers things to us in their individual and field moments; logos deals with things in the field, how they relate to each other; and reason tells us what they are in the sense of methodological explanation. A simple example may serve to illustrate the basic ideas. A piece of green paper is perceived. It is apprehended as something real in primordial apprehension; both the paper *and* the greenness are apprehended as real, in accordance with our normal beliefs about what we apprehend. (This point about the reality of the color green is extremely important, because Zubiri believes

that the implicit denial of the reality of, say, colors, and the systematic ignoring of them by modern science is a great scandal.)



Figure 1
Sentient Intelligence in Zubiri's Philosophy

As yet, however, we may not know how to name the color, for example, or what the material is, or what to call its shape. That task is the function of the logos, which relates what has been apprehended to other things known and named from previous experience; for example, other colors or shades of colors associated with greenness. Likewise, with respect to the material in which the green inheres, we would associate it with paper, wood, or other things known from previous experience. In turn, reason via science explains the green as electromagnetic energy of a certain wavelength, or photons of a certain energy in accordance with Einstein's relation $E=h\nu$. That is, the color green *is the photons as sensed*; there are not two realities. The characteristics of the three phases may be explained in more detail as follows:

- *Primordial apprehension* of reality is the basic, direct installation in reality, giving

us pure and simple reality. This is what one gets first, and is the basis on which all subsequent understanding is based. Perhaps it can most be easily understood if one thinks of a baby, which has *only* this apprehension: the baby perceives the real world around it, but as a congeries of sounds, colors, etc., which are *real*, but as yet undifferentiated into chairs, walls, spoken words, etc. It is richest with respect to the real, poorest with respect to specific determination (ulterior modes augment determination, but diminish richness). In it, reality is not exhausted with respect to its content, but given in an unspecific ambient transcending the content. This transcendence is strictly sensed, not inferred, even for the baby. Primordial apprehension is the basis for the ulterior or logically subsequent modes.

- *Logos* (explanation of what something is *vis à vis* other things, or as Zubiri expresses it, what the real of primordial apprehension is *in reality*). This is the second step: differentiate things, give them names, and understand them in relation to each other. As a baby gets older, this is what he does: he learns to make out things in his environment, and he learns what their names are, eventually learning to speak and communicate with others verbally. This stage involves a "stepping back" from direct contact with reality in primordial apprehension in order to organize it. The logos is what enables us to know what a thing, apprehended as real in sentient intellection, is *in reality* (a technical term, meaning what something is in relation to one's other knowledge). It utilizes the notion of the "field of reality". The reality field is a concept loosely based on field concept of physics: a body exists "by itself" but by virtue of its existence, creates field around itself through which it interacts with other bodies.

- *Reason* (or *ratio*, methodological explanation of what things are and why they are, as is done in science, for example). This is the highest level of understanding; it encompasses *all* of our ways of understanding our environment. One naturally thinks of science, of course; but long before science as we know it existed, people sought explanations of things. And they found them in myths, legends, plays, poetry, art, and music—which are indeed examples of reason in the most general sense: they all seek to tell us something about reality. Later, of course, came philosophy and science; but no single way of access to reality, in this sense, is exhaustive: all have a role. Reason, for Zubiri, does not consist in going to reality, but in going from field reality toward worldly reality, toward field reality in depth. If one likes, the field is the system of the sensed real, and the world, the object of reason, is the system of the real as a form of reality. That is, the whole world of the rationally intellectively known is the unique and true explanation of field reality.

In Zubiri's word's, reason is "measuring intellection of the real in depth".[37] There are two moments of reason to be distinguished (1) intellection in depth, e.g., electromagnetic theory is intellection in depth of color;[38] (2) its character as *measuring,* in the most general sense, akin to the notion of measure in advanced mathematics (functional analysis). For example, prior to the twentieth century, material things were assimilated to the notion of "body"; that was the *measure* of all material things. But with the development of quantum mechanics, a new conception of material things was forced upon science, one which is different from the traditional notion of "body". The canon of real things was thus enlarged, so that the measure of something is no longer necessarily that of "body". (Zubiri himself will go on to enlarge it further, pointing out that personhood is another type of reality distinct from "body" or other material things). Measuring, in this sense, and the corresponding canon of reality, are both dynamic and are a key element in Zubiri's quest to avoid the problems and failures of

past philosophies based on static and unchanging conceptions of reality.

It is important to understand that for Zubiri, our primary contact with reality is at the level of primordial apprehension. Though poorest in specific detail, it is richest in raw content, as illustrated in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Three levels of sentient intelligence

This means that Zubiri has, in an even more radical way than Kant, made his own "Copernican Revolution", because in Zubiri's thought, the traditional grounding of knowing has been turned upside down. Our fundamental source of knowledge about the world is our direct contact with it, not the highest level of our intelligence. This is illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Zubiri's "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy

V.3 Reality

Given Zubiri's radically new approach to philosophy, and his analysis of intelligence as sentient, it is not surprising that his concept of reality is quite different from that of previous philosophy as well. As mentioned above, he rejects the idea of reality as a "zone of things", usually conceived as "out there" beyond the mind, and replaces it with a more general notion, that of formality. "Reality is formality", he says over and over, and by this he means that reality is the *de suyo*, the "in its own right"; it is not the content of some impression. Anything which is "in its own right" is real. This *de suyo*, the formality of reality, is how the content is delivered to us. Our brains—Zubiri refers to them as organs of formalization—are wired to perceive reality, to perceive directly the "in its own right" character. It does *not* emerge as the result of some reasoning process working on the *content*; it is delivered *together with the content* in primordial apprehension.

This includes reality in apprehension, as well as reality beyond apprehension. But always, the character of reality is the same: *de suyo*. It is therefore something *physical* as opposed to something conceptual. And this is true whether one is speaking of things perceived at the level of primordial apprehension, such as colors, or things perceived in ulterior modes of apprehension such as reason, where examples might be historical realities such as the Ottoman Empire, or mathematical objects such as circles and lines: both are *real* in the same sense, though they differ in other respects (mathematical objects are real by postulation, whereas historical entities are not). Moreover, reality is independent of the subject, not a subjective projection, but something *imposed* upon the subject, something which is *here-and-now* before the subject. Logos and reason do not have to go to reality or create it; they are born in it and remain in it.

When a thing is known sentiently, at the same time it is known to be a reality. The impression of reality puts us in contact with reality, but not with *all* reality. Rather, it leaves us open to all reality. This is *openness* to the world. All things have a unity with respect to each other which is what constitutes the *world.* Zubiri believes that reality is fundamentally open, and therefore not capturable in any human formula. This openness is intimately related to transcendentality:

> …reality as reality is constitutively open, is transcendentally open. By virtue of this openness, reality is a formality in accordance with which nothing is real except as open to other realities and even to the reality of itself. That is, every reality is constitutively respective *qua* reality. [39]

Reality must not be considered as some transcendental *concept*, or even as a concept which is somehow realized in all real things:

> …rather, it is a *real and physical moment*, i.e., transcendentality is just the openness of the real *qua* real.…The world is open not only because we do not know what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all because no thing, however precise and detailed its constitution, is reality itself as such.[40]

Sentient intellection is transcendental impression, in which the *trans* does not draw us out of what is apprehended, toward some other reality (as Plato thought), but submerges us in reality itself. The impression of reality transcends all its content. This impression of reality is the object of philosophy, whereas the world as such-and-such is the object of science.

For Zubiri, the fundamental or constitutive openness of reality means that the search for it is a never-ending quest; he believes that the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century has been an example of how our concept of reality has broadened. In particular, it has been broadened to include the concept of person as a fundamentally *different* kind of reality:

> That was the measure of reality: progress beyond the field was brought about by thinking that reality as measuring is "thing". An intellection much more difficult than that of quantum physics was needed in order to understand that the real can be real and still not be a thing. Such, for example, is the case of person. Then not only was the field of real things broadened, but that which we might term 'the modes of reality' were also broadened. Being a thing is only one of those modes; being a person is another.[41]

Not everything that we perceive in impression has reality beyond impression; but the fact that something is real only in impression does not mean that it isn't real. It is, because it is *de suyo*. And what is real in impression forms the basis for all subsequent knowing, including science. Still, we are quite interested in what is real beyond impression, which may be something else, or the same thing understood in a deeper manner. For example, electromagnetic theory tells us that colors are the result of photons of a particular energy affecting us. But, according to Zubiri—and this is extremely important—there are not two realities (the photons and the colors), but *the colors are the photons as perceived*. Reason is the effort to know what things are "in reality" that are known in primordial apprehension. This is illustrated in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Reality in impression and reality beyond impression

V.4 Truth

Truth, like reality, is much different in Zubiri's approach. The traditional view has always been that truth is some sort of agreement of thought and things. Zubiri believes that this view is incomplete and not sufficiently radical for two reasons: (a) "things" as understood in this definition are the product of ulterior modes of intellection, and (b) "thought" is not univocal, being different in the three modes. The notion of truth as agreement of two things, *dual truth*, is a derivative notion, which must be grounded upon something more fundamental. For Zubiri, the priority of reality is always paramount, and hence the primary meaning of truth, *real truth*, is impressive actuality of the real in sentient intellection. It is a quality of actualization, not agreement of two disparate things, which as the ground of truth has always posed insuperable verification problems. All other truth is ultimately based on this real truth, this actualization. As such,

real truth is imposed on us, not conquered; dual truth, a derivative form of truth, we conquer through our own efforts. Real truth must be sought in primordial apprehension:

> …the real is "in" the intellection, and this "in" is ratification. In sentient intellection truth is found in that primary form which is the impression of reality. The truth of this impressive actuality of the real in and by itself is precisely real truth.…Classical philosophy has gone astray on this matter and always thought that truth is constituted in the reference to a real thing with respect to what is conceived or asserted about that thing.[42]

The two aspects of truth for Zubiri are shown in Figure 5.

Truth and reality are not identical in Zubiri's philosophy, because there are many realities that are not actualized in sentient intellection, nor do they have any reason to be so. Thus, not every reality is true in this sense. Though it does not add any notes, actualization does add truth to the real. Hence truth and reality are different and not mere correlates, because reality is not simply the correlate of truth but its *foundation* on account of the fact that "all actualization is actualization of reality." [43]



Figure 5. Real truth and dual truth in Zubiri's philosophy

V.5 Knowledge and Understanding

Zubiri believes that one of the principal errors of past philosophers was their excessively static view of knowledge—a conquer it "once and for all" approach. Typical of this mentality are the repeated attempts to devise a definitive list of "categories", such as those of Aristotle and Kant, and Kant's integration of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry into the fabric of his philosophy. Rather, knowledge as a human enterprise is both dynamic and limited. It is dynamic because the canon of reality, like reality itself, can never be completely fathomed and is always subject to change and enlargement. It is limited because as human beings we are limited and must constantly search for knowledge. The phrase "exhaustive knowledge" is an oxymoron:

> The limitation of knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is something derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of rational intellection,

> from knowing as such, since it is inquiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is formally inquiring, only because of this must one always seek more and, finding what was sought, have it become the principle of the next search. Knowledge is limited by being knowledge. *An exhaustive knowledge of the real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of the real without necessity of knowledge.* Knowledge is only intellection in search. Not having recognized the intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as inquiry is what led to…subsuming all truth under the truth of affirmation.[44] [Italics added]

Understanding is also a richer and more complex process than heretofore assumed. Indeed, oversimplification of the process of understanding has led to major philosophical errors in the past. Understanding requires (1) apprehension of something as real (primordial apprehension stage), (2) knowing what that thing is with respect to other things (logos stage), and (3) what it is in reality itself (reason stage). Traditionally only the latter is considered. Zubiri comments:

> Understanding is, then, the intellective knowing which understands what something, already apprehended as real, really is; i.e., what a thing is in reality (logos) and in reality itself (reason), the real thing understood in both the field manner and considered in the worldly sense.[45]

Understanding, then, requires sentient intellection and cannot exist, even for subjects such as mathematics, without it. This insight reveals clearly Zubiri's radical departure from all previous thought.

V.6 Zubiri and Science

The scientific and the metaphysical are closely connected, because both are forms of knowledge emerging from the reason or third mode of human intellection. Articulating the relationship between them has been a difficult problem for at least three centuries of Western philosophy. For Zubiri, the relationship is as follows: reality unfolds in events observed by the sciences, which indeed allow us to observe aspects of it which would otherwise remain hidden. But this unfolding of reality is no different from its unfolding through personal experience, poetry, music, or religious experience. All human knowing is of the real, because reality is the formality under which man apprehends anything. In man's quest for understanding, the utilization of scientific concepts, amplified and interpreted, only supposes that the sciences are an appropriate way of access to reality. Philosophy, in turn, reflects on the data offered by the sciences as "data of reality". But philosophy is not looking to duplicate the efforts of science. Both philosophy and science examine the "world", that to which the field of reality directs us. But science is concerned with what Zubiri terms the "talitative" order, the "such-and-suchness" of the world, how such-and-such thing behaves; whereas philosophy is concerned with the respective unity of the real *qua* real, with its transcendental character, what makes it real.[46] Philosophy (and theology) thus ask questions that cannot be meaningfully be expressed in scientific language. But both philosophy and theology rely to some extent on science to tell us about the world. What science tells us, for example about causality, needs to be incorporated into the vision of reality that philosophy seeks.

To a great extent, the belief that reality is closed supports two long-standing philosophical doctrines, which Zubiri terms *entification of reality* and *logification of the intelligence*. Entification of reality is the belief that reality is ultimately composed of stand-alone entities, such as the billiard-ball particles of Laplace's Demon, or Aristotle's substances. Logification of the intelligence is the belief that knowledge in the proper and primary sense is only at the rational level; any oth-

er "knowledge" would be inferior and of relatively minor importance.

Typically, those who reject other forms of knowledge in favor of science exclusively have have a straightforward view of science: *science is objective knowledge about the world*. Advocates of this view also claim that truth is an agreement of thought with things. Now, Zubiri would agree that science is objective knowledge about the world; where he disagrees concerns the level of the knowledge delivered by science. For those who accept (implicitly or otherwise) the logification of the intelligence, there is only the one level, that of rational knowledge. In Zubiri's philosophy, this is not so; science is *not* the primary source of knowledge. There are three levels of knowledge: primordial apprehension of reality (direct contact with reality), logos (defining what things are with respect to other things), and reason (methodological explanation of what things are and why they are, as in done in science, literature, and theology, for example). So science, a form of reason, must build on what *is* the primary source, primordial apprehension. Moreover, since the truth attained by reason is not what he terms "real truth", i.e., absolute truth, it is not infallible—further developments can force revisions. This allows Zubiri to overcome one of the major objections to realism as a theory of science: the history of science is replete with examples of new theories replacing old ones because of new discoveries and new evidence. Under any realist philosophy in which rational knowledge is the "gold standard" of knowledge, this is inexplicable. But for Zubiri, scientific theories are not our primary source of knowledge of the world; so their replacement as science progresses does not pose an epistemological problem, as it does for the advocates of any philosophy of science making it (science) the primary access to reality.

In some cases, advocates of science as the source of all knowledge assume a more positivistic attitude: the meaning of a statement is intimately related to its operational method of verification, so scientific knowledge is the only knowledge available, since non-scientific statements cannot be so verified. This leads to a leveling of knowledge:

> …science begins by breaking down [the] world so as to reduce it to its just cognitive proportions. These just proportions are expressed in the term "the facts:" what is before me, only in virtue of being there and insofar as it is there, without the least intervention on my part. Now, the facts thus understood tend to be reduced to empirical data. Scientific truth will consist in nothing but agreement with these data, and science will be simply a knowledge about their ordered concatenation. The reduction of things to facts, and of facts to sensible data, leads inexorably to the idea of an intellectual life in which all branches of knowledge are equivalent and whose overall unity is given only in the encyclopedia of complete knowledge.[47]

For Zubiri, there are three serious problems with any positivistic approach such as this: (1) The meaning of statements cannot be identified with their method of verification, because this represents a hopeless confusion of the three levels of human intelligence. Verification methods involve concepts of reason, whereas the meaning of statements arises at the level of logos, coupled of course with primordial apprehension of reality.[48] (2) We are not dispossessed of knowledge of things, but have it through primordial apprehension (though not in the scientific sense, of course). (3) There is no one-to-one mapping of facts to sense data, because this again represents a confusion of levels of human intelligence. The senses do not deliver "data" to us because they do not "deliver" anything at all: that is the paradigm of *sensible intelligence*, based on a presumed separation of sensing and knowing. We do not have to infer reality based on data delivered to us, on the model of an information technology system

with remote sensors, because we are immersed in it; the sensing and knowing are part of a single, integral process: *sentient intelligence*.

Moreover, reality, in Zubiri's philosophy, cannot be entified, and thus broken down into logical atoms, be they sense data or billiard-ball particles. Reality is, rather, something open. Reality cannot be considered as some transcendental *concept*, or even as a concept which is somehow realized in all real things:

> …rather, it is a *real and physical moment*, i.e., transcendentality is just the openness of the real *qua* real….The world is open not only because we do not know what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all because no thing, however precise and detailed its constitution, is reality itself as such.[49]

So the idea of being able to capture it in a complete way, or to say all that can be said about it utilizing rational knowledge such as science, is doomed from the start. There will always be knowledge about the world which cannot be subsumed under science (or any other form of rational knowledge), or captured in any human formula. Zubiri notes that art, literature, and music are other examples of rational knowledge that tell us about the world—tell us different things about it than science does. Hence, the fundamental or constitutive openness of reality means that the search for it is a never-ending quest; he believes that the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century has been an example of how our concept of reality has broadened.

V.7 God and Theology

Theology in the Western tradition is generally regarded as a rational enterprise, much like science, and as such often starts with demonstrations of the existence of God, such as the so-called "cosmological proof." For Zubiri, this approach is wrong for reasons that are analogous to those he adduces with respect to knowledge in general. Zubiri believes that any attempt to base theology on complex rational arguments, such as the proofs of the existence of God by Aquinas or Scotus, fails because it makes too many controversial philosophical assumptions at the outset, as do attempts to ground human knowledge in general on theories at the level of reason. Rather, one must start from something much more modest, namely something in our personal experience. For Zubiri, this is our experience of the power of the real. Reality imposes itself on us in an especially forceful tripartite way, as ultimate, possibility-making, and impelling. Our experience of this imposition, our experience of the power of the real, is our experience of the ground of reality.[50] This experience of the power of the real leads us immediately not to "God", but to what Zubiri terms "Deity". Knowing what this "Deity" is necessarily comes later, and may require additional sources of knowledge. In this more modest approach, one does not seek lofty goals, but simply to analyze basic human experience, given our experience of the power of the real. The relationship between knowledge acquisition in normal situations, and of God is illustrated in Figure 6.

Eschewing philosophical frameworks, Zubiri bases his theology on an analysis of human reality, which lead us to its grounding reality just discussed: something ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling. Because reality is grounding, it serves as the *real ultimate support* of my life. It will also serve to *make my self-realization possible*, and to *impel me towards my realization*. These three characteristics have an intrinsic unity; they form the ground of reality. On our human side this consists in being "religated" (fr. Latin *re-ligare*, re-tied) to my ground in order to be. From the side of reality to be a ground means that it has power over me. The power and strength of the real as a dominance moves me to realize myself as a person.[51]



Figure 6. Knowledge acquisition stages in ordinary knowledge and theology

For Zubiri this first step, somewhat analogous to primordial apprehension, is thus the recognition that each person is, in his very constitution, turned toward a reality that is more than he is, and on which he is based. This reality is that from which emerge the resources he needs to make his personality, and which supplies him with the force necessary to carry out this process of realizing himself. Such turning of a person to reality is religation. It is a turning toward some ground not found among things immediately given, something which must be sought beyond what is given. This gives rise in the first place to the notion of "Deity". Later, the theist will call this ground 'God'. With respect to religions, nearly all offer a vision or explanation of this ground, and therefore there is some truth in all.

It is only when this fundamental ground of religious faith and knowledge has been recognized that construction of any sort of "rational" theology makes sense. While scientific and theological knowledge are both knowledge at the level of reason, for Zubiri, they are different in their object, structure, and method of verification. Both seek to tell us about reality, though not necessarily the *same* reality. By analyzing these difference, we can gain some insight into the reasons for potential conflicts, and how to resolve them.

Scientific knowledge is based on postulation, and is subject to verification using methods appropriate to postulation.[52] In the case of science, those methods revolve around experimentation. But we do not postulate anything when dealing with theological knowledge. For example, we do not say, "Let's assume there is a God" or "Let's assume there are many gods" and then look for consequences. Rather, as Zubiri emphasizes, the ultimate source of theological knowledge is direct human experience. This is not direct human experience of God, as in a mystical vision (though that is not excluded), but rather

our direct experience of a power outside of us:

> Natural Theology has generally approached God in a conceptual way, making of Him what Zubiri calls a "reality-object" and concentrating all its efforts in establishing ways of "demonstrating" His existence.…[O]n the contrary, God, if He is something, is not a "reality-object", but what he called "reality-ground", a ground to which, if it exists, we will be "religated" (religados), that is, reconnected. In contrast to the demonstrative ways, purely idealistic, Zubiri proposes the way of religation, for him the only one truly real.[53]

In Zubiri's view, we are religated to reality, because reality imposes itself on us in an especially forceful tripartite way, as ultimate, possibility-making, and impelling:

> The experience of this imposition, of this power of the real which is a fact, is…the experience of the ground of reality, the fundamental experience which each man possesses as a theist, an agnostic or an atheist. The divergences begin at the time of intellectual discernment and volition when confronting this fundament. For the theist, the experience of the fundament is an experience of God, a God which is not transcendent "to" things, but transcendent "in" things. To reach God it is not necessary to leave the world, but to enter more into it, reaching its foundation or ground. God is at the bottom of things as their ground; and in his experience of things man has the fundamental experience of God. The life of man is woven into his experience with and of things; and as this experience is in itself an experience of God, it turns out that the life of each man is in some way a continuous experience of God. This means that the real God of each person is not a concept or the result of reasoning, but the very life of man.[54]

In theology, we utilize this direct experience, and also reported direct experience, as in sacred texts such as the Bible. So for example, key theological information comes from reports of experiences such as those of Moses on Mt. Sinai. On the basis of direct and reported experiences, inferences are drawn, and large-scale theological structures erected. Such inferences often—indeed usually—go beyond direct experience, and refer to things in the world, what Zubiri terms "reality beyond apprehension". These inferences will inevitably be influenced by the general state of knowledge at the time, and by the world in which the theologian lives and with which he is familiar. Often the inferences are directed at explanation of "origins"—how the world came to be, how man came to be, and why he is as he is. Thus the geocentric theory of the universe, based on a set of observations, was used in conjunction with certain Biblical verses to construct a vision of the heavens. Conflict can therefore arise when new knowledge of the world is inconsistent with earlier knowledge, rendering the inferences and vision untenable. The problem, therefore, is to keep the core beliefs and exercise great care with inferences. Inferences easily turn into extrapolations, and extrapolations lead to problems because they are often unverifiable and far removed from the original source of the knowledge. As mentioned previously, science and theology both seek knowledge of reality beyond apprehension, but not necessarily the *same* reality. For example, science does not look for God to appear in some experiment; by the same token, theology does not seek to discover new subatomic particles. But extrapolation can lead to much blurring and overlap.

This focuses attention directly on a key difference between theological and scientific knowledge, their respective methods of *verification*. Verification is "clearly encountering or finding something which one is already seeking."[55] For science, verification takes the form of the experimental method. For theology, verifi-

cation is usually by means of authority, either individual, local leader (e.g., Pastor), church council, or church leader (e.g., Pope). While this may suggest that theology will always be on the losing side in any confrontation, as it was with the geocentric theory, that is not necessarily the case. Because all postulations ultimately break down, theology has the potential for greater certainty than forms of rational knowledge such as science. This comes about in the area of moral experience and human causality.[56]

The originality and vigor of Zubiri's approach can be gauged by comparing it to "classical" theology, as shown in Table 1.

V.8 Human Reality

For centuries it was believed that what is real "beyond" impression comprises "material bodies", envisaged as made up of some sort of billiard-ball type particles. The development of quantum mechanics forced a change in this picture, though not without considerable controversy. A much more difficult effort was required to recognize that something can be real and yet not be a thing, viz. the human person. The human person is a fundamentally different *kind* of reality, one whose essence is *open*, as opposed to the closed essences of animals and other living things. An open essence is defined not by the notes that it naturally has, but by its system of possibilities; and hence it makes itself, so to speak, with the possibilities. "Its-own-ness" is what makes an essence to be open. This open essence of man is the ground of his freedom, in turn the ground of his moral nature. Zubiri terms the set of notes defining the essence of what it means to be a person *personeity*, and *personality* the realization of these notes by means of actions. A person, for Zubiri, is a *relative absolute*: "relative" because his actions are not entirely unconstrained, but are what make him the kind of person that he is; "absolute" because he enjoys the ability to make himself, i.e., he has freedom and is not an automaton, fully deterministic.

As a consequence, man's role in the universe is different; and between persons (and only between them) there is a strict causality, which in turn implies a moral obligation. This causality is not a simple application of classical notions of causality to persons, but something irreducible to the causality of classical metaphysics, and still less reducible to the concept of a scientific law. This is what Zubiri refers to as *personal causality*: "And however repugnant it may be to natural science, there is...a causality between persons which is not given in the realm of nature." The key characteristic of this type of causality is that we can know it in ways that we cannot know about other aspects of reality. Indeed, personal causality—and our knowledge of it—is the ultimate basis for morality.

VI. Conclusion and Next Steps

With this as a basis, it is possible to begin construction of a systematic theology based on Zubiri's philosophical foundation. This theology will differ in many ways from that of St. Thomas because it starts from a different philosophical outlook, namely *sentient intelligence* rather than *sensible intelligence*, and is able to utilize knowledge about the world gained since the 13th century. The first step, an analysis of proofs of the existence of God, has already been written.[57] Other topics include

- Basis and Sources for Theology
- Relation of Man and God
- Moral Theology
- Sacramental Theology
- Dogmatic Theology
- Mystical Theology
- Human Life and Destiny
- Law, Legal/Political Systems and Social Justice
- Theology and Science
- Theology and Humanistic Disciplines

- Other Theological Traditions
- Contemporary Issues

We hope to publish essays on these topics in future volumes of *The Xavier Zubiri Review*, and invite readers who wish to contribute to contact the editor. Meanwhile readers may wish to consult the following sources:

- *Theoforum*, Volume 40 No. 1 (2009). Special issue devoted to Zubiri and his theology.
- Guillerma Díaz Muñoz, *Teología del misterio en Zubiri*, Herder, Barcelona, 2008.
- Francisco Ortega, *La teología de Xavier Zubiri*, 2ª edicíon, Edicíon Hergué/Editorial Andaluza, 2005.

Notes

[1] The text of this article will appear in a revised from in a forthcoming book on Zubiri's theology, co-written by several Zubiri scholars.

[2] Pope Francis, *Lumen Fidei*, Section 36.

[3] Edith Hamilton, *The Greek Way to Western Civilization*, New York: Mentor Books, 1948, ch. 15.

[4] Address of Pope Benedict upon conferral of Ratzinger prize, 30 June 2011, as reported by Vatican Information Service, "Faith Conducts Reason to Open Itself to the Divine", http://visnews-en.blogspot.com/2011/06/faith-conducts-reason-to-open-itself-to.html.

[5] Address of Pope Benedict upon conferral of Ratzinger prize, 30 June 2011, as reported by Vatican Information Service, "Faith Conducts Reason to Open Itself to the Divine", http://visnews-en.blogspot.com/2011/06/faith-conducts-reason-to-open-itself-to.html.

[6] See the article on this subject in this issue.

[7] Pope Benedict XVI, *Benedictus*, Ignatius Press, 2006, p.78.

[8] *Ibid*.

[9] John 3:16, NIV.

[10] Pope Benedict XVI, *The Fathers*, vol. II, Huntington: OSV, p. 31. Article on the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.

[11] *Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles, and Criteria*, Chapter 1, §5, available at http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=9879#INTRODUCTION.

[12] Confessions, book 7, Ch. 10, tr. by J. G. Pilkington, quoted in *An Augustine Reader*, ed. by John J. O'Meara, Garden City: Doubleday Image Books, 1973, p. 144-145.

[13] Pope Benedict XVI, *The Fathers*, Our Sunday Visitor, 2008, p. 26.

[14] *Ibid*.

[15] St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, Book 3, Ch. 24, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103324.htm.

[16] *Summa Theologica*, Q2, A3.

[17] Francis Meehan, *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1940, p. 187.

[18] *Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 1985, p. 446.

[19] Nehemiah 9:7-8, NIV, 2010.

[20] Mathew 9:22, NIV, 2010.

[21] Mathew 17:20, NIV, 2010.

[22] I Cor 15:17, NIV, 2010.

[23] I Timothy 3:9, NIV, 2010.

[24] Hebrews 11:1, New English Bible

[25] James 2:20, NIV, 2010.

[26] Xavier Zubiri, *Man and God*, tr. Joaquin Redondo, Thomas Fowler, Nelson Orringer, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009, p. 159; Spanish original *El hombre y Dios*, p. 212. (hereafter, MG).

[27] MG, p. 161; Sp. p. 214.

[28] Joseph Ratzinger, *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures*, tr. by Brian McNeil, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006, p. 110.

[29] *Ibid*, p. 111.

[30] *Sobre la esencia*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1985, p. 89-90 [English translation by A. R. Caponigri, *On Essence*, Washington, DC:

Catholic University of America, 1980, p. 113.]

[31] *Ibid*.

[32] Diego Gracia, *Voluntad de Verdad*, Barcelona: Labor Universitaria, 1986, p. 89.

[33] Xavier Zubiri, *Sentient Intelligence*, tr. by Thomas Fowler, Washington, DC: Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1999, p. 83ff (hereafter, SI).

[34] SI, p. 63.

[35] SI, p. 94.

[36] SI, p. 4, 84, 100, 243.

[37] SI, p. 257.

[38] SI, p. 256-257.

[39] SI, p. 248.

[40] SI, p. 248.

[41] SI, p. 261.

[42] SI, p. 84.

[43] SI, p. 193.

[44] SI, pp. 261-262.

[45] SI, p. 363.

[46] SI, pp. 48-49, 197, 219.

47 Xavier Zubiri, *Nature, History, God*, tr. Thomas Fowler, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980, p. 17; original *Naturaleza, Historia, Dios*, Ninth ed., Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987, p. 41 (original edition, p. 16).

[48] Of course, the meaning of some statements may involve reason, but ultimately meaning has its roots at the level of logos.

[49] Xavier Zubiri, *Inteligencia y razón*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1980, p. 20; English translation, *Sentient Intelligence*, tr. by Thomas B. Fowler, Washington: Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1999, p. 248. (hereafter, SI).

[50] Xavier Zubiri, *Man and God*, *op. cit.*, back cover summary.

[51] From the Translator's Introduction to *Man and God*, *op. cit*.

[52] Thomas Fowler, "Reality in Science and Reality in Philosophy: Importance of the Concept of Reality by Postulation", *The Xavier Zubiri Review*, Vol. 7 (2005), pp. 41-56.

[53] Xavier Zubiri, *Man and God*, *op. cit.*, back cover summary

[54] *Ibid*.

[55] SI, p. 336.

[56] Thomas Fowler, "Causality, Personal Causality, and the Science/Religion Dialogue", Metanexus Conference, Madrid, 2008.

[57] Thomas Fowler, "The Existence of God in Zubirian Theology", *The Xavier Zubiri Review*, vol. 12, p. 47-83 (2010-2012).